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ABSTRACT 
Our target is to objectively quantify important aspects of emerging 
economies’ financial markets and deliver value adding actionable 
recommendations that can be used by a wide spectrum of end-users like 
academics, policy makers and real life investors. We create two quantitative 
models that capture the dynamics of global Emerging Market currencies and 
sovereign debt ratings. We build on the extensive literature on Emerging 
Market crises and introduce a number of methodological and conceptual 
innovations. A wide range of market stylized facts and practical and intuitive 
limitations dictate the way we progress with our research, from considering 
and selecting dependent and explanatory variables to the way we apply and 
interpret the model results. We first estimate a parsimonious panel 
specification that models and forecasts Emerging Market currency dynamics 
and produces trade signals for investing in one-month forward exchange 
rates. The second instrument models and forecasts credit ratings assigned by 
two of the leading rating agencies to Emerging Market sovereigns. The 
specifications we select are tested on the basis of their statistical and 
forecasting performance which is found to be solid and unbiased. The 
currency model is further tested based on its ability to generate profit making 
trading portfolios. The ratings model is also assessed based on its forecasts 
for forthcoming sovereign rating actions. We proceed to apply both models on 
real time data and compare the results from blindly following the model 
recommendations to a situation where an investor filters these results by 
superimposing his market awareness and subjective judgement. Our findings 
suggest that the tools developed here can reliably be integrated in an 
investor’s decision process. The events of late 2010 suggest that many of the 
ideas presented in our work can be implemented to Developed Markets and 
be expected to produce interesting and usable results.     
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INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this thesis is to develop quantitative tools that can be applied 
in different emerging market asset classes and produce actionable 
recommendations. The first tool we create is a Foreign Exchange (FX) Model 
that captures and forecasts significant moves of one month forward exchange 
rates for twenty one emerging markets globally. These forecasts are 
presented in the form of recommendations to buy or sell the underlying 
currencies on a one month horizon. The success of the model is gauged on 
the basis of its statistical consistency but more importantly on its ability to 
generate profit making trade recommendations. An important element of our 
work involves the overlay of market awareness and investors’ intuition in 
creating but also using the FX model we create. The second model we 
created is an EM Ratings Model that describes and predicts the ratings that 
major rating agencies would assign to 30 emerging market sovereigns. Both 
products that we develop are global, in that they are applied on all emerging 
markets in a uniform manner. The aim is to build products that satisfy intuition 
and market stylized facts, remain statistically robust and produce results that 
are directly usable by investors.    
We present our work on our FX model in the first four Chapters of the 
thesis. Chapter 1 outlines the relevant academic literature and our 
contribution, as well as our choice of dependent variable. Chapter 2 describes 
in detail the process via which we approached and selected the explanatory 
variables of our specifications. In Chapter 3 we present the methodology we 
adopted and the statistical performance of the different specifications we 
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tested and the ones we finally decided to select. Chapter 4 puts our FX model 
to the toughest test by translating the model generating signals to investment 
portfolios of EM currencies. The track record of these portfolios is assessed 
both in and out of sample as well as during a period of real time data. The 
latter forms the platform for one of the most interesting aspects of our work, 
that of presenting how real life EM investors could or would use a quantitative 
tool like our EM FX model.    
Chapter 5 presents our work on building and applying our EM Ratings 
Model. We refer to the relevant literature and the ways in which our work 
differs from what was done previously. We describe the left and right hand 
side of our model specification, the accompanying statistical results and 
estimation methodology. We proceed to apply the selected model to real time 
data again and present specific examples and ways in which this product is 
both intellectually appealing and practically useful.  
With the privilege of hindsight most market moves seem easy to explain. 
Currency moves are no exception. However translating this retrospective 
understanding to a clear, objective rule that models and forecasts currency 
moves is a very different exercise. Adding to this the complication of 
addressing emerging markets and doing so with a cross country and across 
time specification makes the target even more challenging. In the following 
Chapters we present our work in detail and provide guidance in ways that 
quantitative techniques and investment decisions can and should be linked to 
optimize returns in a systematic yet realistic fashion. 
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1 CHAPTER ONE: Modelling and Forecasting Currency 
Risks in Emerging Markets: Literature Review and Our 
Contribution 
1.1 Introduction 
Chapter 1 of the thesis is the first of four chapters that describe our work 
on our Emerging Markets FX model. In essence we develop a quantitative 
tool that builds on the widely published area of early warning signal 
mechanisms with regards to mounting exchange rate risks and the evolution 
of currency crises in emerging markets. Our work deviates from previous 
research in that we model high frequency, forward exchange rate dynamics, 
focus on both upside and downside risks and opt to generate actionable trade 
recommendations which are intuitive and profit-making. This chapter reviews 
the relevant research and puts our work in context.  
In the last thirty years, vast amount of research has been carried out on 
the area of currency crises. The sequence of crises that shocked both 
developed and emerging markets in the 1990s triggered a renewed interest in 
the subject. The majority of currency crises, as defined in the literature, 
involved cases where pegged regimes were abandoned either following a 
successful attack from speculators or because the government chose to let 
the currency float. Literature both academic and empirical focused on a 
number of key issues, such as what constitutes a crisis, which variables best 
explain past currency crises or hopefully provide signals for forthcoming ones 
and what methodology would more appropriately describe the underlying 
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processes. With regards to the dependent variable, the near consensus view 
has been to focus on cases of substantial double digit depreciations of a 
bilateral nominal exchange rate. 
The bulk of the relevant theoretical work has mainly focused on 
explaining past crises. However, the need to successfully predict future crises 
is inherently linked to the research on currency risks. An admittedly 
challenging task, as it is difficult to forecast an event that seems to adopt a 
different shape and form each time it occurs. Most have acknowledged the 
multifaceted feature of currency crises in emerging markets but support the 
notion that commonalities still exist and merit further research. This thesis 
builds on relevant research and significantly extends the work done previously 
in a number of ways. First of all we do not wish to assess currency crises or 
crashes per se.  We opt to generate actionable trade recommendations on a 
monthly basis and therefore focus on high frequency exchange rate dynamics 
for a number of emerging market currencies globally. We assess both upside 
and downside currency risks as opposed to the almost unanimous tendency 
of previous work to only focus on risks of substantial devaluations or 
depreciations. We follow a parametric approach and create a very 
parsimonious, technically robust quantitative tool for gauging currency risks in 
emerging markets 
The remaining of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2 
attempts a brief presentation of the relevant literature. Section 1.3 discusses 
the ways in which our work deviates from and extends previous research. In 
this section we present in more detail the rationale and key characteristics of 
our sample and dependent variable selection before we turn to the analysis of 
 14 
the explanatory variables considered and selected in Chapter 2 of the thesis. 
Section 1.4 concludes.  
1.2 Literature Review 
The main objective of the current thesis is to produce quantitative tools, 
readily applicable in real life investment decision processes. As our aim is to 
model and forecast currency risks in emerging markets a natural starting point 
was to read, understand and exploit the substantial academic literature on the 
topics of currency and financial crises and crashes. Nevertheless, our work 
relates also to research carried out within financial institutions which share our 
goal for applicability of results and the limitations dictated by market stylised 
facts. This thesis is a sort of hybrid in that it explores both the relevant 
academic research, acknowledges the intellectual appeal of creating early 
warning signals for medium to long term mounting pressures, but also aims to 
account for market realities and create solutions that serve as high frequency 
investment tools. We tap on the vast supply of interesting material and make 
our own recommendations which hopefully others will find useful in the future.  
This section does not aim to exhaust the list of important papers that 
have contributed to the understanding of emerging market crises over the 
years. Several other papers have masterfully presented a comprehensive 
review of relevant research. In what follows we provide a brief overview of the 
relevant research and present in more detail some of the most influential 
papers as well as a summary of   the work which this thesis more closely 
relates to. As we proceed to present the key points of interest in the literature 
we also make a brief presentation of our views with regards to the different 
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lines of thinking. The majority of papers published on financial crises in recent 
years can broadly be classified with respect to two aspects: “What” each 
paper researches and “how” the authors chose to address the underlying 
issues. In turn, these broad criteria can be broken down to even more refined 
themes. A certain degree of over-lapping and complementarities between 
branches of work can reasonably be expected. 
Let us first turn to the topics more often addressed by papers on crises. 
One thematic classification can be made depending on what sort of crises one 
is interested in. While a crisis will always constitute an out of the ordinary 
event, a distinction is made between currency crises, financial or banking 
crises and sovereign debt crises. In practice of course most incidents of 
economic disorder will involve many if not all of these types of crises 
simultaneously. Still, let us address the key characteristic of each of these 
aspects separately.  
Debt crises refer to cases where a sovereign defaults on its debt 
obligations. The definition of default may vary somewhat but it will almost 
certainly involve the inability or unwillingness of a government to meet some 
or all of its principal and/or interest payment obligations for foreign currency 
or, less often, local currency denominated debt held by investors. Research 
on sovereign default became very topical with the Latin American “Debt crisis” 
in 1982. Renewed interest was attracted in the late nineties when a new wave 
of sovereign defaults hit global emerging market. This time it was a global 
issue with countries as far apart as Russia in 1998 and Argentina in 2001 
defaulting on their debt obligations. In mid 2007 the developed world 
experienced the so-called Great Recession that initiated in the US and 
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effectively affected all major economies. As a result a new trend emerged 
whereby significant amount of debt was in one way or another transferred 
from the private sector (corporate, banking or household) to the sovereign 
level. This new trend unsurprisingly led to heated debates on the sustainability 
of the mounting sovereign debt levels. In early 2010 a number of European 
sovereigns attracted attention due to ballooning fiscal and debt burdens which 
were perceived by investors as unsustainable. In a domino effect that started 
with Greece, quickly involved other peripheral EU countries like Ireland and 
Portugal and touched even upon some of the key core European economies 
such as Italy and Spain, markets were swift to price in significant probabilities 
of possible default or restructuring. The spiralling market reaction led to a 
number of coordinated policy actions from the EU and the IMF in an attempt 
to minimize moral hazard and potential contagion. As this thesis is finalised 
the jury is still out on the outcome and success of these measures and the 
eventual response by markets. We shall return to the topic of sovereign credit-
worthiness and default risk at the last chapter of the thesis where we review in 
more detail sovereign credit ratings and their links to fundamentals.  
The other two types of crises, currency and banking ones have so often 
occurred sequentially or coincidentally that they are referred to as “twin crises” 
in the literature. Irrespective of the cause and trigger of a banking crisis, it 
usually manifests itself in mass withdrawals from the banking sector. This 
would in turn lead the banks to freeze deposits and refrain from servicing the 
withdrawal requests. Often the banks will lean to the government to intervene 
and bail-out the banking system from the liquidity shock. Currency crises often 
precede, coincide with, or follow liquidity squeezes or banking crises and 
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involve substantial weakness of the local currency. Hereafter in this chapter 
we shall focus on currency crises alone, although, as mentioned above, 
problems in most sectors of the economy can share common roots. The 
currency crises that occurred in the last thirty years are often broadly 
categorised in three “generations” depending on what is understood to be the 
cause of the crisis and what are the variables that would explain it best. Much 
of the research carried out in the field of currency crises has focused on one 
or more of these generations. 
What is known as “first generation” models focused mainly on how 
pegged exchange rate regimes are bound to become pray for speculators 
who will likely attack the currency when they find it optimal to do so. This line 
of research follows the seminal work by Krugman(75) (1979) on “A model for 
balance of payments crises” which links excessive fiscal and monetary 
policies to currency crises. The key idea behind the “first generation” models 
was that it is weak fundamentals and unsustainable and incompatible policies 
that will lead to balance of payments deficits which will likely be financed by 
the a country’s foreign exchange reserves. This will, in turn, attract the interest 
of speculators, who monitor the level and depletion rate of foreign exchange 
reserves held by a central bank that tries to defend a pegged exchange rate 
regime. Once the reserves fall below a certain threshold level, investors will 
perceive the government as no longer able to defend the currency and believe 
that it may be forced to abandon the peg following what is called a 
“successful” speculative attack.  
We too acknowledge the importance of macroeconomic fundamentals 
and the relevance of adopted macro policies. However we do not focus only 
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on cases of self fulfilling currency crises nor do we narrow our scope of 
interest in cases of transition from pegged to floating currency regimes. In fact 
we are particularly interested in the dynamics of currency markets in recent 
years which are first and foremost characterised by free or managed floating 
regimes in the majority of emerging markets that we monitor. 
What is classified as “second generation” models acknowledged the fact 
that a peg may be abandoned not only because the government can no 
longer defend it, but also, as seemed to be the case in the collapse of the 
European Monetary System (EMS) in 1992 and 1993, because a government 
prefers to float the currency at a time that seems optimal to do so. Usually this 
is during a recession, a time at which abandoning the peg is expected to lead 
to a substantial weakening of the currency which in turn could help reinstate 
the country’s international competitiveness and support growth.  
Again our work here deviates from the “second generation” models in 
that we define a crisis as a substantial change in the valuation of a currency, 
be it due to a peg being abandoned or during a floating exchange rate regime. 
Official intervention from the government to affect the exchange rate of its 
national currency is a very common scenario in emerging markets. However 
we are wary of how feasible it is to quantify, let alone model, such an 
intervention. We are also very much aware of the fact that central banks may 
need to, and indeed will tend to intervene to adjust an exchange rate higher or 
lower depending on the circumstances. As discussed our goal is to capture 
both upside and downside currency risks. Therefore it is fair to say that our 
work does not fall under the “second generation” group of research papers. 
The “third generation” of models of currency crises includes work on 
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more recent events like the Mexican crisis in 1994 and the Asian crisis in 
1997 were links are established between currency and banking crises. 
Factors seen as likely triggers for these crises include excessive money 
supply, significant capital inflows to unregulated economies which lead to 
bubbles in the domestic credit and often stock or housing markets. All this 
was often followed by unexpected capital flight as a sudden negative 
turnaround in the global economic environment made investors less 
complacent of stretched valuations within particular countries. This line of 
work brought the idea of contagion to the forefront of crises research. 
Colourful names like “Tequila Crisis” and “Asian Flu” have been used in the 
literature to describe the domino effects that followed respectively, the crisis in 
Mexico in December 1994, which affected the majority of the Latin America 
region and the crises in a number of East Asian currencies following the 
collapse of the Thai baht in July 1997.  
We explore the literature on “third generation” currency crises to assess 
the event specific factors that mattered each time and, importantly, to select a 
group of explanatory variables that most have tested and many have found of 
some relevance. We do end up using the one variable that merits near 
consensus support, namely the real effective exchange rate. The other 
variables that we finally select though, have not, as far as we know, been 
presented in the literature. Furthermore our work is neither limited to one 
specific crisis nor limited to crises alone, at least not as defined by the 
relevant literature. In effect our research does not fall in the “third generation” 
of currency crises group of work either. 
An interesting categorisation of most major crises was attempted by G.L. 
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Kaminsky(63) in late 2003. In her paper on “Varieties of Currency Crises”, 
Kaminsky suggests that the majority of currency crises that have preoccupied 
research work and devastated emerging and occasionally industrial countries 
can be categorised in six groups. Four out of six of these involve events that 
are a function of vulnerabilities in domestic fundamentals. One group links 
crises to the global market environment which could trigger a flight of 
international capital flows from certain countries and cause the countries in 
question to experience a crisis. The last group involves countries, which 
experienced a crisis despite strong fundamentals, though it is noted that these 
crises are inherent to developed rather than emerging markets. We only look 
at emerging markets and find that a global model would best describe 
currency risks in emerging markets if it includes both factors that are inherent 
in each country but also factors which reflect the dynamics and circumstances 
of global markets.  It is therefore not possible to categorise our research in 
terms of one group alone as suggested by Kaminsky in the 2003 paper. 
Besides deciding on what sort of crises to research, one also needs to 
address the question of what methodology to select. This issue brings us to 
the second way in which research papers on currency crises may be grouped. 
There are broadly two approaches to consider, the parametric and the non-
parametric one. Those leaning towards the parametric approach will need to 
decide on the best modelling methodology, the most appropriate way to 
quantify the crises events they chose to research and the variables that will 
best help explain and hopefully forecast these events. The non-parametric 
approach will involve a similar selection process with regards to explanatory 
variables and definition of the crisis variable. The link between these two 
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though, will be typically assessed and established via graphical analysis. We 
adopt a clearly parametric approach in our analysis, and opt for an innovative, 
straightforward and parsimonious specification to fit all the countries in our 
sample. 
A classic paper that set the standard for much of the parametric 
quantitative assessment of out-of-the-ordinary currency devaluations was 
published in 1996 by Frankel and Rose(47) (FR) on “Currency Crises in 
Emerging Markets: Empirical Indicators”.  In their analysis, FR used annual 
data from 1971 to 1992 for a large group of 100 emerging markets. FR used 
graphical analysis as a starting point to gauge the way that different variables 
behave on the run-up to a currency crash but they noted that graphical 
analysis has its limitations. One of the biggest drawbacks of graphical 
analysis that they point out is that it is uni-variate and does not allow one to 
assess the way in which the selected explanatory variables interact.  
FR proceeded to estimate a Probit model in their attempt to assess 
which variables are statistically significant indicators of forthcoming currency 
crashes. In a Probit model, a dummy variable is used to define a dichotomous 
dependent variable and the results are presented in terms of probability that 
the specified event will occur or not. In the case or currency crises, the 
dummy variable is, in most papers, set equal to one, at times when the 
definition of a currency crisis is satisfied and takes the value zero, at all other 
times. According to FR a currency crash occurs when the spot weakens by 
more than 25% in any given year and at the same time the weakening 
observed in that year is also at least 10% more than that observed in the 
previous year. The dependent variable will be zero at all other times. 
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According to the definition adopted by Frankel and Rose, fitting the estimated 
Probit model specification to the data will provide probabilities that a currency 
crash will occur within the following two years.  
In our analysis we favour the choice of a Logit specification which falls in 
the same family of models as the Probit version. We try however, to estimate 
and forecast probabilities of currency crises occurring in the near future. We 
feel that a signal for the following 24 months, interesting as it may be, is not 
nearly as usable as expected from an investment tool. Our work differs from 
that advocated by FR and the majority of relevant research in a number of 
important aspects.  First and foremost, we do not monitor changes in spot 
rates, but instead focus on forward exchange rates which we believe is really 
what investors are interested in. Moreover, we model cases of both exchange 
rate depreciation and appreciation as both provide investment opportunities 
and accordingly may conceal risks for those involved. Furthermore, we only 
condition our crisis variable on an exchange rate appreciating or depreciating 
by more than a certain rate at any given time period. In doing so, we do not 
rule out the moves which, significant as they may be, do not exceed the 
recent past. The main reason for us keeping a broader scope than what a 
purely academic or theoretical paper may do is our goal to create a tool that 
will be integrated in an investor’s day to day decision making process.  
A paper that promoted the use of graphical analysis and the creation of 
early warning signals mechanisms for currency crises was published by 
Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (KLR)(68)  in 1997, and is titled: “Leading 
indicators of Currency Crises”. In this classic paper, KLR employed uni-variate 
graphic analysis of monthly data to assess the likelihood of a crisis occurring 
 23 
in the following 24months. The definition of currency crises that KLR adopt is 
based on a weighted average of monthly percentage changes in both the 
nominal spot exchange rate and a country’s foreign exchange reserves. This 
definition aims to capture not only the “successful” speculative attacks 
described earlier in this chapter, but also the “unsuccessful” speculative 
attacks against which a government managed to defend the currency. As KLR 
note this wider definition of what constitutes a crisis also allows them to 
deviate from the “first generation” models which assumed the existence of 
fixed exchange rate regimes which may or may not be abandoned following 
an attack. KLR’s definition could pick up crises events even under floating 
exchange rate regimes. 
Our research nears the KLR approach in that we too, do not limit 
ourselves on successful attacks and we too wish to account for currency 
moves under floating exchange rate regimes as well. We still deviate from the 
work that KLR did in that we focus on forwards and they still look at spot 
exchange rates. This is not merely a difference in the choice of the dependent 
variable. It manifests the difference in mandate and dictates the need for a 
possibly altogether different specification. 
Others have adopted crises definitions similar to that suggested by KLR. 
In three seminal papers published by Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz 
(ERW)(41) in 1994, 1995 and 1996, the authors advocate the use of an index 
for “exchange market pressure” which accounts for unsuccessful attacks as 
well as successful ones. For their currency crises variable ERW create an 
index which extends to include changes in the spot exchange rate, changes in 
foreign exchange reserves and   changes in interest rates. They also look at 
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both the reserves and the interest rate as differential between each country 
and Germany, which they chose as reference point. Given the way their index 
of exchange rate pressure is defined ERW also account for revaluations and 
not only cases of devaluations following a successful speculative attack.  
Incorporating interest rates in the measure of currency risks takes the 
crises literature on a whole new level. Spot rate changes are an important 
aspect to monitor but in high interest rate regimes, one needs to take into 
account what the interest rate implies for a currency’s future valuation. One 
important point to make is that nowadays it seems more relevant to look at all 
currencies versus the USD which is the common reference point for most 
currency denominations. The other necessary adjustment would be to make 
the natural switch from using Germany as a reference point to using the euro-
area interest rate. Another important contribution from ERW is the fact that 
their suggested index allows one to monitor both revaluations and 
devaluations. However this feature remains only a theoretical possibility as 
ERW really only focus their analysis in cases of downwards exchange rate 
pressures.  
Moving on  to the right hand side of the model specification we lean on 
papers such as FR mentioned above and others mentioned later in this part of 
the chapter, in order to assemble a group of variables which will best help us 
quantify, model and forecast currency risks in emerging markets. FR tested a 
number of different macro data as indicators of large spot exchange rate 
devaluations within the selected 24month horizon. FR looked at four groups of 
variables, including data on domestic macro economic fundamentals and data 
on “external variables” to quantify a country’s vulnerability to shocks not 
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attributed to domestic factors. FR focused a lot on the importance of debt as 
an indicator of forthcoming crises and stressed the importance of the 
composition of debt in terms of maturity and interest rate variability. The last 
group of indicators that FR contemplated was “foreign variables” which aimed 
to account for the circumstances prevailing in the global financial arena. FR 
found that currency crises in emerging markets are closely linked to real 
exchange rate over-valuations, a rise in developed markets interest rates, 
high domestic credit growth and a depletion of foreign direct investment 
inflows. We discuss and assess the relevance of each of these, amongst 
other variables in a later section in this chapter. 
A variable that attracted a lot of attention in the literature of currency 
crises and particularly the “third generation” models discussed earlier in this 
section is Contagion. The so-called “Tequila Effect” and the infamous “Asian 
Flu” are two prime examples of colourful names used to describe the spill-
over of crises from one country to many others which were linked to the first 
one either due to geographic proximity or via other channels. In their 1996 
paper on “Contagious Currency Crises” Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz, 
(ERW)(41), review the work carried out by others on currency crises and 
contagion in particular and note that despite the wide selection of theoretical 
papers which tend to focus on a small sample or even a single event, only a 
handful of studies had attempted to systematically analyse contagion.  
One paper which advocated the key role of contagion was a 1996 paper 
by Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (STV)(116), on “Financial Crises in Emerging 
Markets: The lessons from 1995”. This work examined the way in which the 
1994 Mexican crisis in particular had evolved and attempted to draw 
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conclusions applicable to other occasions. STV define crises as a 
combination of factors and carry out single year cross section regression 
analysis. STV point out the great relevance of contagion and suggest that the 
so-called “Tequila-effect” which led to a number of other emerging markets 
feeling similar pressures in the aftermath of the Mexican crisis, only hit 
previously weak countries that investors felt may be next. In their paper STV 
find factors like credit growth, over-valuation of the real exchange rate and 
depletion of reserves as the sort of weak fundamentals that characterised the 
countries hit by contagion in the Mexican crises.  
In their own analysis of contagion ERW estimate a panel binary Probit 
model, using quarterly data from 1959 to 1993. They include both economic 
fundamentals and political factors in their model and they try to account for 
both successful and unsuccessful attacks. By including the explanatory 
variables both with and without a lag, ERW effectively tested which variables 
are leading and which are coincident indicators of exchange rate pressure. 
ERW first establish that there is clear evidence of contagion as they find that a 
speculative attack in one country, raises the probability that other countries 
will experience currency crises as well.  Then they attempt to get a more clear 
sense of the channels via which contagion is transmitted. In particular they 
test the hypothesis of contagion transmitting a crisis from one country to its 
trading partners and from one country to others with similar economic policies 
and fundamentals. ERW find that both these channels are statistically 
important with trade links having a more dominant effect as a crisis 
transmission mechanism than common macro frameworks.  
A key criterion that differentiates papers on currency crises is whether 
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the aim is to purely describe the past or to attempt to predict the future as 
well. In their 1997 paper mentioned above, KLR tried out a large group of 
candidates to assess whether these variables were good indicators of 
forthcoming currency crises. A threshold was adopted for each indicator and 
that indicator was assumed to give a signal once it crossed that pre-defined 
threshold. The selection of the parameters is based on the success of an 
indicator in signalling forthcoming crises. All indicators were expressed as 
year on year percentage changes of monthly data. Like FR, KLR looked to 
include domestic and international indicators and also tried to account for 
qualitative factors such as political stability via the inclusion of dummy 
variables. Again like FR, KLR found that real exchange rate deviations from 
trend are a key factor in currency crises. They also found that exports, some 
measure of output, equity prices and some ratio of money to gross 
international reserves are important early warning signals for forthcoming 
currency pressures.  
As mentioned above, the majority of papers on currency crises, aspired 
to understand and explain past crises but did little in terms of testing the 
forecasting power of the suggested methodology, be it parametric or 
graphical. Berg and Pattillo, (BP)(12) published in 1998-1999, their paper “Are 
currency crises Predictable? A Test” effectively put FR, STV and KLR to the 
test. BP assess the out-of-sample forecasting power of these models and in 
particular their ability to predict the Asian crises in 1997. BP’s results are 
supportive of parametric multivariate probit models. They also suggest that 
further work could be carried out on the selection of explanatory variables and 
mention that contagion and qualitative factors like political stability are crucial. 
 28 
BP conclude that although up to that point, research papers aimed and rather 
successfully managed to explain past crises, evidence suggested that 
research on forecasting future crises may also be expected to bear fruits. 
We opt to generate a model that rather accurately describes the past 
but, equally, assists us in forecasting the near term currency risks in emerging 
markets in a consistent and intuitive manner. We also wish to apply our model 
on a monthly basis which is a frequency higher than what is adopted by the 
majority of similar papers. As far as the explanatory variables are concerned 
we assess many of the usual suspects presented in relevant literature but 
finally adopt a set of all but one new variables for our specification.  In the 
sections that follow in this chapter we go through our selection criteria in 
detail. The issue of forecasting accuracy is nowhere a more central 
consideration than in financial institutions. As mentioned at the beginning of 
this section, our work shares the need for intuitive and usable results that is 
inherent in the creation of most modelling tools presented in the market. 
Below we briefly present some examples of models which were created within 
leading investment banks and which leveraged on the academic research 
work outlined above. 
One example of empirical work that largely followed the relevant 
academic research was “GS-Watch”, by A.Ades, R.Masih and D. 
Tenengauzer(1), published by Goldman Sachs in December 1998. GS-Watch 
provides a combination of the econometric and non-parametric approaches 
presented in the literature. The outcome of GS-Watch was on the one hand a 
set of nine “early warning signals” of a forthcoming financial crisis and on the 
other hand a calculated probability that such a crisis will occur in the following 
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three months. The analysis was done and the logit-type panel model 
estimated on a sample of 27 emerging markets globally. The explanatory 
variables included a set of fundamentals consistent with relevant academic 
research and variables that attempted to account for political stability, global 
liquidity and contagion. GS-Watch incorporates most of the well established 
“schools” of thought on financial crises. However it still stops short of 
implementing the theory in a manner that will produce actionable trade 
recommendation. This already differentiates GS-Watch from our work here.  
In their 2001 paper titled: “On Crisis models: An alternative crisis 
definition”(42),   A.C. Eliasson and C. J. Kreuter,(EK), of Deutsche Bank 
Research point out a number of limitations enforced by the choice to model 
crises as a binary variable. EK suggest as an alternative the use of a 
“continuous” crisis definition which accounts for both exchange-rate and 
interest rate “extreme” events in emerging markets. Deutsche Bank also 
publishes “DESIX: Deutsche Bank Eurasia Group Stability Index”(38), an index 
that comprises of a combination of indicators that aim to capture both 
quantitative and qualitative factors that provide an assessment of a country’s 
ability to “withstand shocks and crises”. The usability of DESIX as a 
parameter in one’s investment decision is limited as no conclusion is driven 
with respect to the information content of the different  index levels, nor are 
the index scores translated into trade suggestions.  
R. Subbaraman, R. Jones and H Shiraishi published in September 2003 
“Damocles: an Early Warning System Model”(121) for Lehman Brothers. 
Damocles largely follows the literature of early warning systems and uses a 
combination of economic and financial variables as indicators that may 
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produce forward looking signals for future financial crises. Cases where the 
bilateral nominal exchange rate between a currency and the USD falls in any 
given month by more than three standard deviations from the sample mean 
are classified as crises. A set of 10 indicators including macroeconomic and 
market data are combined to construct an index measure. A reading above a 
certain index level is seen as an indication that a country’s balance of 
payments is vulnerable to a financial crises and an index reading above an 
even higher threshold is interpreted as a signal that a financial crisis could be 
imminent.  
Another example of empirical work which links academic background 
and the perspective of investment banks is “Credit Suisse First Boston’s 
(hereafter mentioned as “CSFB”) EMRI: Emerging Markets Risk Indicator”(77), 
first published by M.S. Kumar, W. Perraudin, V. Zinni in April 1998 and re-
estimated in September 2000 by A. Roy and M.M Tudela, who published the 
renewed version in Dec 2000. In its 1998 version EMRI was a logit type panel 
model applied on 32 emerging markets globally, and producing risk scores for 
the probability of having significant country specific devaluations in the near 
term. Following the relevant academic literature a large number of economic, 
financial and qualitative variables were tested and 16 were selected for 
inclusion in the so called “parsimonious” version of the model. In EMRI an 
attempt was also made to capture the so called “unanticipated” depreciation 
and a second version of the model was estimated where the devaluation rate 
was adjusted for the interest rate differential between a country and the US. 
In the version of EMRI as re-estimated and published by Roy and Tudela 
in 2000(113), the general framework remains largely unchanged. Changes 
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include the extension of the sample to 36 countries. The 2000 EMRI version 
also calculated “raw” and “marginal” explanatory factor contributions to the 
likelihood of a forthcoming currency crisis. Regional models are also 
calculated besides the overall global model version. The model results are 
presented as monthly changes in annualised probabilities, aiming to best 
capture the dynamics of currency risks.  
The attractiveness of products like Damocles, GS-Watch, DESIX and 
EMRI lays in the attempt to incorporate academic conclusions on the subject 
of financial crises, with the ability to update the results regularly and overlay 
market-oriented story telling. Nevertheless as long as all these products stop 
short of making trade recommendations to their clients they remain little more 
than technically robust exercises on academic crises research, carried out 
inside major investment houses. 
A paper that builds on the conclusions driven by Berg and Pattillo 
mentioned earlier in this section and also on the work done in CSFB’s EMRI 
was published in January 2002 by M. Kumar, U. Moorthy and W. Perraudin, 
(KMP) titled,“ Predicting Emerging Market Crashes”(76). KMP estimated a logit 
type multivariate panel model to forecast what they call currency “crashes” 
instead of  “crises” to emphasize that they wish to focus only on successful 
speculative attacks and in general cases where pressure on a currency does 
evolve to substantial currency depreciation. Consistent with the relevant 
literature KMP focused on downside currency risks. They attempted to 
quantify the forecasting performance of their findings via the application of a 
simple trading rule which makes “long” or “short” trade recommendations 
depending on whether the probability of a currency crash is above or below a 
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certain threshold. KMP define a “long” trade in a specific currency as a 
recommendation to buy and hold that currency against the US dollar and a 
“short” recommendation as a trade where investors are advised to sell a 
particular currency and buy US dollars instead. KMP’s findings support the 
idea that such models may be successfully used for the development of profit 
making trading rules.  
Although KMP take the typical crises modelling exercises further, they 
do not address many issues which are crucial to a real life investor. In brief 
they do attempt to account for interest rate differentials but define crashes in a 
manner that does not completely depart from the shortcomings of modelling 
spot rather than forward exchange rates. KMP also admit to having no access 
to market determined data on interest rates which raises the obvious question 
of the applicability of their findings on real markets going forward. KMP, 
indeed attempt to quantify the performance of their model in making 
investment recommendations for both buying and selling an EM currency 
within a short period of time. However they base these recommendations on 
results from a specification that only models cases of substantial 
depreciations.  Whether a weak buying signal can be reliably seen as a selling 
opportunity is highly debatable. In the remaining of this chapter we shall 
discuss in greater detail such practical aspects of the analysis carried out in 
papers like the one by KMP.  
The research as presented in the first four chapters of the thesis 
replicates our work on “CREMM: CSFB’s Currency Risk in Emerging Markets 
Model”(80) (hereafter referred to as “CREMM”) which was developed, 
presented and maintained by the author of this thesis N.Lekka. An 
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introduction to CREMM was published by N. Lekka in July 2003. From July 
2003 to May 2005 N. Lekka maintained, updated and applied the model to 
real life data on a calendar month basis. The results were published and 
shared with investors that were at the time clients of CSFB.  CREMM was 
also presented to the ECB, IMF and a number of Universities and financial 
conferences globally. CREMM, which is in essence the model presented in 
great detail in this thesis builds on relevant research but was designed and 
implemented with a clear focus on the applicability and usability of the results. 
The focus was to provide an aid to investors that are interested in forward 
exchange rate returns and in model generated signals that are updated in a 
rigorous manner to produce high frequency trade recommendations for a 
whole group of emerging market currencies. The request for direct application 
dictated the need for the model input data to be leading indicators readily 
available in time for the model updates. As for the model output, the aim was 
to translate it into trade signals that are intuitive and, more importantly, profit 
making. To this date we have yet to come across a model developed within 
investment banking or in a more academic environment that addresses this 
constellation of issues. It is these considerations that we aim to present in 
detail in the next sections. 
1.3 Our Contribution to Relevant Research 
We tap on the wide research published on currency crises to underpin 
our understanding of emerging markets, understand the characteristics of 
each currency, develop a sense of what is the best way to capture currency 
risks, familiarise ourselves with the available methodologies and make a well 
 34 
educated judgement on the selection of explanatory variables we consider or 
include in the model. The work presented in this chapter though, departs from 
the relevant literature on currency crises and crashes in a number of key 
aspects.  
First, we adopt a different definition of our dependent variable as we 
wish to model forward exchange rate returns and not changes in the spot 
exchange rate. Second, we focus on both upside and downside currency risks 
and not limit our scope on cases of significant deprecation alone. Third, 
although we assess most of the variables that merit some sort of consensus 
in relevant research we chose to include in the selected model specification 
only a handful of variables, most of which are not discussed in previous 
research papers. A fourth important way in which this thesis differs from 
previous work is the manner in which we apply, present and test the model 
results. This section presents in greater detail all these aspects and 
considerations in the model development process.  
1.3.1 Data Sample  
We availed ourselves of monthly data on 21 emerging markets globally. 
In this section we present our data sample and outline some considerations, 
central in the data compilation process and key to gaining an insight to this 
modelling exercise. Compiling a data set for 21 emerging markets globally for 
any period is bound to be a major challenge. In this section we touch upon a 
number of practical limitations one is faced with when gathering economic or 
financial data for emerging markets, even from the most reliable of data 
sources.  We shall return to many of these issues in a later section where we 
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discuss the variables that we considered and the reasons why we selected to 
include or exclude different data series in our analysis.  
1.3.1.1 Data Sources 
The majority of the data were downloaded from data providers such as 
Datastream and Bloomberg. We also utilised data sets publicly available by 
the IMF and the World Bank. For more specialised data series on credit 
ratings we turned to leading rating agencies like Moody’s and Standard and 
Poor. A lot of the market determined data we use were provided by the 
economists, strategists and traders at CSFB.  
1.3.1.2 Country Groups 
We estimate one model for all 21 countries included in our sample. 
Admittedly no two emerging markets are alike and the one-size-fits-all model 
specification introduces a considerable degree of limitation in our ability to 
capture the characteristics inherent to each currency.  
One way of grouping emerging markets advocated in the literature is in 
terms of geographic links. In line with market approach the countries included 
in our sample can be grouped in three geographical sub-samples. These 
regional groups are: “Latin America”, “Emerging Europe, Middle East and 
Africa” and “non-Japan Asia”, hereafter referred to as LATAM, EMEA and 
ASIA respectively. 
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Table 1 Regional Country Groups 
LATIN 
AMERICA 
(LATAM) 
EMERGING 
EUROPE 
MIDDLE EAST  
& AFRICA 
(EMEA) 
NON-JAPAN 
ASIA 
(ASIA) 
ARGENTINA CZECH REPUBLIC INDIA 
BRAZIL HUNGARY INDONESIA 
CHILE  POLAND MALAYSIA 
COLOMBIA  RUSSIA PHILIPPINES  
MEXICO SLOVAKIA SINGAPORE 
VENEZUELA SOUTH AFRICA SOUTH KOREA 
 
TURKEY TAIWAN 
 THAILAND 
1.3.1.3 Sample Starting Points 
Data on emerging market series are rarely available for a considerably 
long period. When constructing our dependent variables we used data on 
bilateral spot exchange rates of each local currency versus the US dollar and 
one month market determined interest rates to calculate the forward points 
between each currency and the USD. For the US market we used the one 
month USD London inter-bank offered rate (LIBOR), which is the interest rate 
at which banks can borrow from other banks USD for one month. For the 
emerging market currencies included in our sample we use the market 
determined interests rates from the most liquid traded instrument as described 
in the following section. Table 2 below shows the earliest date for which we 
had data available on spot and forward exchange rates. The starting date for 
the forward exchange rates is conditional on the availability of interest rates. 
In all cases the forward exchange rates were available for a shorter period 
than the spot exchange rates. 
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Table 2 Data Sample Starting Dates 
CURRENCY SPOT EXCHANGE RATE SAMPLE START DATE 
FORWARD 
EXCHANGE RATE 
SAMPLE START 
DATE 
ARGENTINEAN  PESO OCTOBER 1994 MAY 1997 
BRAZILEAN REAL OCTOBER 1994 SEPTEMBER 1998 
CHILE PESO OCTOBER 1994 NOVEMBER 1998 
COLOMBIAN PESO FEBRUARY 1996 JANUARY 1998 
CZECH KORUNA OCTOBER 1994 MARCH 1995 
HUNGARY FORINT OCTOBER 1994 AUGUST 1997 
INDIAN RUPEE OCTOBER 1994 FEBRUARY 1998 
INDONESIAN RUPIAH FEBRUARY 1994 SEPTEMBER 1994 
MALAYSIAN RINGGIT  FEBRUARY 1994 MARCH 1994 
MEXICAN PESO OCTOBER 1994 NOVEMEBR 1998 
PHILIPPINES PESO OCTOBER 1994 NOVEMBER 1994 
POLISH ZLOTY APRIL 1999 JULY 1998 
RUSSIAN RUBBLE DECEMBER 1995 JULY 2000 
SINGAPORE DOLLAR JUNE 1995 JUNE 1995 
SLOVAKIAN KORUNA JULY 1996 JULY 1996 
SOUTH AFRICAN RAND OCTOBER 1994 DECEMBER 1995 
SOUTH KOREA WON AUGUST 1996 NOVEMBER 1997 
TAIWAN DOLLAR FEBRUARY 1997 OCTOBER 1997 
THAILAND BAHT FEBRUARY 1994 FEBRUARY 1994 
TURKISH LIRA FEBRUARY 1994 OCTOBER 1998 
VENEZUELAN 
BOLIVAR MAY 1996 NOVEMBER 1998 
As will be explained in greater detail at a later section of this chapter, our 
dependent variable calculates the difference between the prevailing spot and 
forward exchange rate. Therefore we are limited to only include in our 
analysis the periods during which both spot and forward data are available. It 
follows that the last column of Table 2 below is the one that corresponds to 
the starting dates of the time series included in our analysis. One other major 
issue which is common in all data series but significantly more so in less 
transparent emerging markets, is the fact that even for the period during 
which data are available you are bound to either have gaps within the series 
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or a number of outliers which you need to amend. In our data we found only a 
small number of such discrepancies which rarely covered a period longer than 
one or two months. In these few cases we replaced the missing values with 
the average of the available data in the preceding and following month. 
1.3.2 Choice of Dependent Variable 
Our goal is to model and forecast returns from investing on the one 
month forward exchange rate of a number of emerging markets globally. 
Therefore, this work departs from the academic and empirical research 
published on currency crises which primarily focuses on one-off significant 
depreciations of the spot exchange rate. We too think that both investors and 
policy makers would benefit from a more rigorous understanding of the events 
that have devastated both emerging and developed markets in the past few 
decades. Our mandate nevertheless is different. We model one month 
forward exchange rate returns, generate monthly portfolios for a group of 
emerging market currencies globally and assess the model performance via 
tracking the profit and loss that would have been generated if one was to 
blindly follow the model recommended trading portfolios.  
1.3.2.1 Exchange Rate Conventions Adopted  
Before we proceed, let us outline some of the assumptions and certain 
basic rules we adopt in terms of notation and presentation of analysis. For 
matters of convenience, when referring to any currency pair we will use the 
notation adopted by Bloomberg and Reuters, the leading markets data 
providers. Table 3 below gives the names and codes for all the currencies we 
include in our model. In this thesis we will be quoting all emerging market 
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currencies versus the US dollar. 
We will always quote an exchange rate in terms of units of local currency 
per one US dollar. That means that the local currency is our “quoted” currency 
and the USD is our “base” currency.  An exchange rate of RUB28.5 means 
that you can exchange 28.5 Russian Rubbles for one USD in the market. A 
fall in the exchange rate from RUB28.5 to RUB28 indicates an appreciation of 
the RUB versus the USD as one can now buy one US dollar with less units of 
local currency, which in this case is the Russian rubble.  
Table 3 Currency pairs and annotation  
Currency Bloomberg code vs the USD 
ARGENTINE  PESO ARS 
BRAZILEAN REAL BRL 
CHILEAN PESO CLP 
COLOMBIAN PESO COP 
CZECH KORUNA CZK 
HUNGARIAN FORINT HUF 
INDIAN RUPEE INR 
INDONESIAN RUPIAH IDR 
MALAYSIAN RINGGIT MYR 
MEXICAN PESO MXN 
PHILIPPINES PESO PHP 
POLISH ZLOTY PLN 
RUSSIAN RUBLE RUB 
SINGAPORE DOLLAR SGD 
SLOVAKIAN KORUNA SKK 
SOUTH AFRICAN RAND ZAR 
SOUTH KOREAN WON KRW 
TAIWAN DOLLAR TWD 
THAILAND BAHT THB 
TURKISH LIRA  
NEW TURKISH LIRA 1 
TRL 
TRY 
VENEZUELAN BOLIVAR VEB 
 
                                               
1 The Turkish lira was re-denominated on January 1st 2005. Until that date the currency code was TRL 
and it quoted in millions of liras per one USD. From that day onwards, the currency code was TRY to 
denote the New Turkish Lira which has dropped six zeros from the previous way it was quoted. Here 
we will use the TRL code and the old quote as our sample covers mostly the pre 2005 period. 
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In practice there is a difference between the exchange rate at which a 
bank will buy a currency and the exchange rate at which the same bank will 
be willing to sell the same currency at the same point in time. This price 
difference is called the “spread” between the “bid” and the “offer” levels. The 
“bid” is the exchange rate at which a bank is willing to buy the base currency, 
here USD, and sell the quoted currency. The “offer” is the exchange rate at 
which the bank is willing to sell the base currency and buy the quoted 
currency.  So for our example above a currency trader within a bank will 
typically give a dual quote: USD/RUB: 28.55/28.58. This means that the bank 
is willing to pay 28.55 Russian rubbles for every US dollar it buys, but is 
willing to sell one USD for 28.58 Russian rubbles.  
The bid/offer spread will vary and will tend to widen for less liquid 
currencies. Emerging Market currencies are typically less liquid than the 
developed market currencies. For the currencies considered here, the bid-
offer spread represents the largest part of the transaction costs involved when 
dealing in emerging market currency markets. It is arguably the most 
quantifiable transaction cost. Even though the market liquidity has improved in 
the last decade and that in turn has brought down the bid/offer spreads 
considerably, they still represent some sort of entrance barriers for many 
market participants or could de-motivate investors from very frequently 
realigning their positions. In absence of objective and consistent data on 
transaction costs and for the sake of simplifying the presentation of our 
analysis we will not differentiate between bid and offer quotes in our analysis. 
We use the mid level of exchange rates which serves to split the cost evenly 
between purchase and sell recommendations made by the model. It also 
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helps us keep a neutral stand between a bank and its counterparties as our 
trade recommendations would equally apply to both target groups.  
1.3.2.2 Forward Exchange Rate Mechanism  
One of the key considerations in our work it that we chose to work with 
forward exchange rates, instead of spot, as this ultimately is what real life 
investors trade and effectively focus on. A forward exchange rate transaction 
involves an agreement by two parties to buy or sell a certain amount of 
currency at a pre-agreed exchange rate at a specific point in the future. We 
focus on the one month forward exchange rates and monitor the model 
results on a 12month calendar monthly basis. The mechanism involved in 
determining forward exchange rates is the same that applies to forward prices 
in all other financial markets as well, like commodities, interest rates or 
equities. In a forward rate transaction an agreement is made at time t for an 
action to take place at time T in the future.  The one month forward exchange 
rate for the Russian rubble (RUB) versus the US dollar (USD) as quoted at 
the beginning of month t will be the exchange rate at which one investor 
agrees to buy from another investor Russian rubbles versus USD at the 
beginning of the next calendar month.  
Technically the forward exchange rates will adjust the prevailing spot 
exchange rate at time t, for the cost involved in carrying out the forward 
transaction. At time t, investor A agrees to buy from investor B in one month, 
Russian rubbles at an exchange rate of F units of RUB per one unit of USD. 
By definition participant B agrees to sell to participant A the same amount of 
RUB in one month. We say that in this case investor A “goes long” the RUB 
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on a one month forward basis, while, investor B “goes short” the RUB on a 
one month forward basis.  The one month forward exchange rate at which the 
transaction will be unwound in one month’s time is decided at time t by the 
market and is called the “outright forward exchange rate” which we denote 
with TtF , . The outright forward TtF ,  is determined by adjusting the spot 
exchange rate prevailing in the market at time t for the so-called “cost of carry” 
applicable on a one month time horizon. The “cost of carry” is a term used to 
describe the cost born by investor B in order for him to be able to get hold of, 
keep and deliver the agreed amount of RUB in one month to investor A. 
Below we present an example of a forward rate agreement in detail to 
graphically present the intermediate stages involved in the transaction and the 
way in which the cost of carry is calculated in practice.  
Adopted notation: 
TtqR ,,  The interest rate prevailing for holdings of the quoted currency 
(here RUB) at time t with maturity at time T 
TtbR ,,  The interest rate prevailing for holdings of the base currency (here 
USD) at time t with maturity at time T 
tS  The spot exchange rate for local currency (here RUB) versus one unit 
of foreign currency (here USD) prevailing at time t. 
TtF ,  The market determined forward exchange rate for local currency 
(here RUB) versus one unit of foreign currency (here USD), set at time t, for 
delivery at time T. 
K  The amount of local currency (here RUB) versus foreign currency 
(here USD) that investor A agrees to buy from investor B at time T In the 
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future. 
T  The investment horizon, here assumed to be one month 
Process Stage I: at time t : 
Investor B buys K  amount of RUB versus USD at the spot market at tS .  
In effect B is “locking in” his cost for delivering RUB in the future to 
investor A 
If B did not hold any USD to settle the spot transaction he will borrow the 
necessary amount equal to 
tS
K  .  
The K  amount of RUB that B holds for the period of one month from 
time t  to time  T , will be invested in the local interest rate TtqR ,, . 
Process Stage II: at time T  
 
B delivers the K  amount of RUB to A and gets USD. 
B uses the USD proceeds from A to settle the loan he took at time t  
USD.  
Investor B will need to repay the amount of dollars he borrowed at time t 
equal to 
tS
K  plus any interest accruing on the loan.  
The accrued interest will be calculated based on the one month USD 
interest rate TtbR ,,   prevailing at time t .  
Overall, TtF , , that is the one month forward  exchange rate set at time t  
for time T , will be such that it accounts for the difference between the 
revenue B gets from investing the RUB in TtqR ,,  for one month and the money 
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B pays for borrowing USD at TtbR ,,  for one month. By definition, the forward 
exchange rates will imply that the currency with the highest local interest rate 
will tend to depreciate.  
This fact is consistent with the interest rate parity condition which states 
that in the long run interest rate differentials cannot continue to exist without 
relevant changes in exchange rates. However in the short run, realised spot 
exchange rates tend to differ a lot from what the forward exchange rates had 
implied. Therefore, forward exchange rates need not necessarily be seen as 
unbiased forecasts for future spot exchange rates, particularly in the short run.  
The term: “outright forward” is used to describe a market determined 
direct quote for the price at which one can buy or sell the local currency per 
unit of foreign currency at some future settlement date. In many emerging 
markets “outright forwards” are not or have not for a large part of our sample 
period been readily available. This is due to the lack of liquidity, the fact that 
many of these countries still impose capital controls or impose other 
constraints in market operations. Most of these aspects have been in a 
continuous improving trend as emerging markets become more transparent, 
less volatile and more market oriented.  Following the currency crises in the 
1990s most pegs were abandoned although many countries still implement a 
managed floating currency regime to this date, with the central bank 
intervention part of the everyday agenda. The fact remains, however that for 
most of the markets we are considering we can still not avail ourselves of 
outright forwards.  
We therefore chose to construct the one month forward exchange rates 
for all the countries in our sample, in order to ensure that the data will be 
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comparable and consistent for all countries. In doing so we adopt the 
following definition for constructing our one month forward exchange rates: 
The forward exchange rate is equal to the spot exchange rate adjusted for the 
so-called forward points relevant to the time horizon we are interested in. In 
our case this will be the one calendar month period.  
The forward points are practically the calculation for the cost of carry 
where one also accounts for the maturity of the forward exchange rate and 
the day count conventions adopted in each country and market.  Note that in 
Equation 1 below we add the forward points to the spot exchange rate. The 
sign of the calculated Forward Points will depend on two factors. First, which 
is the base currency in the currency pair in question. As discussed earlier all 
the currency pairs we consider in our model are quoted versus the USD, 
making the latter the “base” currency in all cases. Second what matters is 
which currency in the pair is characterized by higher interest rates. In 
particular, if the USD interest rates, i.e. the Base currency interest rates are 
higher that the interest rates of the Quoted Currency then the Fwd Points will 
come with a negative sign. If the Base currency interest rates, in this case the 
USD rates, are lower than the interest rates of the Quoted currency, then the 
calculated Fwd Points will have a positive sign.  
Equation 1 : Definition of Outright Forward Exchange Rate 
TttTt FPSF ,,   
Where:  
TtFP ,  Denotes the one month forward points set at time t for settlement 
at t+1 
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The forward points are constructed as shown in Equation 2 below. 
Equation 2: Definition of Forward Points 
 
Where we assume the following notation: 
bD  Day count convention for the base currency (here the USD)  
qD  Day count convention for the quoted currency (here each EM 
currency)  
M  Maturity of the forward in days (assumed 30days for one month 
forwards) 
1.3.2.3 Market Determined Forward Exchange Rates 
One very important feature of our work here is that in constructing the 
one month forward points we availed ourselves of interest rates as implied by 
the instrument actively traded in each country’s currency market. This 
includes outright forward exchange rates or non-deliverable forwards (NDFs) 
or deliverable off-shore or on-shore interest rates. We now turn to review in 
greater detail a number of considerations central to an EM investor’s market 
approach.  
The non deliverable forwards are forwards where there is no physical 
settlement at time  T . This means that in our example above B would not 
physically deliver RUB to A for exchange of USD at time  T . Instead the 
transaction will be settled by payment between the two participants of the 
difference between TS , the realised spot exchange rate which is also referred 
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to as the Fixing Rate at time T , and TtF , , the forward exchange rate 
prevailing at the time the transaction was agreed upon. The NDF market has 
developed a lot in recent years and has been particularly popular in emerging 
markets where liquidity considerations or capital controls may not allow for a 
fully functioning forwards market. The NDF market enables an investor to take 
a position or cover his currency risk against a potential move in the underlying 
exchange rate and also allows one to express his views on the valuation of a 
currency. Deliverable Forwards would be the vehicle of choice for an investor 
who wishes to hedge a committed exposure in a certain currency. Such 
investors who need to have physical delivery of a certain currency at maturity 
of the forward transaction will typically not invest in NDFs.   
In EM we also often see a differentiation between on-shore and off-shore 
forward exchange rates. This comes as a result of many emerging markets 
still imposing capital controls and all sorts of limitations to the capital that is 
allowed to be invested at local rates. Though the two rates theoretically 
cannot deviate too much or for long periods of time, market access limitations 
allow for significant discrepancies. Often investors with physical presence in 
the country can have access to the on-shore rates.  
Table 4 below gives a brief description of the exchange rate regime and 
market stylized facts prevailing in each one of the currency markets we 
include in our model. It is important to note that the majority of emerging 
markets have seen at some point in time a change in the policy, the currency 
regime or market regulations that apply domestically. Although our sample of 
countries is no exception to this rule of transition and change in regimes, we 
manage to sustain some degree of homogeneity in our sample. This we 
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achieve by constructing the outright forwards based on market determined 
interest rates. Therefore under any regime one could either invest in forward 
rates directly if these are available, or replicate the model trade 
recommendation by investing in the spot exchange rate and the market 
determined interest rate and unwind the transaction at some point in the 
future, again at the prevailing spot. So our sample is homogeneous in that all 
the model signals refer to actionable currency trade recommendations.  
Table 4 Currency Regimes as of 2005 
CURRENCY REGIME 
MARKET IMPLIED 
INTEREST RATE 
USED IN 
CALCULATING 
FORWARD 
EXCHANGE 
RATES WAS 
DERIVED FROM 
THE FOLLOWING 
INSTRUMENT 
COMMENT 
ARGENTINE  
PESO 
MANAGED FLOATING 
WITH NO PRE-
ANNOUNCED PATH FOR 
THE EXCHANGE RATE 
NON DELIVERABLE 
FORWARDS 
Not freely convertible/ 
restrictions apply/ CB * 
intervenes regularly / 
ARS was fixed at ARS1.4 to 
one USD from Jan.1, 1992 
to Jan. 6 2002 
BRAZILIAN 
REAL 
INDEPENDENTALY  
FLOATING  
NON DELIVERABLE 
FORWARDS 
Non convertible/ CB* 
intervenes on ad hoc basis 
CHILEAN PESO INDEPENDENTALY  FLOATING 
NON DELIVERABLE 
FORWARDS 
Not freely convertible/ 
restrictions apply/  Free-
Floating Currency/ 
CB* may intervene  
occasionally 
COLOMBIAN 
PESO 
INDEPENDENTALY  
FLOATING 
NON DELIVERABLE 
FORWARDS 
Not freely convertible/ 
restrictions apply/Free-
Floating Currency/ 
CB* intervenes  regularly  
CZECH 
KORUNA 
MANAGED FLOATING 
WITH NO PRE-
ANNOUNCED PATH FOR 
THE EXCHANGE RATE 
DELIVERABLE 
FORWARDS 
Fully convertible/ free 
floating/ CB* may intervene 
regularly particularly in the 
EUR/CZK bilateral exchange 
rate 
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HUNGARY 
FORINT 
PEGGED EXCHANGE 
RATE WITHIN 
HORIZONTAL BANDS 
DELIVERABLE 
FORWARDS 
Fully convertible/CB* 
intervenes to ensure the 
EUR/HUF trades within the 
+/-15% band around a 
central parity  as required by 
ERM–II prior to joining the 
EMU 
INDIAN RUPEE 
MANAGED FLOATING 
WITH NO PRE-
ANNOUNCED PATH FOR 
THE EXCHANGE RATE 
NON DELIVERABLE 
FORWARDS 
Restrictions apply/  Reserve 
Bank of India intervenes to 
maintain a Real effective 
exchange rate stability 
INDONESIAN 
RUPIAH 
MANAGED FLOATING 
WITH NO PRE-
ANNOUNCED PATH FOR 
THE EXCHANGE RATE 
NON DELIVERABLE 
FORWARDS 
Restrictions apply/ free 
floating/ CB intervenes 
occasionally to maintain 
stability 
MALAYSIAN 
RINGGIT 
VARYING FROM 
MANAGED FLOATING TO 
FIXED 
NON DELIVERABLE 
FORWARDS 
DURING OUR REAL LIFE 
APPLICATION MYR WAS 
FIXED AND THUS WE 
REMOVED IT FROM THE 
TESTING 
MEXICAN 
PESO 
INDEPENDENTALY  
FLOATING 
DELIVERABLE 
FORWARDS 
Fully convertible/ free 
floating/ CB intervenes 
occasionally 
PHILIPPINES 
PESO 
INDEPENDENTALY  
FLOATING 
NON DELIVERABLE 
FORWARDS 
Restrictions apply/  
CB* intervenes to limit sharp 
fluctuations in the exchange 
rate  
POLISH ZLOTY INDEPENDENTALY  FLOATING 
DELIVERABLE 
FORWARDS 
Free floating/ fully 
convertible/CB rarely 
intervenes 
RUSSIAN 
RUBLE 
MANAGED FLOATING 
WITH NO PRE-
ANNOUNCED PATH FOR 
THE EXCHANGE RATE 
NON DELIVERABLE 
FORWARDS 
Restrictions applied pre- 
june 2004/ fully convertible 
since 2006/Central Bank of 
Russia intervenes to 
maintain a stable ruble 
exchange rate 
SINGAPORE 
DOLLAR 
MANAGED FLOATING 
WITH NO PRE-
ANNOUNCED PATH FOR 
THE EXCHANGE RATE 
DELIVERABLE 
FORWARDS 
Restrictions apply/ fully 
convertible/ Monetary 
Authority of Singapore 
(MAS) manages the SGD 
against an undisclosed trade 
weighted index 
SLOVAKIAN 
KORUNA 
MANAGED FLOATING 
WITH NO PRE-
ANNOUNCED PATH FOR 
THE EXCHANGE RATE 
DELIVERABLE 
FORWARDS 
During our sample period 
the CB would intervene 
regularly/ Slovakia adopted 
the EUR and the SKK 
seized to exist in Jan 2009 
SOUTH 
AFRICAN RAND 
INDEPENDENTALY  
FLOATING 
DELIVERABLE 
FORWARDS 
Not fully 
convertible/restrictions 
apply/CB intervenes heavily  
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SOUTH KOREA 
WON 
INDEPENDENTALY  
FLOATING 
NON DELIVERABLE 
FORWARDS 
Restrictions apply /  
both the CB* and the 
Ministry of finance and 
economy intervene 
occasionally   
TAIWAN 
DOLLAR 
INDEPENDENTALY  
FLOATING 
NON DELIVERABLE 
FORWARDS 
Managed floating/ 
Restrictions apply / CB* 
intervenes heavily 
THAILAND 
BAHT 
MANAGED FLOATING 
WITH NO PRE-
ANNOUNCED PATH FOR 
THE EXCHANGE RATE 
DELIVERABLE 
FORWARDS 
Managed floating since 
2001/ restrictions apply / 
Authorities intervene and 
have imposed capital 
controls occasionally  
TURKISH LIRA INDEPENDENTALY  FLOATING 
DELIVERABLE 
FORWARDS 
Fully convertible and 
deliverable/ floating from 
1998 to 1999, crawling peg 
from 1999 to 2001, fully 
floating since 2001/Central 
Bank intervenes 
occasionally 
VENEZUELAN 
BOLIVAR 
VARYING FROM 
MANAGED FLOATING TO 
FIXED  
NON DELIVERABLE 
FORWARDS 
DURING OUR REAL LIFE 
APPLICATION VEB WAS 
FIXED AND THUS WE 
REMOVED IT FROM THE 
TESTING 
Note: (*) CB stands for Central Bank 
1.3.2.4 Returns Defined on a Forward Exchange Rate Basis 
Our goal is to model and forecast returns from investing on the one 
month forward exchange rate of a number of emerging markets globally. In 
practice our definition of returns for any given calendar month, measures the 
extend to which, the one-month-forward exchange rate available in the market 
at time t  will deviate from what the spot exchange rate ends up being one 
month later at time T . Effectively we wish to capture the out-performance and 
under-performance of the realized nominal spot exchange rate from what the 
market had priced in, when adjusting the spot exchange rate prevailing one 
month earlier for the one month cost of carry.  
Equation 3: Forward Exchange Rate Return  below gives the expression 
we use to calculate the returns on a forward rate basis.  
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Equation 3: Forward Exchange Rate Return  
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Where:  
TtR ,  denotes the return from investing at time t , in the forward exchange 
rate maturing at time T  
TS  denotes the spot exchange rate prevailing at the maturity of the 
forward exchange rate transaction 
Modelling returns on a forward rate basis relates to investor’s interest but 
is also an approach that allows us to maximise the number of observations 
available and get a better sense of the underlying currency dynamics during 
periods of floating exchange rate regimes but also during currency pegs and 
in particular at the point of transition from fixed to floating regimes. Below we 
present the arguments that support our thinking. Most of the exchange rates 
we include in our sample have been fixed for some part of their recent history. 
Following the majority of literature on currency crises and focusing on 
changes of the nominal spot exchange rate alone, would significantly reduce 
the number of observations available, simply because, during periods of fixed 
exchange rate regimes the spot, by definition, does not move. Arguably the 
focus of the academic literature has been on the time of transition from fixed 
to floating regimes, which is exactly what constitutes a crisis for most. 
However, we find that the forward rates will tend to provide signals long 
before the peg is abandoned. Therefore most papers that try to forecast when 
a peg will be abandoned may be missing out on significant amount of 
information by not accounting for market implied pressures on a fixed spot 
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exchange rate on the run up to a currency crisis. As Figure 1 below shows, 
the market implied forwards were reflecting the build up of exchange rate 
pressure at least six months before Argentina decided to move from a regime 
where the Argentine peso was pegged to the dollar, to a floating regime. The 
ARS peg was abandoned on January 6th 2002 while the first signs of 
weakening were priced in the forward rates as early as June 2001. 
Figure 1 ARS move from fixed to floating Jan 2002 
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During periods of floating exchange rate regimes, forward exchange 
rates suggest themselves as the most appropriate variable to model as they 
account for interest rate differentials and determine the real return to 
investors. If the interest rate parity condition was to hold at all time horizons, 
the returns based on our definition above would have to be invariably zero, or 
only slightly different from zero to account for potential transaction costs. 
However, deviations from what the interest rate parity would imply are the rule 
rather than the exception in the short run and we find that indeed the forward 
exchange rate is rarely an accurate predictor of the realized future exchange 
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spot rate. This in turn means that by focusing on returns as defined in 
Equation 3 above, one can reasonably expect to indeed forecast cases where 
investors gain profits, after accounting for the cost of carry.  
We are not the first to attempt to model returns above the cost of carry. 
KMP follow on the steps of CSFB’s EMRI and besides modelling pure spot 
exchange rate depreciation they continue to model what they call 
“unanticipated” depreciation which they define as follows in Equation 4:  
Equation 4: KMP definition  
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In Equation 4 above we have replaced the notation in KMP with our 
notation adopted here to facilitate comparison. The difference between 
Equation 4 and the expression in Equation 3 that we use in our work is 
twofold. First of all at times of fixed exchange rate regimes, during which the  
spot does not change from one month to the next, what we note as “part a” in 
Equation 4, will be zero. As “part a” is multiplied by “part b”, during periods of 
fixed exchange rate regimes the whole expression in Equation 4 will become 
zero. Therefore the above mentioned merit of our analysis in that we can have 
extra observation points during periods of fixed exchange rate regimes, is lost 
in the KPM approach. The second important difference has less to do with the 
mathematical calculation and more to do with the practicalities of data 
availability and the consequences this has for the model results. As noted by 
both KMP and the authors of EMRI the interest rates available to them were 
often not market determined, thus making the “unanticipated” depreciation a 
poor proxy for market determined forward exchange rates that we construct 
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and use in our work hereafter.   
1.3.2.5 Selection of Returns’ Threshold to Model 
The aim of this exercise is to model cases where investors would have 
made substantial returns from investing in local currency versus the USD on a 
one month forward rate basis. What constitutes “substantial” returns is, clearly 
debatable. Most of the papers on currency crises focus on double digit, one-
off depreciations of the spot exchange rate. Some have opted to account for 
momentum as well and have incorporated in their definition of a crisis an 
acceleration factor which assumes that the currency weakening at any time is 
significant but also exceeds the depreciation of that currency in the recent 
past. Depending on the data frequency and chosen horizon, the focus is on 
spot depreciation in any given month or year and the “recent past” is, in turn, 
defined as the previous month or the previous year for example.   
In our analysis we model the cases where an investor gained in any 
given month, more than 5% above the cost of carry, when buying or selling 
any one of 21 emerging market currencies globally on a one month forward 
exchange rate basis. The choice of the 5% threshold is indeed subjective but 
we felt it accommodates a number of key considerations. First of all as we 
focus on returns on a forward rate basis we have already taken into account 
any currency moves due to interest rate differentials. In a way any non-zero 
deviation of the spot from what the market implied forward rates were pricing 
in, translates into net profit for an investor. In that sense, 5% profit above 
carry should compensate the risk appetite of most investors. 
By definition, choosing a lower threshold would give us a greater number 
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of points to model. However, selecting the cases where returns were above 
5%, gives us a sufficiently large number of observations for our dependent 
variable while filtering out a substantial amount of noise, which in volatile 
currencies like the emerging market ones, is bound to be even higher.  
As discussed earlier in this chapter, we do not explicitly account for 
transaction costs in our analysis. Although transaction costs have been on a 
decreasing trend for most emerging market currencies, they are still an 
important consideration which can create entrance barriers for a number of 
investors. Occasions where investment in emerging market currencies would 
have generated more than 5% profit above carry, can reasonably be expected 
to have generated a net profit after transaction costs as well. What is more the 
transaction costs involved in forward rate transactions are significantly less 
than the cost involved in spot transactions, making the case for focusing on 
forward rate returns even stronger.  
Last but not least it is worth pointing out that the returns refer to gains on 
a one month period and not on an annualised basis. EM currencies are 
indeed volatile and likely to move by high percentages at short periods of 
time. Still, making a 5% gain on a single currency month from investing in a 
single currency pair is an option worth pursuing.  
1.3.2.6 Symmetric Assessment of Upside and Downside Risks 
Another important way in which our work here extends on previous 
research is that we assess both upside and downside currency risks in 
emerging markets. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the near consensus 
view in the literature of currency crises is to focus on the risks of potential 
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depreciation. It is quite reasonable that most of the literature on currency 
crises primarily focuses on downside risks as their prime objective is to 
foresee the point in time when a currency is likely to be devalued or 
significantly depreciate after a pegged exchange rate regime is abandoned 
either under the pressure of a successful speculative attack or due to 
inconsistent policy targets. From an investor’s point of view, information on 
both forthcoming significant appreciations and depreciations is equally 
interesting and profitable trades can be implemented in both cases on the 
back of early warning signals.  
In fact the trend has been for emerging market currency to appreciate in 
recent years. So much so that the idea that when you buy and hold emerging 
market currencies you are bound to make a profit sooner or later, merits a 
near consensus status. Indeed it seems that we have entered an era that 
hardly resembles at all that of fixed exchange rates which were under the risk 
of substantial weakening should the peg be abandoned. If we focus on the 
years since 2002, which is the period of time which we use to test our model’s 
forecasting power, we see that all the emerging market currencies included in 
our model have been under a floating exchange rate regime. Arguably the 
degree of independence that this floating regime enjoys varies significantly 
between countries, as Table 4 above shows. Nevertheless recent years have 
also seen improving emerging market fundamentals, greater degree of 
transparency and more liquidity for most emerging markets. This constellation 
of EM supportive factors attracted more capital from new or existing EM–
dedicated investors which under-pinned a trend for most emerging market 
currencies to appreciate.  
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At the same time investors’ rising risk appetite fuelled the search for 
yield-bearing investment instruments. Decreasing but still substantial interest 
rate differentials in favour of emerging market compared to developed 
markets triggered significant capital inflows to emerging market currencies. 
The demand for these so-called “carry trades” was a function of the interest 
rate spread that each currency offered over the relevant holding of US dollars. 
This trend may be unsustainable in the long run especially as the interest 
differential between emerging and developed markets is gradually depleted 
and valuations of emerging market currencies remain stretched prompting 
official intervention on behalf of local Central Banks aiming to smooth 
currency fluctuations or even target specific valuation levels. In the mean 
time, however, the currencies that would be expected to depreciate according 
to the interest rate parity are exactly the ones that tend to appreciate. The 
rationale is that an investor that agrees to buy a “high-carry” currency on a 
forward rate basis expects to at least earn some or all of the carry when he 
unwinds the trade given that the underlying currency, supported by capital 
inflows, is unlikely to have depreciated as much as the forwards had priced in. 
However, as economic theory and empirical evidence suggests, when these 
market exuberances correct, the trend reversal is usually very harsh and fast. 
It is such pressures that make it necessary to continue monitoring the 
downside risks even at times when trade recommendation for selling 
emerging market currencies are not very popular. 
One approach that incorporates both revaluations and devaluations is 
that advocated by Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (ERW) in their mid 
nineties papers. As mentioned earlier, ERW construct an index for exchange 
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rate pressure which comprises of a combination of changes in the exchange 
rate, the official foreign exchange reserves and the interest rates differentials. 
This index may rise or fall capturing spot appreciation or depreciation 
respectively. Even in these studies however, the focus is to gauge the 
downside risks as ERW define crises as the times when the created index 
exceeds the sample mean by more than 1.5 standard deviations. Cases were 
the index level is below the sample mean are not accounted for.  
In our attempt to assess both upside and downside risks we estimate 
two separate parsimonious models one to capture the “appreciation” 
probabilities and one to capture the “depreciation” probabilities. It is important 
to keep the notion of “appreciation” and “depreciation” in the context of 
forward exchange rate returns as defined earlier. Our definition of 
“appreciation”, as shown in Equation 5  involves the cases where the local 
currency is, based on the end of month realised spot exchange rate, more 
than 5% stronger versus the USD than what the one month forward had 
implied one month earlier. 
Equation 5 Definition of “Appreciation” 
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Accordingly, Equation 6 below describes our definition of “depreciation” 
which includes the cases where the local currency is, based on the end of 
month realised spot, more than 5% weaker versus the USD than what the one 
month forward had implied one month earlier.  
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Equation 6: Definition of “Depreciation” 
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The two models are estimated separately and in their final specification 
they have all but one common input variables. The use of two separate 
models allows us to also affect a second level test on the robustness of the 
model performance when translating the model results into trading signals. 
This aspect is discussed in greater detail in a later chapter of this thesis. 
1.3.2.7 High Frequency Dependent Variable 
Given that our goal was to create an investment tool to generate high 
frequency trade recommendations, we chose the period of one calendar 
month as our investment horizon. Effectively the model generated signals for 
any given month are implemented at the first day of the month and closed out, 
in the absence of any risk management, at the last day of that month. This 
point is essential in the tracking of the performance of the model generated 
portfolios.  Our choice of the one month framework was also dictated by data 
availability. Admittedly, the use of very high frequency forward exchange data 
means that you may end up picking up a lot of short-term noise. Moreover the 
model results will be largely driven by the moves in the spot exchange rate 
which is bound to be more volatile than interest rates and particularly in the 
short run.  
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1.4 Conclusion 
In the first Chapter of the thesis we presented in detail the research 
framework that relates to our analysis. We proceeded to outline the significant 
ways in which our work differs from what was done previously. Both 
academics and practitioners have understandably attempted to assess and 
model the dynamics that determine out of the ordinary moves and events in 
financial markets. Events deemed as crises in the banking, debt and currency 
spheres have been in the lime light of Emerging Market economic research 
for decades. The events of the late 2010’s proved that the same risks can 
easily apply to developed markets and, if anything, Emerging Economies 
have learnt from their previous misfortunes and are now leading by example 
in terms of financial and macroeconomic stability. Even before the recent 
events, we opted to analyse currency risks in ways that distinguish us from 
most of the approaches adopted previously. The research that is relevant to 
our work primarily analysed extreme events in currency markets. Such events 
typically involved the case of Central Banks that were either forced to or 
willingly abandoned a fixed exchange rate regime and allowed a currency to 
float. They also involved currencies that were typically devalued or 
depreciated by double digit rates in a repeated fashion. The incidents 
analysed the behaviour of the spot exchange rate. Macro-fundamental or 
qualitative variables were used to explain these incidents via graphical 
analysis or modelling exercises.  
Our work differs in all the aspects mentioned above. We do not wish to 
solely explain extreme currency moves and we do not focus on the spot 
exchange rate. We model significant moves of the forward exchange rate 
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which is relevant to investors. We have a one month horizon and construct 
forwards that replicate what investors would be able to practically trade in 
each emerging market. We do not solely rely on country macro-fundamentals 
but we do only use quantitative variables in our analysis. We adopt a 
parametric approach and apply the same model to all countries and 
throughout the whole sample of data. We aim for a specification that is tested 
on the basis of two aspects. First its ability to fit past history but also its ability 
to produce forecasts that can be translated into actionable trade 
recommendations. This allows us to generate signals that are directly 
comparable. Finally we look at both upside and downside currency pressures 
as both are equally relevant to an investor’s agenda. In the following Chapter 
of our thesis we provide a thorough analysis of the considerations that 
dictated our choice of explanatory variables. 
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2 CHAPTER TWO: Modelling and Forecasting Currency 
Risks in Emerging Markets: Explanatory Variables 
Considered and Selected 
2.1 Introduction 
Data is a very precious commodity in research and it is rightly stated that 
the results you get from a model are only as good as the data you plug in to 
the model to begin with. When compiling the list of possible explanatory 
variables for our model we relied a lot on the usual suspects presented in 
relevant research literature. Academic papers like the ones published by  FR, 
KLR, STV, BP and KMP and market products like Damocles, GS Watch or 
EMRI that were presented in greater detail in Chapter 1 of the thesis, provided 
useful insight with regards to which variables may best capture currency 
crises dynamics. Though there is a lot of common ground in terms of adopted 
methodology and variables considered, there is no consensus regarding the 
variables that work. Variables considered in the relevant literature include 
some form of real effective exchange rates, domestic credit growth, US 
interest rates, exports, money supply often measured as a ratio to foreign 
exchange reserves, output growth, equity prices and a host of other variables.  
We assessed a number of variables and included them in several 
formats and lag structures in various versions of our model. Section 2.2 
outlines the qualitative and quantitative characteristics considered when 
assessing the candidate explanatory variables. These considerations, often 
supported by statistical results from our estimations, allowed us to filter the 
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initially large sample of potential explanatory variables down to a handful of 
time series which we include in our selected parsimonious specification.   
An issue of particular importance in our research here which also 
differentiates ours from previous work is the accuracy with which we approach 
the definition and format of each and every variable we used. Take oil prices 
for example, a data series that has been used as an explanatory variable by 
others. As far as we are concerned no paper would specify whether the data 
used were prices of crude or some other type of oil, let alone specify whether 
it is a region specific crude oil like the Urals crude Russians trade or Brent 
crude. We could not find a paper that would even specify if the data used refer 
to spot prices or prices of futures contracts. We strongly feel that one needs to 
be very explicit about the definition of the selected data as most versions are 
rather irrelevant to what we try to model.  
We also find very few examples where the format of the data is 
explained or supported in detail. In our work we consider every variable in a 
number of formats such as level form, percentage change on a monthly, 
yearly or three month basis and other formats in which a variable is usually 
monitored by market participants. We try to assess as many versions as 
possible guided by intuition and common practice. However we remain wary 
of the effect that even the simplest mathematical transformation can have on 
the information content of data series. At the same time we remain conscious 
of the fact that no quantitative technique can capture all the factors that 
matter. We prefer to stick to a minimum common denominator approach 
which, although misses out on a number of country specific and crises 
specific attributes, serves well in providing a snapshot of global currency risks 
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in a form that allows for comparison between countries and throughout time.  
In Section 2.3 we present the different variables we considered, the 
various versions that were reviewed and why we find that they may or may 
not be of relevance to a modelling exercise like ours. Section 2.4 proceeds to 
present in greater detail the handful of variables that were consistent from a 
statistical performance point of view and compatible with our rationale and 
market understanding. It is these variables we include in our selected 
specifications that we apply and review in Chapter 3 and 4 of the thesis. 
2.2 Data Considerations 
We proceed to briefly outline the key conditions that we expected our 
candidate variables to meet in order to even consider including them in the 
estimated model specifications. The criteria are driven by economic theory 
linked to market practicalities, limitations and realities we have found to be of 
extreme importance and relevance.  
2.2.1 Data Consistency 
A rather unobvious data consideration we had to be aware of is that 
even the most straightforward data series need not have the same definition 
for all the countries in our sample. Take the data on “Central Bank net non-
gold foreign exchange reserves” for example, one of the key variables in the 
currency crises literature. The data title seems self explanatory, in practice 
though the composition of the data that market participants use may vary 
significantly across countries. For example, South Africa market analysts 
focus on non-gold FX reserves minus foreign loans and net forward position. 
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For Turkey the same data series most likely includes non-gold FX reserves 
net of outstanding obligations to the IMF. For Colombia the data include non-
gold FX reserves net of Central bank’s liabilities. Opting to get the data for all 
countries from a single source such as the IMF or a single data provider such 
as Bloomberg or Datastream did not resolve the issue of different 
compositions under the same data title. In cases where the title of the data did 
not correspond to the same definition across our sample of countries we first 
tried to minimize the differences and finally opted to use the data that market 
economists found to be more relevant for each country. 
2.2.2 Frequency of Explanatory Variables 
As discussed in Chapter 1, our dependent variable is a high frequency 
series of monthly returns on a forward exchange rate basis. The obvious 
choice for the variables that explain these returns would be to use monthly 
data series as well. Many papers use quarterly or even annual data but these 
papers tend to focus on medium to longer term horizons than we do and 
adopt quarterly or more often annual data for their dependent variable as well. 
Importantly, most of these papers remain theoretical in their focus and are not 
concerned with the applicability of their recommended model specification in 
forecasting the immediate future. We have different considerations to address 
than those faced by theoretical research papers as our work focuses on the 
usability of the results and the forecasting power of the selected specification.  
The papers that, like us, adopt a high frequency dependent variable 
again use quarterly or annual data but affect some sort of interpolation to 
these series in an attempt to make the left and right hand side of the equation 
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consistent in terms of time frequency. One paper which as mentioned earlier, 
answers questions similar to ours is the 2002 paper by KMP. KMP used 
annual and quarterly data in their work and interpolated these series via fitting 
cubic splines to the data. We strongly feel that any method of interpolation, 
and cubic splines are no exception, introduces a bias in the model for a 
number of reasons listed hereafter. 
 To begin with, some of the macro data one may wish to incorporate in 
an exercise like ours are stock data. Take for example the use of GDP data 
as an explanatory variable which has been advocated by many relevant 
papers. GDP data are at best available on a quarterly basis. Assuming any 
particular way or accumulation of GDP from the first to the last month of any 
given quarter seems arbitrary and of little use, as the reality which we try to 
model is most certainly different from our assumptions.  Such data 
manipulations may be more relevant for the research on early warning 
systems where the forecasting horizon is one or two years ahead and the use 
of low frequency data is less problematic if not desirable.  
KMP do not discuss the problem presented when dealing with stock 
data, but they do mention that in order to account for flow data they first 
cumulate the series, then effect the interpolation and finally difference the 
resulting monthly series. Take current account data for example which is a 
series of flow data in that the quarterly data reflect the current account of that 
quarter alone. We feel that cumulating or interpolating such a series to higher 
frequency data, leads to a specification that models a different reality than the 
one we wish to forecast in the future. It seems to us that one would need to 
first carry out extended research on what is the seasonality and modelling 
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behaviour of each of these series separately and for each country in turn 
before moving to the next level of actually modelling currency moves using 
these series as input. This exercise is very laborious but, more importantly, it 
is by definition futile, as it would not conclude to results that could be usable in 
a modelling exercise like ours. 
Another problem that arises when one uses monthly data which have 
been interpolated from annual data, is that going forward, he will need to use 
annual or quarterly data as well. Fitting a model on data that were interpolated 
from past available annual data is straightforward. Going forward though, if 
your explanatory variables are only available on a low frequency, you will 
need to use either extrapolations of past data or forecasts. Even if one 
unrealistically assumes constant availability of reliable forecasts in the future, 
you need to revise these forecasts periodically. Therefore your results will be 
updated accordingly based on the newly available estimates at any given 
time. Most importantly though, you will have estimated a model based on real 
facts and you will be applying it on assumptions. This was simply not an 
option in our exercise.   
The explanatory variables considered and included in our model were all 
available on a monthly basis. This limits our selection somewhat but we felt 
very strongly against the use of any methods of interpolation of lower 
frequency data such as annual or quarterly, to monthly. We also see little use 
in finding a relationship that works with data from real historic time series and 
then attempt to implement the relationship on forecasts and estimates on 
variables that almost never come up close to even consensus expectations. 
Most macro economic data estimates are released with a considerable lag, 
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and even then are subsequently revised upwards or downwards for quite 
some time until a more accurate actual measurement is available. We believe 
that adding to that an extra degree of subjectivity by interpolating forecasts 
which are likely to be inaccurate would render the results even more spurious.  
Ultimately the matter at hand here is whether one wants to model the 
link between fundamentals and currency moves or the way in which markets 
are bound to react to every release and adjustment. We do wish to capture 
the links between macro data and currency moves. However, to the extent 
that such links are either coincident and not possible to capture by our model, 
or to the extent that macro indicators can act as a low frequency indicator of 
pressure in the medium run, which again is not consistent with our high 
frequency analysis we chose to exclude these variables.  
2.2.3 Standardization of Explanatory Variables 
An issue that relates to and expands on both previous sections on data 
availability and consistency is the process of standardisation of the 
explanatory variables. There are two sorts of data standardisation that one 
sees more often. Filtering out extreme data points from a data series and 
standardising a data series with regards to the sample mean and deviation. 
We do not apply any of these types of standardisation to the data as we aim 
to extract from the series as much information as possible. Information that 
we feel is lost or at best distorted when crude methods of standardisation are 
introduced.  
Often extreme points are deleted from a series in the name of facilitating 
the model estimation and getting results that will not be biased because of a 
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few extreme values present in the sample. Our way of thinking is again 
somewhat different. We are very wary of generally smoothing out irregular 
data points. First of all the definition of “irregularity” tends to be either very 
sample specific or at best subject to the researcher’s interpretation. More 
often than not what may seem irregular on a graph plot is in fact a very real 
event which occurred for any number of reasons and may or may not have led 
to a structural break in the series. 
 We are aware of the limitations that any quantitative instrument has in 
capturing all real world incidents going forward. But as long as we aim to 
model the constantly changing environment of emerging markets, we should 
make every effort to ensure that our model either captures these breaks and 
outliers or that we have at least a very clear idea of the model limitations in 
each case. The only outliers we wish to “clean” our data from are those 
introduced in the sample by human error. As there is by definition no 
consensus on which values have been distorted by human error, we once 
again recall the market awareness of specialists and discuss each point in 
turn before deleting only a handful of data points and replacing them by the 
simple arithmetic average of the previous and following points.  
We now address the other standardisation often affected by researchers, 
that of expressing a data series as a function of a sample specific mean and 
deviation. In our analysis we use different starting points in almost every 
country which means that we would be standardising each series based on a 
different horizon. Moreover even if our country samples had common starting 
points there is no way of selecting the optimum sample length or even period. 
What is more, there is no way of deciding on the best way to implement the 
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model results going forward. There seems to be no clear answer on whether 
one should keep extending the sample constantly or adopt a rolling window 
keeping the sample size constant.  In any case we object to the 
standardisation of the data in any manner that may result in the loss of 
information and remain apprehensive of using a methodology that renders our 
results sample specific. 
2.2.4 Coincident versus Leading Indicators 
Our aim is not only to model forward rate returns but also to forecast 
future returns on a monthly basis. Therefore, our explanatory variables need 
to be leading indicators of future exchange rate moves. There is little use for 
us to consider changes in variables that coincide with, let alone lag, forward 
exchange rates moves, much as this is intellectually interesting and 
theoretically solid. The focus in our analysis is the applicability of the model in 
forecasting future monthly returns.  In any given calendar we can at best avail 
ourselves of data from the previous calendar month and calculate the model 
results with regards to the following month’s forward exchange rate returns. 
Therefore, our preferred choice would be to work with indicators that perform 
well at two month lag from the forecast month. These data need to be 
available in a timely manner and on a regular monthly basis and, importantly, 
they should not be revised following their initial release. 
2.2.5 Quantitative versus Qualitative Variables  
Data availability in emerging markets can be a great challenge even 
regarding quantifiable data such as GDP, public accounts and financial 
markets. Most data are available with a few months lag and will most likely be 
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heavily revised for a number of months following their initial release. 
Discontinuities in data series, change in the data definition or in the 
construction and estimation methodology, outliers and differences between 
similar series from different countries are but a few of the hurdles that make 
filtering a sample of emerging market quantitative data a challenging task.   
Qualitative factors such as political stability, market sentiment or 
contagion are equally if not even more important than fundamental or market 
data in emerging markets. Attempts have been made to quantify such 
elements in order to include them in a parametric model specification or a 
graphical approach, in order to render that analysis more accurate. We 
strongly feel that it is literally impossible to quantify such variables in any 
objective, consistent and meaningful manner.  
Take political stability for example. Assigning a factor or a dummy 
variable to indicate the existence, lack of or degree of political stability at any 
point in the past is utterly subject to a researcher’s assessment. This alone 
renders the results biased and defies the primary purpose of building a 
technical tool, which is to achieve objectivity. What is more, the same 
individual is more than likely to attribute a different degree of importance to 
any event, past, present or future as new pieces of information become 
available. This alone makes it impossible to assign a value to these factors 
and dictates the need to constantly reassess the estimation results which are 
based on past data, thus jeopardising the whole exercise of building a usable 
tool.   
Importantly, even if one is to somewhat assign values to quantify past 
observations, it is practically impossible to forecast future observations, or at 
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least with any degree of accuracy and insight that would make sense to trust, 
let alone use. It is also unrealistic to expect such variables to have an effect 
which will not only be quantifiable but will also act as a leading indictor and a 
consistent one for a particular time horizon. Thus it is unlikely that any of 
these values would have an effect on monthly forward exchange rates with 
two month lag, which is the earlier that we can possibly calculate and the 
latest we are willing to use. This alone makes it futile to try and quantify the 
information content of such variables.  
Contagion is a factor that has been cited as key for the “domino effect” 
that often characterises the aftermath of a crisis and its spill-over to other 
emerging markets. Contagion is a variable very heavily debated in the 
literature on currency and financial or banking crises in emerging markets. 
The rationale is that following a currency crisis in one country the probability 
that other countries will experience similar crises increases. Contagion 
however has taken a different shape and form every time it occurred. 
Common fundamental weaknesses, geographic or trade links have often 
provided the channels through which crises have spilled over from one 
country to the next. Such was the case for the Asian Flu crisis when a number 
of Asian currencies were affected after the initial events in Thailand which led 
to the collapse of the Thai baht in the summer of 1997. In other instances, the 
domino effect that followed a country specific crisis was triggered by 
international portfolio flows which may have been reversed for any number of 
reasons such as global recession. Sudden portfolio flows reversal was the 
main reason why Brazil followed Russia in crisis in 1998. After Russia 
defaulted in 1998 many emerging market investors sold profit making 
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Brazilian assets and used the proceeds to unwind their positions in Russia as 
fast as possible and cover part of their losses.  
Many research papers, attempt to quantify the contagion effect but end 
up capturing only some of the forms mentioned above, if that. We feel that 
such qualitative factors are better assessed via their indirect effect on other 
quantifiable variables. We prefer to exclude such variables from our model 
altogether instead of doing a poor job describing them. 
2.2.6 Macro Economic Fundamentals and Market Data  
Country specific macroeconomic data are a credible indicator of 
currency pressures. Fiscal or trade account balances, growth rate, inflation, 
foreign exchange reserves, debt levels are but a few country variables that 
markets monitor in an attempt to assess a country’s financial health.  
However, as mentioned earlier in this chapter as well, macroeconomic data in 
general, and even more so in emerging markets, are only available with a 
great delay and more often than not are heavily revised a number of times 
following their initial release. What is more, many economic data are either 
coincident or very early indicators of currency or other market moves. 
Importantly, there is no unique correct way to interpret or forecast the 
significance and effect of any given macroeconomic indicator on a currency’s 
performance. 
For example a rise in interest rates may trigger a weakening of the 
respective country currency as markets become wary of the effect of tighter 
monetary conditions on growth prospects. At the same time higher interest 
rates in many emerging markets often attract foreign capital from investors 
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seeking to capture the higher yield offered by these so-called “carry-
currencies”. The FX market pricing will often reflect investors’ view on a 
central bank’s ability to stay “ahead of the curve”. That is the ability of policy 
makers to tackle monetary risks before they are perceived to get out of 
control. Most emerging market central banks have in recent years adopted 
official inflation targeting to appease such concerns. But the balance between 
inflation and growth is a battle that has yet to be decided. The effect of each 
macro variable is further conditioned on country specific factors such as the 
point in the business cycle that a country finds itself or overall economic 
fundamentals and political and social environment. It also almost invariably 
depends on external factors such as global economic circumstances and 
emerging market specific conditions. Given all these considerations it is 
therefore unsurprising that we find most macroeconomic data of little use in 
our forward looking research exercise.  
Research has also often turned to market data for indicators that lead 
moves in exchange rate markets. Market data such as credit spreads, swap 
spreads or equity indices are assumed to discount all the information 
available to market participants. It seems appealing to try to use these data as 
packaged information on a number of different economic variables. Moreover, 
market data allow one to indirectly assess investors’ perception of qualitative 
factors, such as a country’s political stability.  
Most EM financial markets have faced some type of distortion, such as 
access limitations or intervention policies at some point during our sample 
history. Even at times of reasonably free market dynamics liquidity is a key 
consideration. Pricing may only reflect a fairly insignificant change in light 
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positioning and not a change in perception from a well informed market group. 
These changes are attributed to the so-called “technical factors” and are 
closely monitored by investors as they may offer good entry or exit levels to 
otherwise “crowded” trades. It may not be reasonable to expect that any 
market can be used in a consistent manner across time and countries to 
encapsulate macro dynamics. In any case there is no good reason why one 
financial market such as debt or equities should consistently lead 
developments in another market such as foreign exchange. Our results amply 
confirm the hypothesis that different financial markets move in a more or less 
coincident manner. Therefore it is not possible to use financial market data as 
early indicators for future currency market returns. 
2.2.7 Global versus Country Specific Data 
Country specific data are variables that take different values for every 
country. Such country specific variables may be anything from 
macroeconomic data, like the real effective exchange rate, to financial data, 
like a country’s equity index. By definition they are specific to and reflective of 
each country’s economic and other conditions. Global factors on the other 
hand, are variables such as market risk appetite which are not conditioned on 
single country circumstances. Our research focuses on emerging markets. 
The consideration of global factors in our model specification enables us to 
capture elements which affect the emerging markets universe in a more or 
less homogeneous manner, as opposed to developed markets. For example, 
increasing risk appetite could be expected to coincide with or lead to greater 
interest in riskier investments such as emerging markets assets.  
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2.3 Candidate Explanatory Variables: Definition, rationale and 
formats considered 
In our attempt to model and forecast exchange rate returns we tested all 
the usual suspects in terms of explanatory variables. The country specific 
data we considered include Real Effective Exchange Rates (REERs), trade 
balances, credit to the private sector, industrial production, foreign exchange 
reserves, money supply, country specific rating actions from S&P and the 
Morgan Stanley Composite Equity Indices (MSCI). Some of the global factors 
we tried out include the Institute of Supply Management (ISM) Purchasing 
Managers Index (PMI), the OECD leading indicator, oil prices and data 
provided by Moody’s on world default rates. In the sections that follow we turn 
to each one of these variables separately and present and assess them in 
light of the considerations and criteria outlined in Section 2.2 above. 
2.3.1 Global variables 
We first review the so called Global Variables that we considered. The 
rationale, as presented earlier in Section 2.2.7 is that we treat the Emerging 
Markets Universe as a fairly homogeneous group which we expect to be 
affected by and react to global dynamics in a more or less synchronized 
manner. We fully acknowledge that emerging markets can differ significantly 
in more or less all aspects from politics and adopted policies to prevailing 
macro fundamentals and future prospects. However as these countries have 
come a long way in recent years they now present an asset class which has 
grown to be more transparent, more liquid and almost with no exception 
deliver higher returns than what is referred to as Developed Markets. It is this 
characteristic of higher returns that  by definition comes with greater risks and 
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volatility. This may be one of the few common denominators that apply to 
most if not all emerging markets. It is this common feature that we believe is 
worth trying to capture with a Global Variable. A variable that will work as a 
proxy for global risk appetite. The expectation is that at times of euphoria it 
would translate into investment dynamics that are favourable towards EM and 
at times of risk aversion will likely trigger a generalised EM sell off. The latter 
could even describe the earlier mentioned contagion effect, which will affect 
negatively the bulk if not all emerging markets irrespective of country specific 
characteristics.   
2.3.1.1 ISM Indices 
The Institute of Supply Management (ISM) is a US non-for-profit 
organisation which since the 1920s has been publishing a number of indices 
on a regular basis which are closely monitored by market participants. ISM 
publishes indices on both the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors 
of the economy and on different sub-sections of these sectors. Both the ISM 
Manufacturing and the ISM non-Manufacturing are monthly reports, available 
on a timely manner as they are respectively published on the first and third 
business day of the month and refer to the previous calendar month. 
 The ISM indices are “diffusion indices” and compare the changes in 
each market on a month to month basis. The index readings capture the 
sector specific momentum with an index reading between 50 and 100 
indicating growth in the relevant sector and an index reading between 0 and 
50 indicating that the relevant sector is contracting. The ISM indices are not 
compiled based on market data. Instead they are constructed based on the 
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responses from thousands of market participants with regards to their 
understanding and perception of activity on different areas of their business. 
For example, a reading above 50 for the “current new orders” segment of the 
ISM manufacturing report indicates that the majority of market participants 
that responded to the survey placed more new orders in the current month 
compared to the previous one.   
The ISM Purchasing Managers Index (PMI), which is part of the ISM 
report on the manufacturing sector, is one of the most representative and 
informative indicators for overall business activity. The PMI is constructed as 
a combination of sub-indices. In particular new orders form around 30% of the 
PMI, production covers 25%, delivery covers 15%, inventory 10% and 
employment 20%.  According to the ISM a PMI reading above 50 indicates 
growth in the US manufacturing sector.  
We tried out the ISM PMI index in our model estimations in level form 
and also in month on month and year on year changes (hereafter mom and 
yoy respectively) by taking differences of the index levels at the respective 
horizons. We felt that this series would be a good example of a global factor 
that we looked to include in our model. It is quantitative, market-related, 
available monthly on a regular and timely fashion and it provides an indication 
of the status of the US economy. Given that most often the US economy is 
the benchmark people use to judge the overall universe of developed 
economies and also given that in our model we look at all the emerging 
market currencies versus the US dollar the ISM PMI index seemed like a 
strong candidate for inclusion in our model.    
Our statistical findings did not support our assumptions and we did not 
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include any version of the ISM PMI index in the final model specification. This 
does not suggest that the information content of the index is not as strong as 
previously thought. It is very difficult to find a variable that consistently 
explains currency risks, let alone on a monthly basis and in the same manner 
for a total of 21 countries.  
2.3.1.2 Oil Prices 
Commodity prices are often monitored by market participants as they 
may provide a credible signal for the phase of the cycle in which we are at any 
given point. They may also give a country specific signal for a market that 
heavily relies on that particular commodity either as a net importer or a net 
exporter. Oil is one commodity that every economy depends on albeit in 
different ways and to different degrees. It is therefore not clear how one would 
expect oil prices to affect the currencies of 21 emerging markets in a 
homogeneous manner. Even if we crudely assume some degree of 
homogeneity there is no unique clear cause and effect relationship to model. 
It is also not clear which exact data series it is best to use to capture what one 
expects from oil prices. 
Starting from the first concern mentioned above, although the same oil 
prices will prevail for all countries it is debatable whether oil should be 
included as a global factor or as a country specific variable with separate 
estimated coefficients for each country or different country groups. For 
starters some of the largest oil producing and exporting countries are to be 
found within the emerging markets universe. Countries like Russia, Venezuela 
and Mexico stand to benefit from an increase in global oil prices. Some 
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analysts have included oil prices as a dummy variable that only affects net oil 
exporting emerging markets.  We strongly feel that the effect of oil prices on 
oil importers is just as interesting for an investor, especially one that is betting 
on both the strengthening and the weakening of local currencies.  In any case 
we are unwilling to use a dummy variable in order to capture a factor as 
versatile as oil prices.  
Even if one distinguishes between oil importers and exporters there still 
remain a host of other differentiating factors un-addressed. An increase in oil 
prices may be driven by a number of reasons like increase of demand over 
winter or decrease of supply due to supply interactions or even following a 
change in international oil cartel policies. Oil prices may well increase during 
an economic expansion as increase in manufacturing and other sectors 
dictate the need for more and more oil supply which drives oil prices up 
globally. At the same time when oil prices increase for an extended period 
and rise to extreme levels for any number of reasons they put global growth at 
a risk as manufacturing costs increase significantly and expansion is stalled 
while it becomes only a matter of time before part of the costs are passed 
through to the consumer and inflation risks revive. Let’s assume that weaker 
global growth and worsening growth prospects, in general coincide or trigger 
a more risk-averse environment which, in turn, is likely to adversely affect 
riskier assets like emerging markets. This argument suggests that one should 
include oil prices in a model as a global factor with an inverse relationship to 
local currency strength. Nevertheless it is far from clear how one would 
identify which levels of oil prices suggest the economy is overheating and 
which levels indicate economic growth. 
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To add to the complexity of the issue one has to decide which series to 
use. Relevant research papers typically provide a vague reference by stating 
that one of the variables considered or used is oil prices. As mentioned at the 
introduction of this Chapter, one may have used data on crude oil or other oil 
categories, they may have used region specific crude oil data and they may 
have used spot prices or futures. It follows from our research and discussions 
with market analysts that as far as oil is concerned the most relevant series 
would be the West Texas Intermediate (WTI) which is a crude oil traded on 
New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX). We look at the futures contracts 
which quote prices for the WTI that is nearer to delivery, and often by the end 
of the current month. As we look for a market indicator it makes sense to use 
the prices in the futures contracts as these are monitored by most market 
participants and also affected by all those who trade oil even if they are not 
looking to take or make physical delivery of the product.  
We were interested in the role that oil prices, as described above, may 
have as a leading indicator of pressure in world markets. We thus included 
the relevant series in our model as a global factor expressed as an annualized 
percentage change over three month periods and we also looked at the 
monthly difference of that measure to try and potentially capture momentum. 
The statistical findings verified our concern that it is difficult to objectively 
capture the different effects that this variable may have under different 
scenarios. Effectively we did not include any measure of oil prices in our 
specification. One valid argument would be to try and incorporate the oil 
prices we tested above as a country specific variable with country specific 
estimated coefficients that may vary significantly from country to country. We 
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already capture this element however by the inclusion of the Real Effective 
Exchange Rates. The latter are calculated using headline inflation data, which 
is the measure of inflation that incorporates food and energy prices. Oil prices 
are the main element of the latter. We will return to the analysis of REERs in 
greater detail in section 2.4.1 below.  
2.3.1.3 OECD Leading Indicator 
One of the criteria based on which we selected explanatory variables 
was the ability of the data to serve as leading indicators, in that they 
consistently provide early warning signals for future emerging market currency 
risks. Therefore, the OECD Leading Indicator (LI) seemed an obvious 
candidate for explanatory variable. The OECD started publishing a list of 
leading indicators back in the 1980s, in an attempt to provide market 
participants with indicators that reliably precede and signal the turning points 
of the economic cycle.  The OECD publishes composite leading indicators 
(CLIs) which are either country specific or cover the whole group of OECD 
countries. In our analysis we focus on the overall OECD CLI which can 
provide a useful indicator of global economic activity and predict the turning 
points and growth momentum of industrial production which may be seen as a 
proxy for output growth and economic activity in general. The OECD CLI 
approach is based on growth cycle methodology and therefore an upturn will 
correspond to an increase in growth while a downturn will correspond to a 
decline in growth rates, and not necessary a recession or decline in overall 
economic activity. 
The OECD CLI is a weighted aggregate of country specific CLIs which, 
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in turn, are a sum of both quantitative data such as short term interest rates or 
equity prices, and qualitative factors such as consumer confidence and overall 
economic climate. The OECD publishes the data on its CLIs in two versions 
as a de-trended time series and as trend-restored series. The de-trended 
series makes it easier to identify turning points and assess the ability of the 
CLI to accurately provide leading signals for future turning points. The trend 
restored series allows for a more direct comparison between the CLI and the 
series which is used as a reference point when calculating the CLI. The 
reference series is in most cases the Index of Industrial Production (IIP) which 
covers almost all industry sectors and also proved to be a good proxy for 
overall economic activity as measured by GDP.  In December 2002 the OECD 
updated the reference series, the component series and the methodology of 
composing the indices and for estimating the relevant trend of the reference 
series. 
In our model estimations here we try out the trend restored version of the 
updated series of the OECD CLI. In particular we look at the 3month on 3 
month percentage change of the CLI which we then annualise (3mo3mann). 
We also look at the momentum of this measure. OECD recommends the use 
of the trend restored CLIs and also suggests the use of the 6month 
percentage change on an annualised basis (6mo6mann). The 3month version 
that we adopted allows us to capture the dynamics of the index while keeping 
the reference horizon shorter than the 6month OECD formula and bringing it 
closer to our high frequency needs.  
We found that the series had the expected sign in our estimations in that 
an increase in the OECD CLI on a 3mo3mann basis typically preceded a 
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month during which emerging market currencies tended to appreciate on a 
forward rate basis. The coefficient was also statistically significant and mostly 
so in the model that captured the local currency strengthening rather than the 
weakening. However we found that the OECD CLI only worked well as an 
indicator in absence of other global factors in the model and we also found 
that it was not the best performing global factor we considered.   
The relatively poor performance of this series may be explained by the 
fact that the OECD CLIs need to be further updated in order to satisfy the 
criteria that we have set for our explanatory variables. For example although 
the criteria for updating the OECD CLIs in 2002 was to ensure that as many 
as possible from the input data were monthly series available on a timely 
fashion and not revised in the future, 12% of the component series were still 
quarterly data interpolated to monthly and 44% of the data were still not 
available on a timely manner.  What is more the OECD itself suggests that the 
CLIs may serve as useful tools in capturing mostly the turning points in a 
business cycle and therefore the direction of the CLI is likely to be far more 
informative than the level, especially if we look at the trend restored series. 
The OECD notes that there is an asymmetry in the duration of different 
phases of a cycle, in that an average recovery phase lasts about 32 months 
while an average recessionary phase lasts about 25 months. The OECD also 
notes that this difference between how long recession and recovery last again 
varies, with European countries experiencing a smaller difference of about 
6months and non-European countries experiencing almost double the 
difference at about 12 months although they find that the  size of the average 
economic cycle is the same in European and non-European groups.  
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To summarise, the OECD CLI was a strong candidate for global 
variable. However it was not the variable most supported by our statistical 
findings and also worked well only in absence of other stronger global 
parameters. This together with the consideration of the limitations in the 
underlying workings of the series, led us to exclude this indicator from the final 
model specification 
2.3.1.4 CSFB’s Risk Appetite Measure 
 We availed ourselves of the Global Risk Appetite series developed and 
maintained in-house by the CSFB Global Strategy Group. As this is a data 
series developed internally at an investment house and is not an indicator 
people are expected to be familiar with, we will try to present the workings and 
the rationale of this variable in greater detail here. Realized 12month returns 
from a wide spectrum of markets are regressed on the realized 12 month 
rolling volatility from the respective markets. The slope of the regression is the 
Global Risk Appetite Index. The asset classes included in the sample span a 
spectrum from the typically less risky Developed Markets Fixed Income, to the 
riskier Developed Market Equities, to the Emerging Market Fixed Income and 
the riskiest of all Emerging Markets Equities. Risk Appetite will tend to rise 
during risk loving periods when riskier assets outperform safer ones and vice 
versa Risk Appetite will be contracting at times of risk aversion when investors 
will turn to safer asset classes where both returns and volatility are lower.  
CSFB’s Global Risk Appetite Index is a tool that describes market 
realities without trying to forecast the future. Trying to model and forecast the 
Index , CSFB’s Global Strategy Team have found that it is highly correlated 
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with three indicators: First the slope of G3+ yield curve as expressed by the 
difference in the yield between 3m and 10year instruments. The G3+ yield 
curve will typically become steeper at times of higher growth expectations, 
when short terms rates have been reduced to inject liquidity in the economy 
and empower growth, while higher long term rates discount the market 
expectations of future rate hikes on the back of successful growth 
acceleration.  Equally, flat or inverted curves will signal market fears of 
imminent growth corrections or the lack of any signs of correction for an 
existing slowdown. The second factor found to explain Risk Appetite well was 
the momentum of global Industrial Production, again an indicator of growth 
dynamics and potential. The third factor was the score produced by EMRI, the 
Emerging Markets Risk Indicator again produced in-house at CS which was 
expected to produce early warning signals for EM currency pressures.  
In practice CSFB’s Global Risk appetite index proved to be a highly 
mean reverting series which worked well in capturing market dynamics during 
periods of rising or falling risk aversion but proved a much stronger tool in 
capturing the extremes levels of markets exuberance on both the side of 
pessimism and optimism. It is these extreme levels which were called levels 
of Euphoria and Panic that we too found more informative of future market 
moves. Typically an extreme level would be followed by a correction which will 
be more or less consistent in its direction all the way to the opposite extreme 
of the chart, only to be followed by a new correction.  Although it feels intuitive 
that extremes are more likely to be followed by corrections, one needs to 
remember that by definition extremes in market sentiment are driven by 
exceptional circumstances which make it significantly more difficult at the time 
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for investors to make the brave decision to go against the trend and re-
allocate their portfolio against prevailing circumstances. 
Figure 2 CSFB's GLOBAL RISK APPETITE INDEX 
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For example in Figure 2 above Risk Appetite reached Euphoria at 
periods when rallies looked like they could last forever but each time they 
were followed by a lasting correction. These corrections typically led the index 
all the way to the panic zone again on the back of risk incidents which 
seemed almost irreversible at the time. For example the significant fall in oil 
prices in mid-80s led to the longest euphoric period in the chart. Although the 
correction post this euphoric period was interrupted by another rise in risk 
appetite which peaked with the 1987 equity rally, this was in turn followed by a 
very fast and vicious correction which reached panic zone with the October 87 
crash. In more recent years many of the 1990 events that dragged risk 
appetitive to its lows were triggered by EM – specific events like the Mexican 
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and the Asian or the Russian crises and euphoria levels were hit typically as 
risk appetite recovered after every crisis and led to equity bubbles and 
exurban behaviour. In the 2000’s, September 11 in 2001 offered a new type of 
panic-trigger.  
All in all it is very interesting to have a tool that can describe market 
sentiment and it would be a very powerful tool to have if indeed it had 
predictive power. However, as discussed, the index works well as contrarian 
indicator mostly at extreme levels. Our statistical results also confirmed this. 
We therefore opted to include the index in our model as a dummy variable 
that would capture the euphoric and panic points which can work as leading 
indicators of change in market sentiment.  The definition of euphoria and 
panic zones therefore becomes one of great importance. The creators of the 
series have found that there is an asymmetry in describing these two opposite 
extremes in that they consider index levels with a measurement above 5 as 
euphoric, while panic is said to be reached when the index falls below a level 
of -3. Interestingly they also note how rebounds from panic zone tend to be 
faster than corrections from euphoric levels as short memory makes investors 
less willing to give up on their market optimism but typically more decisive to 
put the worst behind them at times of panic.  We see the fact that we only 
used the Global Risk Appetite as a dummy variable for extreme levels which 
significantly reduces the number of data points available, the asymmetry 
between the euphoric and panic levels and the difference in expected market 
behaviour even following extreme levels, as factors that explain why 
statistically we did not find strong and consistent evidence to support the 
inclusion of this parameter in our model specification.  
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2.3.2 Country Specific Macroeconomic and Market Data. 
We proceed to briefly present the country specific data that we have 
considered for our model. We tried out both macroeconomic data as well as 
certain market related data. Most of these data have been considered by 
other papers and their information content has been advocated in relevant 
research. Let us look at each variable separately and the reasons why we did 
not use any of these factors in our selected model specification. 
2.3.2.1 Price Stability 
Inflation is a major issue in emerging markets with periods of 
hyperinflation linked to eras of disarray in the overall economy. High interest 
rates linked to high inflation regimes and leading to a halt in overall growth as 
producers are burdened with higher costs which they sooner or later pass on 
to the consumer. This understandably triggers a decline in demand which in 
turn harms the economy. It is particularly hard to quantify this vicious cycle 
though. Looking at inflation rates per se does not help drive conclusive results 
as an inflation rate that may be alarming for a healthy developed country may 
be natural or even welcome in an emerging economy. This can be due to the 
fact the current high inflation rate may be really a significant improvement 
from even higher levels of inflation previously or that simply inflation goes 
hand in hand with a growing economy or that inflation merely reflects base 
effects. Accordingly disinflation or even deflation, a phenomenon that is 
dreaded as equally bad if not worse than high inflation in a developed 
economy, may be welcome in some emerging economies. Therefore it is both 
level and direction that are inconclusive when it comes to inflation.  
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The majority of the currencies included in our model are currently 
operating under a more or less free floating currency regime but they have, 
nevertheless, adopted a currency peg at some point in recent history. At times 
of fixed exchange rates, inflation will by definition lead to overvaluation of the 
pegged currency versus its trading partners via the purchasing parity 
condition. Given that this overvaluation will not be expressed via a change in 
the exchange rate, it is highly likely that the economy will eventually be led to 
a currency crisis where the peg will be abandoned following an overheating of 
the economy. Our sample comprises of periods of both fixed and floating 
exchange rates and inflation would therefore be expected to have a different 
currency effect in each of these cases in terms of direction and lag. Hence we 
cannot expect to have statistical results that apply to the whole sample period 
we wish to model.  
 Others have tried to capture the idea that only hyperinflation may be of 
interest in emerging markets, as high inflation is the norm and need not be 
indicative of forthcoming upside or downside pressures. Nevertheless we are 
very wary of introducing subjective views in our model and are cautious with 
selecting thresholds for any variable that is considered in the model. Let alone 
when there is no clear consensus as to what constitutes hyperinflation or 
whether those are the only times of interest to our analysis. 
The issue of specific data series selection applies to inflation data as 
well. To mention one interesting dilemma one could use the Producer’s Price 
Index (PPI) or the Consumer’s Price index (CPI). Arguably the two cannot be 
or remain out of sync for long periods. Still, discrepancies may easily apply at 
times. Inflation pressures will by definition start building at the production level 
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and it will be the producer’s pricing power and overall policies that will 
determine how and when these pressures will be  passed on to the consumer. 
It is fair to suggest though that it is mainly when the heat reaches the average 
household that inflation is well entrenched and more of macro policy concern.  
It is worth noting that even as we see many emerging markets moving to 
inflation targeting and being fairly honest about the statistical data they 
publish on macro data like inflation, the data manipulation and policy 
interventions are still very often a concern, thus raising the issue of data 
reliability. CPI data are available for most countries and they are published on 
a monthly basis. In our analysis we did look at the CPI and in particular at the 
month on month and year on year percentage change of the CPI series. 
However as expected, findings were inconclusive and we chose not to include 
the CPI in the final model specification. As in the case of oil prices though, we 
point out that the element of inflation has been captured in our model via the 
inclusion of REERs that we present in section 2.4.1 below. In the case or 
REERs we also capture directly the effect of inflation on exchange rates as 
REERs reflect the change in a currency’s value whether this occurs via 
inflation or nominal appreciation or depreciation.  
2.3.2.2 Domestic Credit Markets 
As discussed earlier in the thesis, currency crises have most often 
occurred in tandem with banking and financial crises. A disorderly increase in 
credit that is offered to the private sector is one indicator of overheating which 
may, along with other symptoms in the overall economy, lead to a banking 
crisis. In our analysis here we use growth of credit to the private sector as a 
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potential explanatory variable. This however is not because it may trigger a 
banking crisis which in turn has often coincided with or preceded a currency 
crisis. We look at credit growth as an indicator that would monitor signals of 
an overheating economy. This would arguably test investors’ confidence and 
may be expected to hurt the country’s assets, alongside with its currency. At 
the same time however we are aware that growth in domestic credit may often 
signal a more advanced financial sector which facilitates the business 
initiatives of the private sector and the rising consumer needs which are 
typical of a growing economy. The worry however, remains that a disorderly 
increase in credit growth often comes hand in hand with poor risk 
management and precedes a rise in non-performing loans and overall 
disarray in the economy.    
In our estimations we include the month on month percentage change of 
credit to the private sector. The variable is included at two months lag from 
the actual month we are forecasting. This allows the information time to feed 
into the system and affect investors’ perspective while also satisfying our 
criterion for variables that work as leading indicators and are available on a 
timely fashion. When estimating the model for currency “appreciation” 
probabilities we find that the credit to the private sector indeed shows the 
expected sign in that an increase in domestic credit in general reduces the 
probability of a local currency appreciating in the near future. In fact this is the 
only one from the country specific variables that we try out in the so-called 
“Extended” model specification that returns the expected sign. Nevertheless 
we do not include this variable in the final specification as the estimated 
coefficient is very insignificant from a statistical point of view. This probably 
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reflects the fact that the variable may act in different ways as we discuss 
above and cannot be expected to act in a consistent manner as an indicator.  
2.3.2.3 Output Measures 
In our attempt to capture output dynamics in the countries we consider, 
we selected to work with measures of Industrial Production rather than the 
series of Gross Domestic Product. Interestingly, even the calculations of the 
OECD Leading Indicators that we discussed earlier in this chapter, consider 
industrial production as a proxy for GDP and a data series which is 
representative of the overall economy.  
The main reason why we opted for IP data over GDP series is that 
although GDP data could be the obvious starting point in order to get some 
sense of a country’s economic status, the data are at best available quarterly, 
are released with a considerable lag from the reference quarter and are 
subsequently revised for a number of times. Industrial production data have 
been found to provide a reliable proxy to overall economic activity and are 
available monthly.  
We looked at the IP measure on a yoy% change and on a mom% 
change basis but found that the variable did not work well in forecasting near 
term currency pressures. In fact the sign of the estimated coefficient 
suggested that an annual rise in industrial production will tend to reduce the 
probabilities of a local currency appreciating in the near future. This finding 
may well reflect what we discussed earlier about the selection criteria for our 
explanatory variables. Macro economic data are often coincident rather than 
leading indicators of currency moves. Alternatively even when they point to 
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future currency risks, the signals refer to a horizon considerably longer than 
the one we are interested in here. All that considered we chose not to include 
industrial production data in our model. 
2.3.2.4 Trade Data 
Trade plays an important role in every open economy, even for the less 
transparent or less liquid emerging markets that we are considering. To best 
capture the external sector dynamics that prevail in an economy we gathered 
monthly data on trade balance for each one of the sample countries we look 
at. Current account data which are often suggested as an alternative are only 
available at the same or lower frequency as trade data but, importantly, will 
tend to be released with a greater lag than the trade data. This makes the use 
of current account data inconsistent with our criteria for data availability. 
However we have to point out that trade balance data miss out on external 
sector elements that are crucial for emerging market dynamics such as 
remittances from expats. We obviously also miss out on the bigger picture 
that Balance of Payment numbers draw. Foreign direct Investment or Portfolio 
flows play an increasing if not more important role for EM currencies than 
simple trade balance data.  
What’s more economists to this date have come to no consensus with 
regards to the information content of external imbalances. Deterioration in 
trade dynamics may be caused and sustained by strong domestic demand 
which has often been the driving force of growth empowering. This has been 
particularly the case in emerging markets in recent years when after long 
periods of dependency on developed market demand, analysts started 
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focusing on the decoupling of EM and their ability to fuel growth from intra-EM 
links or simply on the back of stronger domestic demand. In these cases a 
deteriorating trade surplus or even a trade deficit would not be a worrying 
factor at least in the medium run, and need not coincide or lead to a currency 
depreciation. If however trade deficits simply reveal underlying inability of an 
economy to produce enough to cover its domestic needs and a trade deficit or 
falling trade surplus ends up depleting the country’s official foreign exchange 
reserves, then currency pressures will soon mount.  
In our analysis we considered the 12month trailing trade balance. This 
allows us to keep a wider perspective and assess current circumstances in 
light of the recent past for each country. It also allows us to capture any 
continuous pressures in the trade account which may be more likely to trigger 
or lead to currency adjustments in the near future. Our analysis suggests that 
there is no clear evidence of the trade balance having a direct effect on 
currency pressures.  The estimated coefficient is zero and also highly 
statistically insignificant. Again the arguments described above, the fact that 
we look at the data at two months lag from the actual currency move and the 
fact that even though the data are specific to each country, the estimated 
coefficient is common for all countries in our sample may well be good 
reasons why trade balance data did not prove worth including in our 
specification. 
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2.3.2.5 Liquidity Measures 
Factors like the level or the rate of change of the international non-gold 
reserves held by the central bank have been at the forefront of research on 
currency crises. In fact the quick depletion of foreign exchange reserves was 
the number one factor behind the currency crises assessed by the so-called 
first generation models. The latter focused on cases where a currency peg  
was abandoned following a successful attack by speculators who monitored a 
country’s FX reserves only to apply extra pressure the moment that reserves 
would fall below a threshold. Pressure that would render the peg non 
defendable by the government.  
Data on FX reserves are not only available on a monthly basis but are 
actually published on an even higher frequency with weekly data releases. 
Effectively though too high a frequency of data releases makes it as difficult 
for us to use a variable at too low a frequency. It would make little sense to 
include in a model monthly data on a variable that has three intermediate 
releases to which the market is bound to react almost instantly. In an attempt 
to capture some notion of the market liquidity that prevails in the countries we 
monitor we express the monthly series of foreign exchange reserves as a 
ratio to M2, the most widely used measure of money supply. This measure 
captures capital flight pressures should fears of forthcoming crises rise and 
will in general allow us to monitor the degree of liquidity in the market.  
Our findings did not support the use of this ratio in our specification. The 
near-zero estimated coefficient had a sign opposite to our expectations, which 
was also statistically insignificant. We therefore did not include FX reserves or 
money supply data in our selected model.  
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2.3.2.6 Financial Market Data 
It is often argued that as financial market data and prices in particular 
discount all available information at any given point in time, it would make 
sense to expect such data to work well as indicators of condensed information 
and perceptions on different aspects of the economy. Nevertheless, in 
practice most financial markets absorb, adjust and react to new information 
not only fast but also in a more or less coincident manner. This alone makes it 
futile to expect that one financial market like equity and bond markets will lead 
and consistently so another market like currencies. We tried out one set of 
equity market data and one set of credit market data as potential explanatory 
variables that we could utilise in our model.  
We considered using data on sovereign credit default swap spreads to 
test the hypothesis that credit markets may act as leading indicators of 
currency moves in emerging economies. Such data would typically reflect the 
risk that investors assign to a particular country defaulting on its sovereign 
debt at some point in the future, thus serving as a good proxy for the way 
investors view a particular market. Data gathering in this area is, however, 
particularly problematic as it is not feasible to get data on similar horizons for 
all countries let alone compiling a reliable history for such data. Moreover 
getting data on three or six month credit default swaps is not particularly 
informative because such instruments do not trade actively in the market as it 
is difficult to sell or buy protection for such short time horizon. The data that 
make more sense to look at are the five year default swap spreads which are 
the most liquid instruments in the default protection market. Such data though 
would have little relevance to our exercise here given that we are interested in 
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forecasting currency pressures in the following month.    
With regards to equity markets data, we availed ourselves of the month 
on month percentage change of the Morgan Stanley Composite Index (MSCI), 
a well known and reliable country specific equity index. Counter intuitively our 
estimations suggested that a rise in the equities market reduces the chances 
of a currency appreciating. However this may be due to us using the data at a 
2month lag. As discussed earlier a move in one financial market is swiftly 
priced in other financial markets. Two months later you may be more likely to 
see a correction rather than a continuation of a trend in prices.  We therefore 
decided to exclude financial markets data from our model specifications.  
2.4 Explanatory Variables Selected  
A small selection of explanatory variables all of which were found to be 
both leading indicators of forward exchange rate returns and highly 
statistically significant indicators were chosen for inclusion in our selected 
model specification. 
2.4.1 REER Deviations from Medium Term Trend 
Consistent with relevant research, we find that the overvaluation and 
under-valuation of real effective exchange rates compared to near term trend 
is a very strong signal of forthcoming currency depreciation or appreciation 
respectively. The real effective exchange rate (REER) is an index form 
exchange rate between a base currency and the currencies of the country’s 
major trading partners. The index is calculated as a geometrically weighted 
average of all the relevant exchange rate crosses each of which have been 
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adjusted for inflation differentials and terms of trade dynamics between the 
base country and each of its trading partners. REERs are calculated and 
updated by a host of data providers or institutions. We availed ourselves of 
the REER series calculated in-house by the Credit Suisse Global Strategy 
Team which is a series closely monitored by a large number of market 
participants. CS REERs use seasonally adjusted headline consumer price 
index (HCPI) data for the inflation adjustment of the exchange rates. The 
trade weights are derived from IMF's Direction of Trade Database.  
Headline CPI is the broader measure of inflation that includes the more 
volatile components of the CPI basket such as food and energy prices. For 
poorer EM countries the food component merits possibly the highest weight in 
the basket at around 30% on average. Energy prices are also a very 
significant component in the EM HCPI basket and also play a key factor in 
driving markets. We therefore feel that the inclusion of food and energy prices 
is both informative and necessary in our analysis. The Terms of Trade Data 
as published by the IMF express the total value of exports from one country to 
each of its trading partners as a ratio to the total value of imports from each of 
these trading partners.  
REERs are a simple measure of country competitiveness. Although a 
more elaborate analysis of what drives exchanges rates is necessary, REERs 
provide some notion of exchange rate fair value, as they are a measure of 
nominal exchange rate that has already been adjusted for fundamentals such 
as inflation and trade links. Treating the medium trend of REERs as an 
equilibrium level, towards which REERs can be expected to revert, does 
seem like a fair assumption. In practice, substantial deviations of a currency’s 
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real effective exchange rate from its recent trend tend to be followed by a 
correction through the nominal exchange rate. The concept of mis-valuations 
preceding corrections is intellectually appealing. Nevertheless it depends very 
much on what we consider “equilibrium” towards which a variable is expected 
to revert. In our analysis here we define over or under valuations as 
percentage deviations from a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) trend. The HP trend is a 
rather sophisticated version of a backwards and forwards looking moving 
average. More than just following the general move of the data series, an HP 
trend also follows rather closely the short-term data dynamics.  We calculated 
HP trends using the relevant functionality of E-Views, a statistical and 
econometric software application.   
The assumption behind the de-trending exercise is that a time series is a 
composition of two main elements: a trend and a cyclical component. The HP 
filter effectively extracts the trend component of the series, i.e. the underlying 
high frequency general movement of the data without the elements of lower 
frequency seasonalities. It does so by satisfying the following two conditions 
as per Equation 7 below: 
Equation 7: Hodrick Prescott Filter  
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Where: 
ty  is the logarithmic version of the underlying time series we wish to de-
trend  
Tt ,...2,1  is the respective point in time that each data point refers to 
  is the smoothing parameter set equal to 14,400 for our analysis here 
t  is the trend component at each point in time 
ttt cy   is the cyclical component that remains after the trend is 
extracted from the time series. 
The first part of Equation 7 denotes how the HP filter effectively 
minimizes the deviations between the underlying data and the estimated 
trend. The second part of the equation assigns a smoothing parameter that 
determines the growth rate of the trend itself. The smoothing parameter we 
use in our analysis is 14400 which is the default smoothing parameter used 
by E-views for monthly time series data. In practise the higher the smoothing 
parameter the less flexible the trend will be with the extreme case of   
tending to infinity which means the trend becomes linear. On the other 
extreme a    equal to zero will create a trend identical to the underlying time 
series.  
Trend extraction is not an exact science, nor a topic of consensus 
amongst analysts. We opted to use the HP filter which we feel is successful in 
capturing the dynamics of the whole underlying series. Starting from the 
centre of the series and working as a moving average, it assigns symmetrical 
weights on both backwards and forward points. We have some degree of 
control over the flexibility of the filter by the use of the smoothing parameter 
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although the latter is pre-determined by the statistical software we used. We 
find that the extracted trends do a good job in capturing the dynamics of the 
underlying series. We are aware of both statistical and practical limitations of 
our choice of trend filtering. Our sample of REERs is so wide and diverse that 
no single filter would accommodate the different characteristics that apply. We 
include exchange rates that are either free-floating or managed. Currencies 
that moved from a fixed to a floating regime or vice versa at some point during 
our sample. We have currencies that have followed a fairly smooth pattern 
and currencies which experienced a crisis in the form of significant one-off 
depreciation or devaluation. In light of all this we find the HP filter a much 
more appropriate technique than alternatives commonly adopted in the 
literature. An example of such alternatives defined the trend as a simple or 
moving average over a data sample. We find such approaches very 
subjective and crude in the way they treat the underlying time series. 
Figure 3 to Figure 11 below show three representative examples of 
REERs in each of the three geographic regions we focus on: Latin America 
(LATAM), Emerging Europe Middle East and Africa (EMEA) and non Japan 
Asia (AXJ). All but one currency have had a significant break in the REER 
series at some point in the years that span our samples. This makes the 
applied filter biased towards accommodating the breaks and prone to over or 
underestimate valuations compared to the underlying trends in the months 
that precede or follow the series breaks.  We are aware of this feature but still 
wish to include these breaks in our series and allow our estimated filters to 
accommodate them. The longer the time that has passed from the series 
break to the present the more the effect on the estimated trend will be 
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smoothed away. From the currencies below only CNY does not have an 
abrupt movement to bias the trend. However this is simply because the 
Chinese authorities have continuously managed the CNY very heavily, which 
was pegged to the USD from 1995 to 2005 i.e. practically for the whole period 
of our sample here. As the fluctuations and breaks in the REERs come mostly 
from the spot exchange rate moves, the CNY REER graph in Figure 3 simply 
captures the inflation and trade dynamics between China and its trading 
partners.   
In Chapter 4 of the thesis when we look at the application of the model to 
real-time economic data and its use in producing actionable trade signals we 
discuss how limitations of the sort we are discussing here can somewhat be 
smoothed away when overlaying the real economy stylized facts and 
knowledge. For example in the case of the Argentine Peso which was 
devalued in November 2001 shortly before the end of the sample used in our 
model estimation, we are clearly aware that the HP trend will tend to give 
signals of currency undervaluation for a long part of our forecasting period. 
This will largely reflect the trend component which has adjusted to incorporate 
the structural break caused by the devaluation and have to be interpreted and 
used in light of this fact.   
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Figure 3 AXJ REERs and HP Trends: CNY 
Chinese Won REER and HP trend
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Figure 4 AXJ REERs and HP Trends: IDR 
Indonesian Rupiah REER and HP trend
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Figure 5 AXJ REERs and HP Trends: THB 
Thai Baht REER and HP trend
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Figure 6 EMEA REERs and HP Trends: RUB 
Russian Rubble REER and HP trend
75
95
115
135
155
175
195
Ja
n-9
4
Ju
l-9
4
Ja
n-9
5
Ju
l-9
5
Ja
n-9
6
Ju
l-9
6
Ja
n-9
7
Ju
l-9
7
Ja
n-9
8
Ju
l-9
8
Ja
n-9
9
Ju
l-9
9
Ja
n-0
0
Ju
l-0
0
Ja
n-0
1
Ju
l-0
1
Ja
n-0
2
Ju
l-0
2
Ja
n-0
3
Ju
l-0
3
Ja
n-0
4
Ju
l-0
4
Ja
n-0
5
Le
ve
l o
f R
E
ER
 a
nd
 H
P 
tre
nd
RUB REER INDEX LEVEL
RUB REER HP TREND 
 
 
Figure 7 EMEA REERs and HP Trends: ZAR 
South Afcrican Rand REER and HP trend
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Figure 8 EMEA REERs and HP Trends: TRY 
Turkish Lira REER and HP trend
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Figure 9 LATAM REERs and HP Trends: ARS 
Argentinian Peso REER and HP trend
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Figure 10 LATAM REERs and HP Trends: BRL 
Brazilian Real REER and HP trend
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Figure 11 LATAM REERs and HP Trends: MXN 
Mexican Peso REER and HP trend
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One point we found worth examining further with regards to the REER 
data was the use of average monthly spot exchange rates in the calculations. 
We went on to construct new REER indices using the end of month spot rates 
between a country and its trading partners.  We found that the two series did 
differ and, as expected, the differences were amplified during periods when 
the exchange rates were not pegged or heavily managed. Still, as Figure 12 
to  Figure 14 below show in three representative examples of the three 
regions in our analysis the differences will typically not change the general 
movement of the series.  Therefore the trends we would have calculated and 
in consequence the deviations from these trends would not have been 
expected to alter the results of our analysis. What is more we find the choice 
of calculating REER series based on a single data point of spot exchange 
rates arbitrary, even if the point is the last day of the underlying month. The 
latter would in a way incorporate the latest information with regards to the 
underlying exchange rates but this need not be the most relevant or 
informative. Especially at volatile times we find the smoothing effect of taking 
the average spot exchange rates from the whole calendar month a far more 
objective approach especially for the purposes of estimating and fitting the 
model to the historic data.  As discussed in earlier sections of the thesis, 
moving to a monthly data horizon is already a much higher frequency than 
what is typically used in academic papers. We therefore feel comfortable 
avoiding any higher frequency data in our model estimation exercise.  
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Figure 12 THB REERs based on EoM and Avg monthly spot exchange 
rates 
Thai Baht  REERs based on End of Month and Average Monthly Spots
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Figure 13 TRY REERs based on EoM and Avg monthly spot exchange 
rates 
Turkish Lira  REERs based on End of Month and Average Monthly Spots
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Figure 14 ARS REERs based on EoM and Avg monthly spot exchange 
rates 
Argentina Peso REERs based on End of Month and Average Monthly 
Spots
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Let us further elaborate on how we further assessed the HP limitation 
mentioned above. When we fit the model to historical data, by definition we 
use the HP filter to extract the trend of the whole sample. All analysts would 
do the exact same thing almost by definition, as the way to model a sample is 
to use all the information available on that sample at the time of the 
estimation. However even if this approach is theoretically sound we  were 
wary of having to fit a model on a trend that includes all the underlying data 
and then expect it to work equally well when applied to data outside the 
sample. Figure 15 below shows the case of the Turkish Lira. We calculated 
the HP Trend for the data from October 1994 to and including November 2001 
and thereafter recalculated the HP trend for the REER series that included the 
data of one additional month each time. In Figure 15 we show both the 
individual HP trends updated to include one additional month each time and a 
so-called “selotaped” version. The latter is a cumulative trend generated from 
adding to the original trend that goes out to November 2001, one extra point 
each time which refers to the latest monthly observation. By definition the 
trends that only include data up to a certain point will defer from a trend 
applied to the whole sample, especially if the latter includes structural breaks 
not yet relevant at the time of estimation of the shorter trend versions. We 
know in practice we will be faced with this limitation when applying the 
estimated model to future data. Nevertheless structural breaks will not come 
in isolation and we believe that the model itself will point to mounting 
pressures on the run-up to such breaks. Second, when one estimates a 
model over a sample, they purposely benefit from the whole information 
content of that sample. This is why it is important to avail ourselves of as long 
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and as reliable data as possible. If this sample includes structural breaks, then 
we welcome the inclusion of these points as well, given that they are part of 
the reality we try to model in the first place. From a statistical point of view one 
aims to fit a model on enough information to make it reliably applicable to 
future data as well. In our case this aspect was tested by applying the models 
out of sample and on real time data as well. We will return to this issue in 
more detail in the next chapter of the thesis.  
Figure 15 HP trends estimated based on gradually evolving time series 
post November 2001 (fine colour lines) and the cumulative “selotaped” HP 
trend (bold dark blue line) 
 
Gradual and Selotaped REER HP trends 
with data from Oct 94 and gradual addition of single montlhy points 
post Nov 01 
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When we implemented the model out of sample but most importantly 
when we applied it on a monthly real time basis, we found it useful to 
practically account for the more recent changes in spot in the following 
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manner: While the model estimates for time t are calculated using REER and 
HP data at 2months lag, we also estimated the REERs based on the daily 
spot rate prevailing close to the end of the month at lag 1 of our estimated 
period. Effectively this provided us with an up to date picture of market 
sentiment which we found useful taking into account mostly when it served to 
cancel a model signal. This included cases where the market had already 
corrected in the direction suggested by the model and thus left little room for 
further moves.  Figure 16 below gives an example of such an approach. In 
particular it shows the case of us applying the model to forecast March 2005 
currency pressures. In this case we used input data of two months lag and in 
particular the deviation of the January 2005 REERs from the trend calculated 
with data up to and including January 2005. However as we were actually 
applying the model to forecast March 2005 signals when we were already 
towards the end of February 2005 we also calculated the HP trend which 
included the data up to and included the data on February 23rd and we show 
in the chart the deviation from these trends of the REERs based on the daily 
spots of that date.  
Most signals, especially the strongest ones are still valid in terms of 
direction. Some are weaker but still suggest the same direction. Only one has 
actually reversed. This is the signal for the South African Rand (ZAR) which 
suggested that the currency was undervalued based on the REERs as of end 
of January 2005. However by the end of February because of market moves 
that took place in the mean time the signal was suggesting a marginal 
overvaluation. The signal that was generated based on the January REERs 
was a very weak one and would have probably been ignored by the model 
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anyway, without generating a trade recommendation to begin with. But if there 
was a recommendation, we would have suggested that investors ignore it as 
more recent market data suggest the information had already been priced in. 
Again, we will return to this type of qualitative analysis of the model 
applicability and features in Chapter 4 of the thesis.  
Figure 16 REER deviations from trend at lag2 and intra-month at lag 1 
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In our model estimation we used monthly REER series which were 
calculated using the average spot exchange rates of that particular month and 
the HCPI and Terms of Trade data applicable to the same calendar month. All 
data were used at 2months lag from the month we wish to explain or forecast 
in terms of currency moves. Our statistical results amply confirm that REER 
deviations from HP trend are an extremely significant and consistent leading 
indicator of forward rate returns.  
 113 
2.4.2 Moody’s World Default Rate  
The second variable found to be extremely and consistently significant in 
explaining future forward exchange rate returns is Moody’s speculative grade 
world default rate. This is the only global variable that we include in our 
selected model specification and the one we found to work well and better 
than all alternatives presented earlier in this chapter. The series is compiled 
by one of the leading rating agencies, Moody’s, to include the cases where 
corporations that are rated as speculative grade, default on their debt 
obligations. Ratings are assigned to debt issuers by ratings agencies such as 
Moody’s, S&P and Fitch. The assigned rating can take any value within a 
specific range and reflects the credit worthiness that the agency ascribes to 
each issuer. The ratings assigned by Moody’s to a corporate issuer range 
from “triple A” to “single C” with twenty one main rating categories in between. 
A “triple A” rating corresponds to bonds and preferred stock that are judged by 
Moody’s to be of the highest quality and the smallest investment risk, The 
lowest eleven ratings, namely from Ba1 to single C form the speculative-grade 
universe.  
The measure that we are interested in is the 12-month trailing average of 
the rate at which such speculative grade corporations globally, defaulted in 
their obligations in the last 12 calendar months. So for example if the figure for 
January 2003 was 7.65%, it means that, over the 12 months to January 2003, 
7.65% of speculative grade corporations defaulted on their obligations 
globally. In our selected specification we included the month on month 
percentage change (mom%) of this trailing 12-month speculative- grade 
default rate.  
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Figure 17 Moody’s Global Default Rate  
Moody's Trailing 12-Month Issuer-Weighted Speculative Grade 
Global Default Rates
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The success of this data series as a leading indicator of currency 
pressures could be attributed to it acting as a proxy for global risk appetite. 
Defaults are arguably more of a lagging rather than a leading indicator, given 
that the signs of distress are present long before a company defaults. 
Nevertheless, the momentum of default rates may well serve as a leading 
indicator of the direction that the economic cycle is heading towards. 
Evidence of deterioration in default rates can provide a credible signal that the 
recovery is yet far ahead or that the downturn has yet to trough. In that 
respect, further market sell offs of risky assets such as emerging market 
currencies may be expected to follow. Again because default rates are a 
lagging indicator, an improvement in the world default rate would signal that 
recovery is well underway and could reasonably be expected to precede 
further increases in investors’ risk appetite. The latter often coincides with 
increased interest in emerging market assets, of which currencies are one 
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example. Our findings amply confirm the hypothesis that the monthly growth 
rate of Moody’s global 12month trailing default rate for speculative grade 
corporates provides a proxy for risk appetite and market sentiment.  
Default statistics are interesting indicators of underlying fundamentals 
but there are many aspects that one needs to consider when looking at such 
empirical data. We focus on global default rates as we are looking for an 
indicator to use as a global variable in our model. Traditionally default rates 
have been massively dominated by the US compared to the rest of the world. 
This is consistent with the fact that the US is also by far the leading 
geographic region in terms of corporate bond issuance. According to Moody’s 
historical default rates the US issuers that defaulted represented around 90% 
of global defaults for the periods from 1920 to 2002. In 2002 and 2003 the 
data suggest that the US issuer default dynamics slightly improved and they 
now accounted for about 80% of total default issuers. Year 2002 was an 
atypically negative year for markets and credit dynamics were no exception, 
bringing default rate statistics to new territory pretty much on every metric. 
Figure 18 below provides a snapshot of a geographical breakdown for our 
preferred series of Trailing 12-month issuer default rates.  Capturing primarily 
US dynamics is something we welcome in our analysis as this has been the 
market that typically leads developed world conditions and also acts as the 
barometer of global markets. Importantly we model all emerging currencies as 
exchange rates versus the US dollar. Therefore the fact that our global 
indicator has a clear bias towards capturing US specific characteristic is a 
very welcome parameter.  
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Figure 18 Geographic breakdown of Moody’s Default Rates Statistics 
Moody's Trailing 12-Month Issuer Default Rate 
(Speculative Grade / Geographic Breakdown)
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As stated earlier we select the default rate series for the speculative 
grade corporate universe. We believe that the lower rated and more prone to 
default corporates will work better as risk indicators as they will tend to adopt 
a more knee–jerk reaction to a shift in global fundamentals. Indeed Moody’s 
statistics in Figure 19 and Figure 20 below show the huge divergence 
between Speculative and Investment Grade corporates with the latter 
exhibiting an almost default-free history compared to the former at least until 
the end of 2004.  
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Figure 19 Moody’s Default Rates: IG and SG: Default Rates 
Moody's Annual Corporate Bond Issuer Default Rates 
(Rating Group Breakdown)
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Figure 20 Moody’s Default Counts: IG and SG: Default Counts 
Moody's Annual Corporate Bond Issuer Default Counts 
(Rating Group Breakdown) 
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The difference between the two charts above is that Figure 19 shows 
global annual default rates as a percentage of total issuers in each one of the 
two rating groups, while Figure 20 shows the annual number of defaults 
occurring globally in each one of the two rating groups. Figure 21 below tells 
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again the same story but focuses on the market collapse of 2002 which was 
to be compared only to the 1930’s crises levels. Figure 21 shows annual 
default rates weighted by volume instead of issuers. Again speculative grade 
corporates are on a league of their own with their deviation from the 
investment grade universe rising significantly at times of crises. It is worth 
looking at volume weighted statistics as well as issuer weighted because not 
only the number of defaults but their size is significantly increased. This is 
particularly relevant at times of market deterioration. 
Figure 21 Moody’s Default Rates Statistics: IG and SG: Volume 
Weighted Default Rates  
Annual Dollar Volume-Weighted Default Rates
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If we look at Default Statistics as a risk indicator we need to accept that 
they tell only half the story. Recovery rates, i.e. what an investor will likely get 
as a percentage of the face value of his original investment is an equally 
important consideration if this is above zero. Indeed as Figure 22 below 
shows recovery rates have tended to be to around 30% and 60% of the 
original face value. These numbers are based on the market price at which 
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the defaulted debt trades 30days post default. Arguably the distribution 
around this average can be expected to be very wide but on the other hand 
these recovery rates may well be expected to increase significantly as we 
move further away from the default event. It matters to specify what the 
default event was in the first place, as that can range from a simple delay in 
interest payment to a full blown bankruptcy. Again speculative grade 
corporates can be expected to lead the pact in most default events of more 
permanent nature and to have a lower recovery rate altogether. Still the fact 
remains that recovery rates have been on an improving trend in recent years 
and have also been fairly stable in the last decades, leaving little room for 
surprises.  
Figure 22 Moody’s Default Rates Statistics: Issuer Weighted Recovery 
Rates 
Moody's Annual Average Issuer-Weighted Defaulted Bond Recovery Rates 
(Market Price of Defaulted Instrument 30 days Post Defautl) 
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Qualitative factors like the ones mentioned in this section matter in our 
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analysis but we find that most of them tell the same story from a different 
angle. Overall US corporates dominate both issuance and default rates be it 
weighted by number of issuers or USD volume. This picture is somewhat 
more balanced in recent years as corporate debt market becomes deeper and 
more liquid outside the US. Speculative Grade defaults almost by definition 
outweigh Investment Grade defaults. Recovery rates are just as important as 
the default rates and they have been in a range bound mode in the last 
decades which means that investors have a more or less expected recovery 
rate they can incorporate in their investment decisions. All this considered we 
feel confident that our choice of the monthly percentage change of the trailing 
12-month speculative-grade global default rate is very representative of the 
risk dynamics we wish to capture. Our statistical results amply confirm our 
expectation that this factor is strongly and negatively correlated with moves in 
risky asset classes like emerging market currencies. It works like a good 
proxy for global risk appetite and directly reflects corporate sector dynamics 
which one needs to accommodate when trying to assess investment 
dynamics.  
2.4.3 Sovereign Debt Ratings downgrades by Standard & Poor 
The third variable that we used captures the downgrades of long term 
sovereign credit ratings by S&P. Downgrades are found to be extremely 
significant leading indicators for further EM currency weakness. This is why 
we only include them as explanatory variable in the version of the model 
which predicts probabilities of forthcoming “depreciations” of emerging market 
currencies. We only account for downgrades by one of the leading rating 
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agencies, namely Standard and Poor because at the time of the research we 
could not avail ourselves of historic data on rating outlooks from Moody’s, the 
other leading rating agency.  
As discussed in more detail in Section 2.4.2 above, ratings can take any 
value within a spectrum ranging from AAA for the best rated issuers, to 
Selective Default (SD) for the issuers which have not honoured at least one of 
their credit obligations. Within each rating category above the level of 
Selective Default, rating agencies differentiate their assessment of the credit-
worthingness of the issuer via the use of a rating outlook which can be 
positive, stable or negative. Figure 23 below shows the whole spectrum of 
ratings and rating outlooks applicable and how we have transformed them into 
the form of a numerical index in order to quantify the rating changes and 
include them in our model analysis. The index is composed in such way that 
higher index scores correspond to lower ratings. The worse index score is that 
of level 58 which we assigned to any rating equal to or the worse than CC- 
with a positive outlook. In Figure 23 the horizontal axis only displays the 
sequential rating levels with a positive outlook. This is done merely for 
presentation purposes as the chart would not be readable if we were to 
include in the axis labels all the rating outlook categories. However as 
described above, the underlying index does comprise of different levels for 
each ranking of outlook within each rating level.  
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Figure 23 S&P Hard Currency Sovereign Ratings Spectrum 
Index Score Assigned to S&P Sovereign ratings
 (Higher index score corresponds to lower rating) 
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Rating actions apply to all countries of our model and should capture a 
common rationale on behalf of rating agencies. Arguably factors like the 
stability, the history and possibly the size and political power of different 
sovereigns often merit somewhat different treatment by the agencies. We 
welcome the fact that this variable also captures such subjective elements as 
they surely matter in the minds of investors as well. At the same time as rating 
agencies act independently and are judged for the credibility of their own 
analysis it is fair to assume that the information content of ratings will be 
rather standardised for different rating categories. As rating agencies monitor 
and assess a large sample of factors, both quantitative and qualitative that 
affect the credit worthingness of an issuer, it is fair to say that both rating 
levels and rating actions act as a good proxy of the perception of a country’s 
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overall position and circumstances at any given time. It is this type of reliable 
“all encompassing” information we would typically look for in the indicators we 
include in our model.  
In our analysis we use ratings assigned to a Sovereign’s Hard Currency 
Debt. This typically refers to USD denominated debt as opposed to local 
currency denominated debt. The idea is that a country will be more at risk of 
defaulting in the obligations denominated in a currency on which the country 
has little power to affect via intervention or other policies. Local currency 
denominated debt can easily be reduced in value and therefore become 
easier to service via inflationary policies. In practice nowadays hard currency 
debt also corresponds to the bulk of the outstanding EM sovereign debt. What 
is more, there may be credit accelerating terms that will consider a credit 
event to have been triggered in both the hard and local currency obligations 
once a sovereign defaults in its hard currency debt. Of course there are 
always exceptions to the rules. Russia in 1998 defaulted on and effectively 
restructured only its local currency debt. However Russian debt assets of all 
currencies and Russian assets in general came under significant selling 
pressure at the time. 
Figure 24 below provides a summary of the S&P rating actions that 
applied to the sovereigns we include in our model sample. These actions refer 
to the years for which we have exchange rate data. As a reminder these time 
series are not homogeneous across the different countries but it is safe to say 
that most series refer to the years from 1998 to 2004.  There is clearly no 
common pattern with regards to how S&P treated the different sovereigns in 
these years, both in terms of frequency and direction of actions. On the one 
 124 
end we have the example of Indonesia which saw its rating or its rating 
outlook change a total of 20 times in these years, almost equally split between 
positive and negative rating actions. Indonesia was downgraded gradually 
from BBB-positive in 1994 all the way to SD in March 2000, bounced out of 
SD status briefly in October 2000 only to start being downgraded again in 
March 2001 and end up defaulting again in April 2002. It exited the SD status 
in September 2002 when it was assigned a CCC+ rating with a stable outlook 
and really got out of default status in May 2003 when it was assigned a B- 
with a stable outlook which was later further revised upwards. At the other end 
of the spectrum of sovereign credit worthingness we have Singapore which 
has enjoyed an almost unquestionable credit stability and only saw one 
positive rating action in recent years and that was back in 1994 when it was 
upgraded from AA+ stable to AAA stable, the second highest rating available. 
Notwithstanding significant differences in the rating history of EM sovereigns, 
the fact remains that rating actions will apply to all countries and will convey a 
more or less uniform message in terms of information and perception of the 
country’s fundamentals. 
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Figure 24 S&P Sovereign Rating Actions  
S&P Rating Actions (even by a rating outllok) Per Country 
(applying to country specific sample periods)  
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In recent history ratings agencies have often been accused of acting as 
a lagging rather than a leading indicator.  Rating actions would typically 
confirm rather than drive market sentiment. In the case of rating Sovereigns 
the element of political relationship and reputation at risk was understandably 
significantly more pressing than when rating corporates. This meant that often 
upgrades came too many too early while downgrades came too little too late. 
As rating agencies were faced with actual defaults in emerging markets and 
tried to recapitulate their credibility one could note a change in their approach 
to sovereign rating actions. Agencies started to expect a consistently 
improving track record before reversing past penalties or rewarding a country 
for solid policies and fundamentals via upgrades of their sovereign rating or 
outlook. So upgrades were now coming a bit too late as a reward rather than 
an early indicator. This again reduced their information content for investors. 
Consistent with these market stylised facts we found that upgrades did not 
work well as a leading indicator of future “appreciations” and are thus not 
included in the “appreciation” version of our model. 
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However, we did find that downgrades work well as leading indicators of 
negative currency pressures in emerging markets. This asymmetry in the 
significance of the rating actions as signals of forthcoming upward or 
downward pressures does not come as a total surprise. As discussed above, 
markets will typically require much more information than a rating upgrade to 
be convinced to increase their buying interest. Especially in the case of a 
positive rating action by as little as a rating outlook the information content of 
the action itself is unlikely to drive significant market action. However the 
average risk-averse investor will look for indicators of stress to incorporate in 
his investment decision and rating downgrades are one such indicator. Having 
been accused of delayed response in a number of negative credit events, 
rating agencies became much more pro-active in downgrading a sovereign at 
signs of stress. Especially downgrades by only one or more rating outlooks 
can help deliver the message of the agency’s assessment while not 
jeopardising their relationship with the rated sovereigns, which can be at risk 
in case  of serious negative rating actions.  This stylised fact served well to 
explain why rating actions are likely to be more informative on the downside 
and importantly why even a negative change in outlook will most likely drive a 
market reaction.  
In our analysis we take into account downgrades by a rating notch or 
even by a rating outlook. In our selected model specification we define 
“downgrades” in terms of downwards rating actions as a function of direction 
and independent of the size of these actions. We use a “dummy” variable to 
capture rating downgrades. When a sovereign is downgraded by even a 
rating outlook the “dummy” variable is assigned the value 1 for that specific 
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sovereign and month. The variables take the value zero in all other cases, i.e. 
if there is no action at all or if there is positive rating action. By including the 
occasions when the value takes the value of 1 we capture the increased 
probability of forthcoming “depreciation” in the country that was downgraded 
that month. In the absence of downgrades, the variable has zero effect on the 
model results. It is important to stress that by including downgrades of even 
one rating outlook we have a much wider and finer spectrum of observations 
that significantly increase the sample of rating actions. Downgrades of 
outlooks are also much more likely to have a more immediate and direct 
market effect.  
A sovereign, whose rating history shows the willingness of rating 
agencies to be forward looking and pro-active in times of stress, is Argentina. 
Before the infamous default in late 2001, S&P had already downgraded 
Argentina’s sovereign a total of 6 times in a period of one and a half years 
from February 2000 to July 2001.  
Figure 25 S&P Argentina Sovereign Rating Actions  
S&P Downgrades of Argentine Sovereign 
on the run up to the 2001 Default
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Figure 26 below tells the same story but magnifies one point of particular 
interest in our case here. As discussed in Chapter 1 of the thesis forward 
exchange rates led the market reaction to deteriorating fundamentals in 
Argentina long before the spot was actually devalued in 2001. The Argentine 
peso devaluation came together with the Argentine sovereign default in 
November 2001. As Figure 26 suggests the leading rating agencies had been 
proactive long before the actual default took place. Rating downgrades had 
started more than a year before the actual default took place. This is an 
extreme case of a country that actually defaults on its obligations and at the 
same time abandons its previous currency regime and devalues its currency 
as a reaction to a multi-faceted crisis that explodes.   
Figure 26 S&P Argentina Sovereign Rating Actions & Argentine Peso 
Spot Exchange Rate 
Argentine S&P rating vs ARS Spot rate 
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We will return to the subject of Sovereign Ratings in the last Chapter of the 
thesis where we set out to model and forecast rating actions by both Moody’s 
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and S&P in a number of emerging markets globally. Our findings support the 
idea that credit ratings can be explained to a significant degree by macro 
fundamentals prevailing in the underlying countries. Thus we feel that the 
inclusion of rating downgrades in our model of currency depreciation serves 
well to capture a number of macro-parameters in a condensed proxy manner 
and also incorporates the assessment of these macro dynamics by an 
independent agent. Such information is highly likely to be of interest to market 
agents. Our currency model findings support these notions.  
2.5 Conclusion 
In Chapter 2 of the thesis we outlined the criteria behind our choice of 
explanatory variables and described the many data series we considered and 
in greater detail the few factors we selected. We aim to create a model that 
applies in a homogeneous manner to all the emerging markets included in our 
sample. This choice is driven by the need to produce a specification that is as 
simple as possible, intuitive and practical. We want the model results to be 
comparable across different countries and this can be done best by applying 
the same coefficients to all countries. The only differentiation we are happy to 
accommodate is that between what we call global variables whereby the 
exact same data are applied to all countries and the so called country series 
whereby we adopt data that are specific to each country but again estimate 
one common coefficient for all countries. Both global and country specific data 
need to be thoroughly assessed to ensure they are comparable, consistent 
and meaningful.  The consistency of the data is ensured with the very detailed 
analysis and understanding of what each series represents. Where 
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differences applied between countries we made sure we adopted the data 
commonly used by market participants and market economists. We also 
made a point of including all series in the most informative and relevant 
format, avoiding all types of sample specific or other standardisations, 
commonly adopted in academic research.  
The next big hurdle in our data selection is derived from the purpose of 
the models themselves. We wish to model and forecast forward exchange 
rate moves on a monthly basis. That means that our data will typically have to 
be available on a monthly basis so that we will not need to apply any type of 
manipulation like interpolation or extrapolation which we believe destroys a 
significant part of the information content of the data. This makes a number of 
usual suspect macro data irrelevant to our exercise especially for stock data 
like a country’s GDP. The data also have to be released before the month that 
we wish to forecast and thus be leading indicators of currency moves. This is 
the only information that we will be able to use going forward in forecasting 
currency dynamics. We thus had to exclude a number of market data like 
equity or credit market data which may well be very relevant to investors but 
will typically coincide rather than lead moves in exchange rate markets. Our 
explanatory variables also need to not be heavily revised after their initial 
release. We also want to find variables that work in a fairly homogeneous 
manner for all the countries we incorporate in our sample. A host of macro 
data are excluded on the basis of these criteria. Data like oil prices, inflation, 
money supply and credit growth data, output measures like industrial 
production, external sector variables such as trade data and data on foreign 
exchange reserves have been in the forefront of academic literature on 
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currency crises. In our case however they were all filtered out of our 
explanatory variable selection process as they failed to meet one or more of 
the criteria outlined above. Many of these data were available at a lower or 
higher frequency that one month, almost all were released with a significant 
delay and were revised more than once following initial release. Many would 
have a radically different effect depending on which country we focus and a 
common coefficient would not be representative.   
In order to keep our variables as objective as possible we excluded all 
qualitative factors which may be extremely relevant but is practically 
impossible to properly capture let alone forecast.  Therefore factors such as 
contagion or political stability or corruption were not even tested in the 
models. Indices that incorporate qualitative information but are available in a 
quantitative format were tested though. Leading Indicators calculated by the 
OECD and diffusion indices like the ISM PMIs were tested but failed to meet 
the statistical criteria and were therefore excluded from the final 
specifications. Market measures like CSFB’s Risk Appetite which incorporates 
data on different asset classes from equities to fixed income and from 
developed to emerging markets were also tested as global variables that may 
prove good proxies for market sentiment. Again statistical results did not 
support the inclusion of such data.  
Our thorough filtering exercises resulted in merely three explanatory 
variables that met all the practical, intuitive and statistical criteria in a 
consistent manner and that were included in our models. Over and under 
valuations of Real Effective Exchange Rates (REERs) from HP trends, the 
growth rate of Moody’s speculative grade default rate and Sovereign 
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downgrades by S&P. The first two were included in both versions of our 
models, the one that captures appreciation and the one that captures 
depreciation. The last variable was only included in the depreciation model. 
From the three variables that we used, one is global and two are country 
specific. Importantly they all provide packaged information on market 
elements that are significantly wider than the measure they describe in the 
first place.  Real Effective Exchange Rates are the single variable that merits 
universal approval from all relevant research. REERs capture trade dynamics 
and inflation dynamics as well as exchange rate dynamics. They effectively 
are a proxy of currency fair value and this explains why any significant 
deviations from their medium term trends will typically be restored via market 
moves. We use the HP trend as an anchor and find that indeed over and 
under-valuations of REERs from their HP trend lead reverse currency moves 
by about two months.  
The other two data we eventually use are both from the universe of 
Rating Agencies. The latter have become an integral part of the financial 
system and the crisis of the end of 2010 brought renewed attention to their 
role, functionality and importance. We find that the default rate that Moody’s 
publishes on speculative grade corporates works as a valid proxy for global 
risk appetite and tends to precede in a timely fashion currency moves on both 
directions. The S&P downgrades of sovereign credit ratings is a variable we 
only found working in the depreciation model.  This is understandable given 
the asymmetry inherent in the way rating agencies rate sovereigns. One 
factor that is very important and determinant of this variable’s importance in 
our model is the inclusion of rating outlooks as well, a much higher frequency 
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indicator that understandably bears significant weight in investors’ perception 
and reaction.  
In the first two chapters of the thesis we presented in detail the rationale 
behind our research agenda and the dependent and independent variables 
we have selected. In the following two chapters we proceed to present the 
statistical and empirical findings from our attempt to model and forecast 
exchange rate dynamics in emerging markets.  
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3 CHAPTER THREE: Modelling and Forecasting 
Currency Risks in Emerging Markets: Specification 
Selection  
3.1 Introduction 
In the third chapter of the thesis we present the process of selecting the 
final model specification from a statistical point of view.  In Section 3.2 we 
present our choice of methodology. We estimate a Logit type of model where 
the left hand side is a dummy variable that captures the binary nature of our 
explanatory variable. We estimate two model specifications to separately 
capture upside and downside currency risks. In Section 3.3 we present the 
findings from fitting our models both in-sample and out of sample. We select 
the specification we find to be consistent with our criteria for a parsimonious, 
technically robust model which also delivers the expected results.  We then 
proceed to Chapter 4 where we apply the chosen specifications to real life 
economic data that span about a year and a half of data. Chapter 4 concludes 
the presentation and analysis of our emerging markets currency risk model. 
Chapter 5 of the thesis finally attempts a comprehensive presentation and 
application of our emerging markets sovereign credit ratings model. 
3.2 Adopted Methodology: LOGIT Models, Symmetric 
Assessment of Currency Risks, Panel Data 
The modelling methodology we adopt is straightforward, intuitive and 
consistent with the relevant academic literature on currency and banking 
crises. At the same time we introduce several new elements in our 
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methodology as we aim to model and forecast returns on a forward rate basis 
and we also wish to apply and utilize our model as a trading tool. This 
difference in mandate between our work here and previous research dictates 
and justifies the need to focus and address different issues. In this section we 
present the methodology we adopted and the thought process behind the 
selection of our final specification. 
In our attempt to model and forecast some measure of exchange rate 
returns on a monthly forward exchange rate basis we adopted a Logit type 
methodology. Logit models are used to model and forecast a dichotomous 
event where the focus is on the occurrence or not of a particular assumption 
or event. In our case we focus on the cases of making more than 5% profit 
from investing on one month forward exchange rates. Therefore our 
dependent variable is a dummy variable which takes a value equal to one 
when the above mentioned condition is satisfied and a value of zero at all the 
times in our sample when the condition was not satisfied.  
As discussed in the previous Chapters of the thesis, the near consensus 
view in crises literature has been to focus on downside risks and try and 
model the cases of substantial local currency depreciations. However, the 
focus of our research is far more market oriented and the main goal is to 
produce a model than serves as a high frequency trading tool to a real life 
investor. Therefore it is essential that we try and address the needs and 
constraints of market participants. A key consideration is that one may profit 
from either the weakening or the strengthening of a particular currency as 
long as he is positioned accordingly. We tried to capture this reality by 
estimating two separate model specifications. As outlined in Section 1.3.2.6 of 
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Chapter 1 we define local currency “appreciation” as the situation where a 
local currency turns out at the end of a calendar month stronger, in terms of 
its spot exchange rate versus the USD, than what the one month forward 
exchange rate had priced in a month earlier. Accordingly we define 
“depreciation” as the case where a local currency is actually weaker in spot 
exchange rate terms at the end of a calendar month, compared to what the 
one month forward had priced in a month earlier. Both the spot and forward 
exchange rates are expressed versus the USD. 
In practice we estimate two different Logit models in order to describe 
two separate “either /or” scenarios. Our first specification which we shall refer 
to as the PROBAPP specification, models and forecasts the probabilities of 
“either having more than 5% “appreciation” in any given calendar month on a 
forward exchange rate basis or not”. Equation 8 below describes the way the 
dependent variable is defined in our PROBAPP specification. 
Equation 8: PROBAPP model Dependent Variable 
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The second specification that we estimate forecasts the probabilities of 
“either having more than 5% “depreciation” in any given calendar month on a 
forward exchange rate basis, or not”. We shall refer to this specification as the 
PROBDEP model and the relevant dependent variable is described in 
Equation 9 below. 
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Equation 9: PROBDEP model Dependent Variable 
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The result from a Logit type model is translated in the form of 
probabilities of the assumed “either/or” scenario occurring as shown in 
Equation 10 below. 
Equation 10: Logit model resulting probabilities 
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Where  
  denotes the independent variables included in the model and 
   denotes the matrix of estimated coefficients for each one of the 
independent variables.  
In our analysis we use the outcome of the models in probability format 
exactly as they are generated by Equation 10 above. Others, like A. Roy in his 
paper on CSFB’s EMRI, chose to annualise the model generated probabilities 
in order to transform them in more sizable numbers which users may find 
easier to digest. We strongly feel that any such mathematical transformation 
is highly debatable. When you annualise the probability of an event occurring 
in any given month, it is no longer clear whether the resulting probability has 
more or even the same relevance to the initial time horizon of one month. 
Even if the annualised probabilities proved to be the relevant measure to 
describe the chances of the modelled event occurring in the next year, we 
would still see no use in calculating such measures as we intend to focus on 
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forecasting currency moves within the next calendar month.   
In A. Roy’s paper on CSFB’s EMRI we find another aspect which mostly 
involves the way in which the results are presented rather than calculated. 
The monthly EMRI publication, presented the model results in terms of 
change in the monthly probability scores rather than publishing the monthly 
probability scores directly. We feel that presenting the results as monthly 
changes deprives the reader of the possibility to directly compare the scores 
between countries and time periods. Moreover even if the change in the 
scores gives us some sense of momentum in currency pressures, base 
effects are likely to strongly bias the interpretation of the results. For example 
a 10% increase in the probability of appreciation clearly has a different 
meaning for a currency which is correcting from previous pressure to 
depreciate than it would for a currency which was already in an appreciation 
trend.  
In our analysis we assess the model results in terms of monthly 
probabilities, as those are calculated by the model directly. We carry out any 
second level analysis when interpreting the results and overlaying our market 
sense and experience. Probabilities, as a measure of the estimated model 
outcome are intuitive and straightforward. Importantly, probabilities are 
comparable across countries and through time. Moreover the monthly 
probabilities that we focus on provide information about both the magnitude 
and the timing of expected future forward exchange rate moves.  
From the two models we develop and estimate here, it is the PROBDEP 
model which mimics more the work on “currency crises” which only focuses 
on the downside currency risks. Our two models are symmetrical in their 
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structure except from one explanatory variable. This is the dummy variable 
that we include in the PROBDEP model to capture the effect of any negative 
rating action suffered by a country in our sample. In doing so we effectively 
suggest that all other things being equal, this additional factor further 
increases the chances that the currency will weaken in the near future. We 
chose to work with a “one-size fits all” model specification in that we estimate 
one specification which is common for all the countries included in our sample 
and covers the observations from all the years for which we have data 
available. In particular we estimate two separate panel models, namely the 
PROBAPP and PROBDEP versions described in the previous section. For the 
explanatory variables included in our model we estimate a coefficient which is 
common for all countries and all periods, one for the PROBAPP model and 
one for the PROBDEP model. These sets of coefficients are then plugged in 
Equation 10 above to produce the probabilities of having more than 5% 
“appreciation” or “deprecation” in any given month.   
As discussed in detail in Chapter 2 of the thesis, we used two types of 
explanatory variables, those described as “global” explanatory variables and 
the “country specific” variables. For the “global” explanatory variables we use 
the same time series for each of the countries in our sample and estimate a 
single coefficient common for all countries across time. We thus expect 
“global” variables to affect all emerging market countries in a uniform way. For 
the “country specific” variables we again estimate one common coefficient for 
all countries and across time, but avail ourselves of time series data 
applicable to each country. We therefore assume that these variables are 
expected to affect different countries in a similar manner but the country 
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specific circumstances will determine the final outcome. 
We acknowledge the limitations that a panel model imposes, given that 
currencies move for any number of reasons, in any possible direction, in any 
given country or period. We also share the concern voiced by many 
researchers in the currency crises literature that a number of non-linearities 
may not be captured when the “one-size fits all” specification is adopted. We 
felt however that such characteristics and single currency valuations are best 
captured by fair value and enhanced purchasing power parity (PPP) models. 
However, this thesis aims to find a set of variables that serve as a minimum 
common denominator in describing currency risks for a whole group of 
countries over their recent history. A set that will effectively provide leading 
indicators of short term currency risks going forward. We find that a panel 
model serves well in addressing this objective.  
In this section we outline the main steps in the thorough filtering process 
we underwent in order to make an educated judgement with regards to which 
is the most appropriate model specification for us to select. Throughout this 
process we tried out the list of potential explanatory variables in a variety of 
formats. These formats include level form at any given month, differences 
from month to month (Δmom) or year to year (Δyoy), or growth rates on a 
month on month (mom%), or year on year basis (yoy%). We also tried to 
capture momentum by looking at the change in the growth rate from one 
period to the next (Δmom% or Δyoy%). At times we assessed the effect of 
extreme levels using dummy variables which would only turn non-zero when 
the variable in question would exceed a predefined threshold. We tried out but 
eventually opted not to include sample specific definitions of thresholds, like a 
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number of standard deviations away from the sample mean. We also 
considered at times certain fixed criteria such as a time series exceeding at 
any point in time a value we had independently selected. Importantly we also 
tried out versions for our explanatory variables in which markets tend to look 
at different data even if the particular format does not come across as a very 
obvious candidate. This alone differentiates our work from an uneducated 
data mining exercise. Take the OECD leading indicator for example. This 
measure of global growth momentum may be considered in a number of 
formats. However many market analysts tend to focus on the three months 
over three months annualised percentage change of the series and this is the 
way we tested this variable in our modelling exercise here. 
Below we list a number of aspects that we considered in our 
specification selection process. We present a selection of results from several 
versions which we decided against and present in greater detail the rationale 
for keeping the final model specification.  The first stage of the analysis 
outlines the criteria applied in gauging the statistical power of the 
specifications. Having selected the specifications that perform consistently 
well statistically and also make sense to us as end users we proceed in the 
following Chapter to apply the models in real time and judge their ability to 
perform well as trade generation mechanisms.  
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3.3 Selection of Final Specifications based on Statistical 
Performance 
As discussed in Chapter 1 of the thesis, the dependent variable of our 
modelling exercise captures the cases when the end of month spot 
outperforms or underperforms by more than 5%, the 1month forward that was 
available a month earlier. This we call “excess returns” higher than 5%. As 
discussed, we estimate two separate models. What we call the “PROBAPP” 
model captures the probabilities that the local currency is likely to “appreciate” 
by more than 5% on a one month forward return basis. Our definition of 
“appreciation” as described in Equation 11 below describes the occasions 
when the local currency ends up being, based on the end of month realised 
spot exchange rate versus the USD, more than 5% stronger than what the 
one month forward versus the USD had implied a month earlier. In the 
PROBAPP model our dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 when the above condition is satisfied and the value of zero at all 
other instances. 
Equation 11 Definition of Returns in PROBAPP model 
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What we call the “PROBDEP” model captures the probabilities that the 
local currency is likely to “depreciate” by more than 5% on a one month 
forward return basis. Our definition of “depreciation” as described in Equation 
12 below describes the occasions when the local currency ends up being, 
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based on the end of month realised spot exchange rate versus the USD, more 
than 5% weaker than what the one month forward versus the USD had 
implied a month earlier. In the PROBDEP model the dependent variable is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the above condition is satisfied 
and the value of zero in all other instances. 
Equation 12  Definition of Returns in PROBDEP model 
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Having selected the definition of our dependent variables we turn to the 
laborious task of selecting the explanatory variables that best help model and 
forecast one month forward exchange rate return. In doing so we begin by 
estimating various model specifications on the period from as early as 
January 1994 to June 2002 which is the sample for which we had data on all 
the candidate variables. In reviewing here our findings from this first phase we 
will present a number of representative specifications that we tested, the signs 
of the estimated coefficients and the probabilities that these coefficients are 
statistically significant. The criteria applied in narrowing down the explanatory 
variables to a small set of acceptable candidates were also presented in detail 
in Chapter 2. We reject variables that have either poor or inconsistent 
statistical performance or those that are not available at the frequency and 
time frame we need them. We also reject variables that are statistically 
significant but their estimated signs contradict our understanding of how these 
variables should work in practice.  In Table 5 and Table 6 below we present in 
a compressed format the statistical results from a selection of variations we 
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tried out for our PROBDEP and PROBAPP models which we feel tell the story 
of how we narrowed down the number of variables considered.  
All variables are data available on a monthly basis and no interpolation 
or standardization has been performed. All the variables are included in the 
estimation at two months lag from the referenced dependent variable, unless 
otherwise indicated in the table details above. In all the tables we shall 
present in this section we use the following notation to allow us to present a 
number of pieces of information in a compact yet comprehensible manner: If 
we do not include a specific variable in a certain specification we make the 
relevant cells grey. For the variables we include in each model we show the 
resulting estimated sign and probability. In terms of the estimated sign, we 
use a light blue colour to denote that this is consistent with what is dictated by 
intuition and economic theory. If the sign contradicts our understanding of how 
the variable is expected to work we show it in a dark blue font. This typically 
points to formats or variables that were eventually excluded from the 
specification.  We then show for each of the variables considered the resulting 
probability of this variable been statistically significant. Again we use a light 
blue font for the cases where probabilities are lower than 10%, thus 
suggesting that the variable is fairly statistically significant and a good 
candidate to possibly consider. We use a dark blue font to denote that a 
variable is statistically insignificant and thus not worth including in our 
selected specification in the particular format.  
A variable may be statistically significant or insignificant irrespective of 
whether its estimated sign is intuitive or not. And vice versa, we may have a 
correct sign which is highly insignificant or a wrong sign which is highly 
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significant. In our selection process we kept only the variables that come up 
with the expected sign and were also found to be statistically significant. The 
global variables in particular are expected to satisfy both these conditions 
equally in the PROBAPP and PROBDEP models. We also expect the 
variables to have consistently good performance irrespective of the 
specification and to continue to perform as well when we later prolong or alter 
the estimation sample period. What we describe as “PART I” of our 
presentation of results includes the specifications that were run on the initially 
available sample that runs from January 1994 to June 2002.  
3.3.1 Definition of In and Out of Sample Testing 
The data used in this thesis start at different points in time for the various 
countries included in our sample, with some going as far back as January 
1994.  In terms of the ending points of the sample, the data can be divided in 
two types. The first group includes the data available to us when we first set 
out to model currency risks. This includes data up to June 2002 and this is the 
sample used to filter the initial number of alternative specifications and keep 
only those that satisfied our statistical criteria. By the time we finished this first 
phase of the selection process we could avail ourselves of more data and this 
made our sample longer, ending on March 2003. We thus re-estimated our 
selected specifications in this longer sample which provided a second level of 
proof that our specifications worked. We also used this longer sample to apply 
the updated estimated models which provided the in-sample testing of our 
selected models. These specifications we present here with the actual 
estimated coefficients and the relevant probability of statistical significance.   
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Having tested the model performance in-sample we then re-estimated 
the same specification on a shorter sample that ended in January 2002. It is 
these specifications that we then fit to the data from February 2002 to the end 
of our longer sample in March 2003 and test the model’s performance out-of-
sample. The reason why we applied our out-of sample tests on a sample 
starting on January was that we wanted the starting point to be an objective 
date that would not create any concerns to readers of our research. We felt 
that the beginning of a calendar year would provide such an objective starting 
point. We ended the-out-of sample testing period on March 2003 because we 
wanted to benefit from the longest available data sample, which at the time 
included March 2003. Both the in-sample and out-of-sample tests involve the 
rigorous analysis of the model’s results and their translation to trade 
recommendations.  
3.3.2 Part I: Excess returns greater than 5%, in sample testing 
In Table 5 and Table 6 below we present the models that include the 
dependent variable defined as returns that are higher than 5% in each given 
month, either on the depreciation or the appreciation side. As discussed in 
detail in Chapter 2 of the thesis we have included in the various specifications 
a selection of global and country specific variables. The global variables that 
we consider in Table 5 and Table 6 below are the month on month difference 
of the ISM index and in some cases the year on year change of the ISM, the 
annualized 3month on 3month percentage change in the OECD Leading 
Indicator and in some cases the momentum of this growth rate, the 
momentum of and the month on month percentage change of the 12 months 
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trailing measure of Moody’s speculative grade world default rate. One key 
global variable we include is CSFB’s measure of Risk Appetite which we 
typically consider as a dummy variable that captures the times that the index 
indicates Euphoria and in one specification we include this variable in the form 
of index level.  
The first country specific variable that we consider in Table 5 and Table 
6 is the country specific Real Effective Exchange Rate as deviation from its 
HP trend. The HP trend has been calculated using only data of the estimation 
sample each time.  We also consider the CPI monthly percentage change as 
a measure of price stability, the yearly percentage change of Industrial 
Production as a proxy of output growth, the MSCI index on a yearly 
percentage change as a measure of domestic financial markets, the 
momentum of the monthly percentage change of the credit to the private 
sector as an indication of domestic credit markets, the ratio of FX reserves to 
Money Supply and the 12months trailing measure of the country’s trade 
balance to gauge external market dynamics. 
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Table 5 PART I: Variations of PROBDEP model with 5% returns threshold  
 PART I               
PROBDEP 5%     
model variations        
SIGN PROBA
BILITY
SIGN PROBA
BILITY
SIGN PROBA
BILITY
SIGN
PROB
ABILI
TY
SIGN
PROB
ABILI
TY
SIGN
PROB
ABILI
TY
SIGN
PROB
ABILI
TY
SIGN
PROB
ABILI
TY
ISM INDEX                              
mom change - 0.64 - 0.68 - 0.67 - 0.65 - 0.68 - 0.64
RISK APETITE               
euphoria dummy + 0.03 + 0.00 + 0.00 + 0.00 + 0.00 + 0.00  + * 0.00 + 0.03
OECD LI                                
3m/3m ann% momentum - 0.87 + 0.96 - 0.87
MOODY's DEFAULT RATE 
mom% + 0.00 + 0.00 + 0.00 + 0.00 + 0.00 + 0.00 + 0.00 + 0.00
REER                                
deviation from HP trend + 0.00 + 0.00 + 0.00 + 0.00 + 0.00 + 0.00 + 0.00 + 0.00
CPI                                   
mom% + 0.09 + 0.44 + 0.43 + 0.43 + ** 0.00
IP                                     
yoy% - 0.22 + 0.83 + 0.83 - ** 0.06
MSCI                                  
yoy% - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00
CREDIT TO THE PRIVATE 
SECTOR                               
mom% momentum
+ 0.34 + 0.35 + 0.35 + 0.35 + ** 0.00
FX RESERVES ratio to 
MONEY SUPPLY - 0.43 - 0.43 - 0.43 - 0.43 - ** 0.52
TRADE  BALANCE        12m 
trailing moving avg - 0.49 - 0.47 - 0.47 - 0.47 - ** 0.46
* indicates that the Risk Appetite in included in the specification in index level form
** indicates that the explanatory variable is included in the specification in lag1 instead of the default assumption of lag 2
The (dark) light blue sign indicates that the estimated coefficient displays the (reverse from the) expected sign
The (dark) light blue probability measure indicates that the estimated coefficient is statistically (in)significant
Estimations are run on sample from Jan 1994 to June 2002  
Table 6 PART I: Variations of PROBAPP model with 5% returns threshold  
 PART I               
PROBAPP 5%     
model variations        
SIGN PROBA
BILITY
SIGN PROBA
BILITY
SIGN PROBA
BILITY
SIGN PROBA
BILITY
SIGN PROBA
BILITY
SIGN PROBA
BILITY
ISM INDEX                              
mom change - 0.49 + ** 0.99 - ** 0.29
RISK APETITE               
euphoria dummy - 0.13 - 0.07 - 0.05 - 0.16 - 0.08 - 0.07
OECD LI                                
3m/3m ann% momentum + 0.52 + * 0.41 + * 0.54 + 0.77 + * 0.18
MOODY's DEFAULT RATE 
mom% - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00
REER                                
deviation from HP trend - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00
CPI                                   
mom% + 0.02 + 0.02
IP                                     
yoy% - 0.01 - 0.01 + 0.25
MSCI                                  
yoy%
CREDIT TO THE PRIVATE 
SECTOR                               
mom% momentum
+ 0.82 + 0.77 - 0.20
FX RESERVES ratio to 
MONEY SUPPLY - 0.42 - 0.39 + 0.20
TRADE  BALANCE        
12m trailing moving avg - 0.52 - 0.56
* indicates that the OECD LI is included in the specification as a 3m/3m ann% 
** indicates that the ISM index is included in the specification as yoy change
The (dark) light blue sign indicates that the estimated coefficient displays the (reverse from the) expected sign
The (dark) light blue probability measure indicates that the estimated coefficient is statistically (in)significant
Estimations are run on sample from Jan 1994 to June 2002  
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Let us first turn to the global variables considered and the way we 
selected the ones to keep in our final specifications. As discussed in Chapter 
2 we considered including oil prices as a candidate explanatory variable but 
decided against it as there was no strong evidence that this variable should 
exhibit a specific sign in either specification. From the variables we did test in 
our estimations our statistical findings suggest that the ISM index and the 
OECD leading indicator come out consistently insignificant as explanatory 
variables. In our analysis we tried out alternative formats for these two 
variables other that what is included in Table 5 and Table 6 although these 
are the most intuitive formats. Nevertheless the results again confirmed that 
these global indicators are not fit candidates for modelling high frequency 
currency moves in emerging markets. We also tried including in our 
estimations only one of the two variables in case the spurious statistics were 
the result of over-lapping information included in each one of them. The 
variable that we left in the specification in each case was still insignificant.   
A global variable that suggested itself as a possible candidate for 
inclusion in our models was CSFB’s Risk Appetite Index. It proved to be a 
significant explanatory variable for the PROBDEP model both when we 
included the measure in index level form and as a Euphoria dummy. It is 
worth noting that the definition of Euphoria we adopted requires the index to 
be higher than its sample average value by more than 1standard deviation. As 
discussed in Chapter 2 the definition that CSFB tends to adopt in practice is 
somewhat different, defining euphoria as the cases when risk appetite takes a 
value higher than +5. As this definition is not statistically supported and rather 
arbitrary we opted to create a definition that is more systematic. The 
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PROBDEP model results suggest that when risk appetite rises to extreme 
levels and the euphoria dummy becomes one, the probabilities of near term 
local currency weakness are increasing. When we include the risk appetite 
index in level form our findings suggest that the higher the risk appetite the 
higher the chances that a downwards correction in emerging market 
currencies is imminent. However the Risk Appetite variable somewhat loses 
its significance in the PROBAPP model. Here we tried to include the risk 
appetite index in dummy form to capture the times when the index enters the 
Panic zone. Like with the Euphoria dummy the definition of Panic we used in 
our estimations captures the points when the index level in any given month is 
lower than its sample average value by more than 1standard deviation. Again 
as discussed in Chapter 2 CSFB defines panic as the cases when risk 
appetite takes a value lower than minus three. Again we feel that the use of 
an arbitrary, let alone asymmetric, definition of extreme zones is not 
appropriate for a modelling exercise like ours. We would expect the Euphoria 
dummy to work in the PROBDEP model and the Panic dummy in the 
PROBAPP model as indicator that the local currency rally or sell-off 
respectively has peaked or troughed and is likely to be reversed soon. 
However we found that only the Euphoria dummy performed as expected, and 
in both models. This together with the fact that risk appetite reached euphoria 
only a handful of months during our long sample and the lack of access to the 
risk appetite index data outside of CSFB led us to exclude the variable from 
the final specification.  
Moody’s world default rate is the only global variable that comes up with 
the expected sign in both the PROBDEP and PROBAPP models. It is also 
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statistically significant at near zero probability level and its performance is 
consistent irrespective of what other explanatory variables are included in the 
estimation. The results suggest that indeed a rise in the default rate of the 
global speculative grade corporate universe is a reliable early indicator of 
forthcoming weakness in riskier assets like emerging market currencies. 
Accordingly, an improvement in global default rates of high yielding 
corporates is a good indication that risky assets will perform well in the near 
future. These findings amply confirm our decision to include Moody’s default 
rate as the only global variable in both the PROBAPP and PROBDEP model 
specifications that we finally selected.  
Moving on to the selection process of the country specific variables, it is 
apparent from Table 5 and Table 6 that macroeconomic fundamentals are not 
statistically significant explanatory variables when included at 2motnhs lag in 
the model estimation. Some macro series like our measure of Industrial 
Production when included both in the PROBDEP and PROBAPP produced 
erratic results in terms of the sign of the estimated coefficient. Others, like the 
measure of Credit to the Private Sector or the ratio of FX reserves to Money 
Supply and the Trade Balance figures exhibit the sign expected based on 
macroeconomic theory in the PROBDEP model but still come out as 
insignificant. In the PROBAPP version these variables remain insignificant but 
also exhibit erratic signs depending on the selected specification. Interestingly 
when we include these variables in the PROBDEP model at zero lags, two out 
of four, namely IP and Credit to the Private Sector become significant and 
also hold the correct sign. However even if these data are statistically 
significant coincident indicators of currency pressures we cannot, in practice, 
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avail ourselves of these data in a timely fashion to use in our model 
application. The other two variables, namely the Ratio of FX Reserves to 
Money Supply and the Trade Balance data continue to show the correct sign 
but remain insignificant even when tested at zero lag. Inflation is another 
macro variable we considered which again held the correct sign when 
included in the PROBDEP model although statistically insignificant depending 
on which specification we estimated. However inflation did not work as 
expected when included in the PROBAPP model. This finding might be 
supported by practical experience which suggests that markets are likely to 
react more aggressively at periods of hyperinflation that lead currency 
weakness than periods of slower inflation growth which may lead to a rise in 
risky assets valuations. However the definition of hyperinflation and its causes 
differ from time to time and from country to country, making it difficult for us to 
conclude on a robust relationship between inflation and near future currency 
moves.   
In summary the above findings support our understanding that 
macroeconomic fundamentals may well be linked to exchange rate dynamics 
but the former need not be leading indicators of the latter in any systematic 
quantifiable manner. This is even more so in our analysis here, as our 
definition of exchange rate dynamics does not involve spot exchange rates 
but returns on a high frequency forward rate basis. The slow moving nature of 
macro fundamentals together with their delayed availability and the fact that 
they are often revised for quite some time after their initial release led us to 
exclude these variables from our high frequency trade signal generating 
model. From the country specific variables that we include in the 
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specifications above only the Real Effective Exchange Rate of each country 
and its deviations from the respective Hodrick Prescott trend comes out as a 
consistently very significant early indicator of both currency strength and 
weakness.  
3.3.3 Part I: Excess returns greater than 2.5%, in sample testing: 
to June 2002 
As discussed earlier in this section we have decided that we wish to 
model the 1month forward excess returns that are higher than 5% in any 
given month. One of the alternatives we tried out was the same definition of 
returns on a forward rate basis but capturing the cases when these exceed 
2.5% in any given month. This threshold has been suggested by the literature 
but we do not feel it provides the necessary buffer for unquantifiable 
transaction costs or more importantly for error absorbance. The latter factor 
inevitably becomes very relevant when you try to model moves that are more 
frequent in nature and may be explained by a host of different ways. Our 
results as shown in Table 7 and Table 8 below suggest that lowering the bar 
for the currency moves we model does not improve the results in the 
specifications we chose to dismiss already.  
Macro fundamentals exhibit similar patterns as in the models that 
capture returns higher than 5%. They either exhibit the correct sign but are 
found to be highly insignificant or, they have statistically significant coefficients 
that bear the counter-intuitive sign, or as both insignificant and with the 
erroneous sign. These findings are also consistent in both the PROBAPP and 
the PROBDEP models that capture returns higher that 2.5%. From the global 
variables we tested, the ISM index again has the correct sign but remains 
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insignificant. The only variable that improved its statistical performance when 
the threshold for returns falls to 2.5% is the OECD Leading Indicator which 
now bears the correct sign and is statistically significant in both the PROBAPP 
and the PROBDOWN model. This exception does not suffice for us to change 
our assessment. Especially as the variables we had already selected still 
meet all the criteria we have set. 
Table 7 Variations of PROBDEP model with 2.5% returns threshold  
 PART I               
PROBDEP 2.5%     
model variations        
SIGN PROBABILITY SIGN
PROBA
BILITY SIGN
PROBA
BILITY
ISM INDEX                              
mom change - 0.32 - 0.39 - 0.05
RISK APETITE               
euphoria dummy + 0.01 + 0.00 + 0.00
OECD LI                                
3m/3m ann% momentum - 0.06 - 0.06
MOODY's DEFAULT RATE 
mom% + 0.00 + 0.00 + 0.00
OIL PRICE                          
3m/3m%
REER                                
deviation from HP trend + 0.01 + 0.00 + 0.00
CPI                                   
mom% - 0.81 - 0.51
IP                                     
yoy% - 0.20 - 0.99
MSCI                                  
yoy% - 0.00 - 0.00
CREDIT TO THE PRIVATE 
SECTOR                               
mom% momentum
+ 0.45 + 0.44 + 0.42
FX RESERVES ratio to 
MONEY SUPPLY - 0.36 - 0.36 - 0.36
TRADE  BALANCE        12m 
trailling moving avg - 0.16 - 0.15 - 0.17
The (dark) light blue sign indicates that the estimated coefficient displays the (reverse from the) expected sign
The (dark) light blue probability measure indicates that the estimated coefficient is statistically (in)significant
Estimations are run on sample from Jan 1994 to June 2002  
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Table 8 Variations of PROBAPP model with 2.5% returns threshold  
 PART I               
PROBAPP 2.5%      
model variations        
SIGN
PROBA
BILITY SIGN
PROBA
BILITY
ISM INDEX                              
mom  change + 0.47 + 0.50
RISK APETITE               
e uphoria  dumm y - 0.19 + 0.30
OECD LI                                
3m/3m ann% m ome ntum + 0.08 + 0.02
MOODY's DEFAULT RATE 
mom % - 0.00 - 0.00
OIL PRICE                          
3m /3m%
REER                                
de via tion from HP trend - 0.00 - 0.00
CPI                                   
mom % + 0.00
IP                                      
yoy% - 0.01
MSCI                                  
yoy%
CREDIT TO THE PRIVATE 
SECTOR                               
mom% momentum
- 0.96 - 0.01
FX RESERVES ratio to 
MONEY SUPPLY + 0.29 + 0.34
TRADE  BALANCE        
12m  tra illing moving avg - 0.08
The (dark) light blue sign indicates that the es tim ated coefficient displays the (reverse from  the) expected sign
The (dark) light blue probability measure indicates that the es timated coefficient is s tatistically (in)s ignificant
Es tim ations  are run on s am ple from  Jan 1994 to June 2002  
3.3.4 Part II and III: Excess returns greater than 5%, in sample 
testing: to March 2003 
Based on the above analysis and findings we decided that we will 
indeed proceed to model one-month forward exchange rate returns that 
exceed 5%. As far as the explanatory variables are concerned we concluded 
that from all candidates considered above the ones we will include in our 
specifications are the Real Effective Exchange Rates expressed as deviations 
from the respective Hodrick-Prescott trends and the monthly percentage 
change in the trailing 12-month global corporate speculative grade Default 
Rate as published by Moody’s.  
By the time we finished the work that produced the results shown in 
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Table 7 and Table 8 above we could avail ourselves of a somewhat larger 
sample, starting again from as early as January 1994 and ending in March 
2003. We thus proceeded with what we call here Part II of our specification 
selection process and re-estimated our selected specifications on this longer 
sample. The results are summarized in Table 9 and  
Table 10 below. Some of the models summarized in Table 9 and Table 
10 below include the Risk Appetite dummies we found to be a close candidate 
in previous model tests. The results again support our choice to exclude this 
factor as the risk appetite dummies we include in our PROBAPP model 
estimations exhibit most of the times a wrong sign or are statistically 
insignificant.  The euphoria dummy works well in the PROBDEP model 
version. Nevertheless as described above we are wary of the lack of 
consistency in the statistical behaviour of this variable. We thus re-affirmed 
our conclusion that we will exclude the Risk Appetite index from our final 
model specification.  
One variable we only considered towards the end of our initial filtering 
stage was the Rating Actions by S&P on hard currency sovereign debt. We 
therefore chose to present our findings with regards to this variable based on 
this second stage of the selection process. This indeed proved to be one 
variable we used in our final PROBDEP specification and also is the only 
variable that is not symmetrical in both models we estimate. Below we present 
the reasons why we opted to keep this variable in one of our specifications. In 
Table 9 we present our testing of the rating actions as an indicator of 
forthcoming currency appreciation. As discussed in more detail in Chapter 2 
of the thesis, the market effect of a positive rating action on the country’s 
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assets classes is likely to be imminent or may at times precede the rating 
action itself. Our understanding is that this is exactly the reason why rating 
upgrades did not work as an early indicator of higher currency appreciation 
pressures when included in the PROBAPP model. Often rating agencies wait 
in the sidelines before praising a sovereign with an upgrade while markets 
tend to discount good news faster than agencies. Often a rating upgrade may 
even lead to a weakening of the currency as markets take profits from their 
previous positioning. On the other hand, as per the results in Table 9, rating 
downgrades come up as marginally significant but always with the wrong sign 
when included in the PROBAPP model.  
Besides the arguments presented above, which still apply, it is worth 
adding one more factor in our interpretation of why downgrades do not work 
well in the PROBAPP model. In our modelling exercise we do not capture all 
possible movements of currencies, but rather focus on a sample of extreme 
events where significant excess returns are to be made. Hence it is only the 
clearest and strongest links between these returns and a handful of 
dependent variables that will show up in our statistical tests results. Moreover 
as our model results come in the form of probabilities and not hard indications 
of specific currency moves there is clearly more room for ambiguity.  In the 
case of rating actions these concerns apply in the following manner. The most 
direct link between rating actions and currency moves is the link from 
upgrades to appreciation and downgrades to depreciation. Saying that an 
upgrade will reduce the probabilities of a depreciation or that a downgrade 
makes an appreciation less likely is too convoluted and need not be 
supported by the data. Indeed Table 9 suggests that downgrades are a 
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significant variable but bear wrong sign. We thus exclude them from our 
analysis.  
In the PROBDEP model we only tested the relevance of downgrades in 
signalling forthcoming depreciations. As shown in Table 10, downgrades are a 
highly significant variable which also exhibits the sign supported by intuition in 
that they increase the probability of depreciation. The model results suggest 
that when a specific country experiences a negative rating action even by a 
rating outlook by S&P, on the country’s hard currency long term debt 
obligations, that country’s currency is likely to feel significant downwards 
pressures in its currency in the months to come. Negative actions contain 
more information for market participants than positive ones. Investors will 
have typically already acted on their own positive views for a country but 
would still be wary of additional penalties that could trigger or justify further 
sell offs. This becomes even more relevant as we capture actions even by a 
rating outlook which makes rating events greater in number and frequency. 
Moreover, a negative rating action may have an immediate market effect but 
may also be expected to have a more lasting effect that remains relevant in 
the months following the rating action. 
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 Table 9 PART II: Variations of PROBAPP model with 5% returns threshold   
 PART II               
PROBAPP 5%     
model variations        
SIGN PROBABILITY SIGN
PROBA
BILITY SIGN
PROBA
BILITY SIGN
PROBA
BILITY SIGN
PROBABI
LITY
RISK APETITE               
euphoria dummy - 0.26 - 0.19
RISK APETITE               
panic dummy - 0.04 - 0.06
MOODY's DEFAULT RATE 
mom% - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00
REER                                
deviation from HP trend - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00
S&P RATING ACTION   
upgrades - 0.44
S&P RATING ACTION   
downgrades + 0.12 + 0.10 + 0.07
The (dark) light blue sign indicates that the estimated coefficient displays the (reverse from the) expected sign
The (dark) light blue probability measure indicates that the estimated coefficient is statistically (in)significant
Estimations are run on sample from Jan 1994 to March 2003  
 
Table 10 PART II: Variations of PROBDEP model with 5% returns threshold   
 PART II               
PROBDEP 5%     
model variations        
SIGN PROBA
BILITY
RISK APETITE               
euphoria dummy + 0.04
RISK APETITE               
panic dummy
MOODY's DEFAULT RATE 
mom% + 0.00
REER                                
deviation from HP trend + 0.02
S&P RATING ACTION   
upgrades
S&P RATING ACTION   
downgrades + 0.00
The (dark) light blue sign indicates that the estimated coefficient displays the (reverse from the) expected sign
The (dark) light blue probability measure indicates that the estimated coefficient is statistically (in)significant
Estimations are run on sample from Jan 1994 to March 2003  
We now move to what we describe as Part III of our model selection 
process. Having selected the specifications we wish to work with, we tested 
one last variable that was often suggested by investors at the time. The 
corporate credit market spreads which many felt would capture information we 
could use. Credit spreads are the price markets put on the debt issued by 
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corporates to quantify the credit risk element that each corporate represents 
compared to the theoretically risk-free debt issued by a sovereign. Indices 
exist that capture the average credit spread of a basket of corporates which 
are deemed to be representative of a specific category of risk. Risk profiles 
are ranked by the rating assigned to each corporate. A number of investors 
we consulted at the time felt that credit spreads would replace Moody’s world 
default rate as a global risk indicator. We set out to test this hypothesis by 
including different credit spread metrics in the place of Moody’s world default 
rate in the PROBDEP model.  
As our Moody’s variable refers to the defaults of the speculative grade 
corporate universe we also considered credit spreads from the same ratings 
universe. In particular we tested the High Yield Credit Spread index in level 
form, as monthly change in index levels and as a monthly percentage change 
of the index levels. We also tested the more specific Indices for BB, B and C 
rated corporates, again in levels, monthly changes and monthly percentage 
changes form.  All variations were included in the model at two months lag. As 
suggested by the results in Table 11 below all spread variables exhibited the 
wrong sign, suggesting that an increase in credit spread, which occurs at 
times of weakening corporate fundamentals or increase of general risk 
aversion, reduce the probabilities of forthcoming currency sell-offs. In terms of 
statistical significance of results, only when the variables were included in 
level form were their coefficients found to be significant. In all other cases 
both the signs were wrong and the coefficients highly insignificant.  
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Table 11 PART III: Variations of PROBDEP model with 5% returns threshold  
PART III:        
PROBDEP 5%     
model variations    
SIGN PROBA
BILITY
SIGN PROBA
BILITY
SIGN PROBA
BILITY
PART III:        
PROBDEP 5%     
model variations    
SIGN PROBA
BILITY
SIGN PROBABI
LITY
SIGN PROBA
BILITY
CREDIT SPREAD INDEX       
HIGH YIELD                      
level
- 0.00
CREDIT SPREAD INDEX    
BB                                       
level
- 0.00
CREDIT SPREAD INDEX       
HIGH YIELD                      
mom change
- 0.27
CREDIT SPREAD INDEX       
BB                                      
mom change
- 0.72
CREDIT SPREAD INDEX       
HIGH YIELD                      
mom  % change
- 0.50
CREDIT SPREAD INDEX       
BB                                                              
mom  % change
- 0.92
REER                                
deviation from HP trend + 0.00 + 0.00 + 0.00
REER                                
deviation from HP trend + 0.00 + 0.00 + 0.00
S&P RATING ACTION   
downgrades + 0.00 + 0.00 + 0.00
S&P RATING ACTION   
downgrades + 0.00 + 0.00 + 0.00
The (dark) light blue sign indicates that the estimated coefficient displays the (reverse from the) expected sign
The (dark) light blue probability measure indicates that the estimated coefficient is statistically (in)significant
Estimations are run on sample from Jan 1994 to March 2003  
 
 
Table 12 PART III: Variations of PROBDEP model with 5% returns threshold   
PART III:        
PROBDEP 5%     
model variations    
SIGN PROBABILITY SIGN
PROBA
BILITY SIGN
PROBA
BILITY
PART III:        
PROBDEP 5%     
model variations    
SIGN PROBABILITY SIGN
PROBABI
LITY SIGN
PROBA
BILITY
CREDIT SPREAD INDEX       
B                                         
level
- 0.00
CREDIT SPREAD INDEX       
C                                         
level
- 0.00
CREDIT SPREAD INDEX       
B                                        
mom change
- 0.25
CREDIT SPREAD INDEX       
C                                          
mom change
- 0.17
CREDIT SPREAD INDEX       
B                                                                
mom  % change
- 0.41
CREDIT SPREAD INDEX       
C                                                                 
mom  % change
- 0.29
REER                                
deviation from HP trend + 0.00 + 0.00 + 0.00
REER                                
deviation from HP trend + 0.00 + 0.00 + 0.00
S&P RATING ACTION   
downgrades + 0.00 + 0.00 + 0.00 S&P RATING ACTION   downgrades + 0.00 + 0.00 + 0.00
The (dark) light blue sign indicates that the estimated coefficient displays the (reverse from the) expected sign
The (dark) light blue probability measure indicates that the estimated coefficient is statistically (in)significant
Estimations are run on sample from Jan 1994 to March 2003  
The lack of compelling evidence in support of this variable does not 
necessarily contradict the investors’ perception of the information content of 
credit spreads. As discussed in Chapter 2 in more detail market prices of one 
asset class cannot be expected to work as leading and consistent indicators 
of another asset class. The same applied when we tried including the MSCI 
equity indices in our models. Equity, credit and currency markets are likely to 
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contain the same information at the same time, rather than with a lead-lag 
relationship to each other. In the case of credit prices in particular it is 
understandable that the move of an index as a whole need not correspond to 
the same type of market reaction for each and every emerging market from a 
diverse sample or across time. In summary we felt this evidence supports our 
decision to exclude the Credit Spread variables from our model specifications 
and continue with the inclusion of our Moody’s world default rate as a proxy of 
global risk appetite. 
3.3.5 Selection of Final Specifications 
 At the end of this selection process we conclude that we wish to keep 
the PROBAPP and PRODEP model specifications as shown in Table 13 and 
Table 14 below. The final PROBDEP specification  as presented in Table 13 
below includes the monthly percentage change of the 12month trailing 
Moody’s Global Corporate Speculative Grade Default Rate, the deviations of 
every country’s  Real Effective Exchange Rate from its respective Hodrick 
Prescott trend expressed as the logarithmic ratio of the REER over the HP 
trend and a dummy variable that takes a value of one every time S&P 
downgrades the long term hard currency sovereign credit rating or rating 
outlook of each country. The final PROBAPP specification as presented in 
Table 14 below includes the two of the three variables included in the 
PROBDEP version, namely the Moody’s world default rate measure and the 
REER over and under valuations from their HP trends. All variables exhibit the 
signs that are consistent with our intuition, economic theory and market 
stylized facts. All estimated coefficients are also extremely statistical 
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significant. What’s more these supportive statistical characteristics have been 
consistent in all specifications we have tested so far irrespective of the sample 
used or the other variables included in or excluded from our specifications. 
We also note that the overall McFadden R-squared of the selected 
specifications are at the 10% level which outperforms similar models in the 
literature. These specifications have been estimated in the sample that starts 
from as early as January 1994 and ends in March 2003. It is on the basis of 
this specification that we present all the findings in Chapter 4 where we apply 
the models and test their practical usability and performance. 
Table 13  Selected specification for PROBDEP model with 5% returns 
threshold.  Version applied to perform in sample testing from Jan ‘94-Mar ‘03 
E x p lan a to ry Varia ble
E st im ated  
Co e ffic ien t S td . Error z-S ta tist ic P ro b ab i lity*
C o n s tan t  -3 .4 151 0 .16 -21 .39 0 .0 00 0
M O O D Y 's D EF AU L T  R A T E  
m o m % 0.06 86 0 .02 4 .10 0 .0 00 0
R EE R                                 
d e via t io n  f ro m  H P tr en d 0.07 47 0 .02 4 .31 0 .0 00 0
S& P  D O W N G R AD ES  d u m m y 1.88 42 0 .35 5 .40 0 .0 00 0
M ean  d epe nd en t va r 0 .0 5     S .D . d ep en de n t va r 0 .22
S .E. o f reg re ss io n 0 .2 1     A kaike  in fo  c rite rio n 0 .36
S u m  squa red  re s id 6 7 .5 6     S chw a rz  c ri te rion 0 .38
Lo g  l ike l iho od -2 72 .65     Ha nn an -Q uinn  c ri te r. 0 .37
R estr.  lo g like liho od -3 01 .95     A vg .  log  likel iho od -0.1 8
LR  s ta tis t ic  (3  d f) 5 8 .5 9     M cF a dd en  R-squ ared 0 .10
P rob ab il ity (LR  s ta t) 0 .0 0
*  P ro ba b it lt y th a t t he  e s tim a te d coe ff ic ia nt  is  in s ig n if ica n t
M od e l es t im a ted  o n  d ep e nd e dn t va riab le sa m ple  fro m  Ja n  '9 4  to  M a r '0 3 
A ll exp la n atory  varia ble s  a re in c lud e d at  2 m on th s  la g fro m  th e  d e pe n de n t va ria b le
R E ER  d e v ia tio n fro m  H P  tre n d is  calcu la te d  a s  th e  log a ri th m ic  rat io  o f RE E R  o ver th e HP  t ren d
H P  tre n d ba se d on  in pu t da ta  f rom  No v '9 3  to  Ja n  '0 3  to  b e  co m pa tib le  w i th  th e  e s tim at io n  s a m ple  
Th is  sp ec i fica it on  w a s  fi tt ed  t o th e ou tp u t d a ta  fro m  Ja n  '9 4  to  M a r' 0 3  to  p ro du ce  th e  in-sa m p le  re su lt s  fo r t he  t rad ing  ru le
P ROB D E P (5 % dep r) M OD EL ES T IM A TIO N   o n Ja n '94 -  M ar  '0 3 
S pe cific atio n a pplied for in s amp le f ittin g (J an'94 -M ar '03 )                                                                                                                                                                                                    
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Table 14 Selected specification for PROBDEP model with 5% returns 
threshold. Version applied to perform in sample testing from Jan ‘94-Mar ‘03 
E x plana tory  V ariab le
E stim ated  
C oeff ic ien t S td . Er ro r z-S tatis tic Pro b abili ty*
C o nsta n t -2 .94 55 0.12 -23 .80 0 .0 000
M O OD Y 's DE F AU LT  R AT E  
m o m % -0 .06 01 0.01 -4 .21 0 .0 000
R E ER                                 
d ev ia tio n from  HP  trend -0 .09 33 0.01 -8 .46 0 .0 000
M ean depen dent va r 0.06     S .D . depen dent va r 0.25
S .E.  o f  regression 0.23     A ka ike  in fo  c rite rion 0.41
S um  squa red  res id 78 .12     S chwarz  c r ite r ion 0.42
Log like lihoo d -312 .11     H annan -Q u inn  c r ite r . 0.42
R estr.  lo g like lih ood -366 .38     A vg.  lo g like lihood - 0 .2 0
LR  s ta tis t ic (2  d f ) 108.54     M cF ad den R- square d 0.15
P rob ab ility(L R s ta t) 0.00
*  P ro ba b it lty th a t the  e s tim a te d coe ff ic ia nt  is in sig n if ica n t
M od e l es t im a ted  o n  d ep e nd e dn t va riab le sa m ple  fro m  Ja n  '9 4  to  M a r '0 3 
A l l exp la n atory var ia ble s a re in clud e d at  2 m on th s  la g fro m  th e  d e pe n de n t va ria b le
R E ER  d e via tio n fro m  H P  tre n d is calcu la te d  a s th e  log a ri th m ic rat io  o f REE R  o ver th e HP t ren d
H P  tre n d ba se d on  in pu t da ta  f rom  No v  '9 3  to  Ja n  '0 3  to  b e  co m pa tib le  w ith  th e  e stim at io n  sa m ple  
Th is sp ecifica it on  w a s  fi tted  to th e ou tp u t d a ta  fro m  Ja n  '9 4  to  M a r' 0 3  to  p ro du ce  th e  in-sa m p le  re su lt s fo r the  t rad ing  
ru le
P ROB APP (5% ap pr) MO DE L ES TIM ATIO N  on Jan '94  -  Ma r '03 
Sp eci fica tion  ap plied  fo r in sam ple  fitt ing (Ja n'9 4-M ar'03)                              
 
We proceed to re-estimate these final specifications at a somewhat 
shorter sample that ends in January 2002. The resulting models are then 
fitted to the remaining sample available from February 2002 to March 2003. 
This provides the basis for what we call our “OUT-OF-SAMPLE” results of the 
models performance. The model versions estimated in the shorter period as 
presented in detail in Table 15 and Table 16 below. This again forms part of 
our analysis in Chapter 4. 
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Table 15  Selected specification for PROBDEP model with 5% returns 
threshold. Version applied to perform out-of-sample testing from Feb ‘02-Mar 
‘03 
Exp lan ato ry  V ar iab le
Estim a te d  
Co effic ient St d.  E rror z -Sta t is tic Prob abi li ty*
Co n sta n t -3 .47 93 0 .1 9 -18.52 0 .0000
M O O DY 's D E FAU L T R AT E  
m o m % 0 .0716 0 .0 2 3 .93 0 .0001
R E ER                                 
d eviat ion  fro m  H P  t ren d 0 .0739 0 .0 2 3 .24 0 .0012
S & P DO W N G R ADE S  
du m m y 2 .0939 0 .3 6 5 .75 0 .0000
M ean depende n t va r 0 .05     S.D.  d ependen t  va r 0 .22
S .E.  o f  reg ress ion 0 .21     Aka ike  in fo  crite rion 0 .37
S um  squar ed  re sid 55.04     Schwarz  crite rion 0 .39
Log  like lihood -224 .32     Hannan-Q u inn  crite r. 0 .38
R estr.  log like lihood -248 .57     Avg . log  l ike l ih ood -0 .18
LR  s ta tis tic  (3  d f ) 48.50     M cFadden  R -squ ar ed 0 .10
P roba b ility (LR s ta t) 0 .00
*  P ro ba b it lt y th a t t he  e stim a te d coe ff ic ia nt  is in sig n if ica n t
M od e l est im a ted  o n  d ep e nd e dn t va riab le sa m ple  fro m  Ja n  '9 4  to  Ja n  '0 2 
Th is sp ecifica iton  w a s su bse q ue n tly a pp l ie d  to  p ro du ce  o ut  o f sa m p le  fo re ca s tin g fro m  Fe b  '0 2 to  M a r '0 3 
A l l exp la n at ory  varia ble s  a re in clud e d at  2 m on th s la g fro m  th e  d e pe n de n t va ria b le
R E ER  d e via tio n fro m  H P  tre n d is calcu la te d  a s  th e  log a r ith m ic  rat io  o f REE R  o ver th e HP  t ren d
H P  tre n d ba se d on  in pu t da ta  f rom  No v  '9 3  to  N o v '0 1 to  b e com p a tible  w ith th e es t im a tio n sam p le  
D escr ip tive  S ta tis tics
PR OBD EP  (5%  d epr)  M ODE L E STIM ATION  on Jan  '9 4 - Jan  '0 2 
S pec ific atio n a pplied in ou t-o f-sa m ple fo rec asting (Feb  '0 2 - Mar  '0 3)                                                                                                                                                                       
 
 
Table 16 Selected specification for PROBAPP model with 5% returns  
threshold. Version applied to perform out-of-sample testing from Feb ‘02-Mar 
’03  
Explanatory Variable
Estimated 
Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Probability*
Con stant -3.2188 0.16 -20.47 0.0000
MOODY's DEFAULT RATE 
mom% -0.0581 0.02 -3.60 0.0003
REER                                
deviation from HP trend -0.1160 0.02 -7.27 0.0000
Mean dependent var 0.05     S.D. dependent var 0.22
S.E. of regression 0.20     Akaike info criterion 0.34
Sum squared resid 50.51     Schwarz criterion 0.35
Log likelihood -203.39     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.34
Restr. log likelihood 1.00     Avg. log likelihood -0.17
LR statistic (2 df) 90.37     McFadden R-squared 0.18
Probability(LR stat) 0.00
* Probabit lty that the estimated coefficiant is insignif icant
Model estimated on dependednt variable sample from Jan '94 to Jan '02 
This specificaiton was subsequently applied to produce out of sample forecasting from Feb '02 to Mar '03 
All explanatory variables are included at 2months lag from the dependent variable
REER deviation from HP trend is calculated as the logarithmic ratio of REER over the HP trend
HP trend based on input data from Nov '93 to Nov '01 to be compatible with the estimation sample 
Descriptive Statistics
PROBAPP (5% appr) MODEL ESTIMATION  on Jan '94 - Jan '02 
Specification applied in out-of-sample forecasting (Feb '02 - Mar '03)                                                                                                                                                                       
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In Chapter 4 that follows, we establish the ability of our two models to 
perform well as trading tools both in and out of sample and we proceed to 
apply the models in real time and forecast the period from January to 
December 2004 on a monthly basis. By that time Moody’s had published a 
slightly updated version of their World Default rate series and we felt it was 
appropriate to incorporate this new series in our estimation. This change 
made only marginal difference in the resulting specification as presented in 
Table 13 and Table 14. The newly estimated versions are presented in Table 
17 and Table 18 below.     
Table 17 Final specification for PROBDEP model with 5% returns threshold. 
Version applied to real time testing from January 2004 to December 2004   
Explanatory Variable
Estimated 
Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Probability*
Constant -3.4091 0.16 -21.43 0.0000
M OODY's DEFAULT RAT E 
mom% 0.0668 0.02 4.05 0.0001
REER                                
deviation from HP tren d 0.0747 0.02 4.32 0.0000
S&P DO WNGRADES du mmy 1.8861 0.35 5.41 0.0000
M ean dependent var 0.05     S.D. dependent var 0.22
S.E. of regression 0.21     Akaike info criterion 0.36
Sum squared resid 67.59     Schwarz criter ion 0.38
Log likelihood -272.88     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.37
Restr. log likelihood -301.95     Avg. log likelihood -0.18
LR statistic (3 df) 58.14     McFadden R-squared 0.10
Probability(LR stat) 0.00
* Probabitlty that the estimated coeff iciant is insignificant
Model est imated on dependednt variable sample from Jan '94 to Mar '03 
All explanatory variables are included at  2months lag from the dependent variable
REER deviation from HP trend is calculated as the logarithmic ratio of REER over the HP t rend
HP trend based on input data from Nov '93 to Jan '03 to be compatible w ith the estimation sample 
PROBDEP (5% depr) MODEL ESTIMATION  on Jan '94 -  Mar '03 
Specification applied in real time forecasting from May 2003 to Jan 2005                                                                                                                                                                       
This specificaiton was fitted to the output data from Jan '94 to Mar' 03 to produce the in-sample resutls for the t rading rule 
and was also used in forecasting each month post March 2003 unt il December 2004.  
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Table 18 Final specification for PROBAPP model with 5% returns 
threshold.Version applied to real time testing from January 2004 to December 
2004  
Explanatory Variable
Estimated 
Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Probability*
Constant -2.9478 0.12 -23.79 0.0000
M OODY's DEFAULT RATE 
mom% -0.0607 0.01 -4.25 0.0000
REER                                
deviation from HP tren d -0.0933 0.01 -8.46 0.0000
Mean dependent var 0.06     S.D. dependent var 0.25
S.E. of regression 0.23     Akaike info criterion 0.41
Sum squared resid 78.10     Schwarz criterion 0.42
Log likelihood -311.91     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.42
Restr. log likelihood -366.38     Avg. log likelihood -0.20
LR statistic (2 df) 108.94     McFadden R-squared 0.15
Probability(LR stat) 0.00
* Probabit lty that the estimated coeff iciant is insign ificant
Model est imated on dependednt variable sample from Jan '94 to Mar '03 
All explanatory variables are included at 2months lag from the dependent variable
REER deviation from HP trend is calculated as the logarithmic rat io of REER over the HP trend
HP trend based on input data from Nov '93 to  Jan '03 to be compatible with the estimation sample 
This specificaiton was fitted to the output data from Jan '94 to Mar' 03 to produce the in-sample resutls for the trading rule 
and was also used in forecasting each month post March 2003 until December 2004. 
PROBAPP (5% appr) MODEL ESTIMATION  on Jan '94 -  Mar '03 
Specification applied in real time forecasting from May 2003 to Jan 2005                                                                                                                                                                  
 
3.4 Conclusion 
In Chapter 3 we presented the model methodology we adopted and the 
process involved in selecting the final specifications. We apply a Logit type 
regression on two separate models and the results are translated in the form 
of probabilities of specific events occurring within the following calendar 
month. In both cases the findings refer to the performance of the local 
exchange rate versus the USD. The first version is called the PROBAPP 
model and estimates the probabilities of the end of month spot outperforming 
the one month forward that prevailed at the beginning of that calendar month. 
The second specification is called the PROBDEP model and is used to 
explain and forecast the probabilities of the end of month spot 
underperforming the one month forward that prevailed one month earlier. 
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After thorough assessment of statistical findings we excluded a host of both 
global and country specific explanatory variables. The exclusion was done on 
the basis of wrong signs and statistical insignificance of the estimated 
coefficients. We opted to include only three variables which came out with the 
correct signs, were extremely statistically significant, were supported by 
market intuition and applicable or theoretical economics and had a 
performance that was consistent for all countries and irrespective of data 
sample. These specifications were estimated and fitted on a sample that 
offered the basis for our in-sample analysis. They were however also re-
estimated on a shorter sample and re-applied on the remaining data to form 
the basis of our out-of sample analysis. Finally we updated the selected 
specifications with all the up to date data series that applied and used them to 
forecast currency dynamics in real life for a whole calendar year. In Chapter 4 
below, we conclude our work on the EM Currency risks by applying the 
models in and out of sample as well as on real life data and testing their 
forecasting and profit generation power. 
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4 CHAPTER FOUR: Modelling and Forecasting Currency 
Risks in Emerging Markets: Model Application and 
Performance Review 
4.1 Introduction 
A key consideration in our modelling exercise was to decide on a 
specification that would work well in providing trustworthy trade 
recommendations on a consistent basis. As discussed earlier in the thesis the 
model results are transformed into probabilities of appreciation or depreciation 
events occurring. We need to translate these probabilities into a usable format 
that would constitute a recommendation to either trade or not in any given 
month.  It is important to decide on this aspect at an early stage as we apply 
this criterion both when looking at the in sample goodness of fit of the models 
and later when we assess the models’ out of sample and real life forecasting 
power and profit generating ability.  
As discussed in Chapter 3 we estimate two separate model 
specifications. One, which we refer to as the PROBDEP version, models and 
forecasts the risks of local currencies underperforming the 1month forward 
exchange rate versus the US dollar. The second, to which we refer to as the 
PROBAPP version, aims to model and forecast the probabilities of a local 
currency appreciating in forward rate terms.  One could argue that we would 
get an equivalent result if we only estimated one specification modelling both 
appreciation and depreciation on a one month forward basis. Our findings do 
not support this notion. In practice we ended up using two specifications that 
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are largely symmetric but with the PROBDEP version including one additional 
explanatory variable. Moreover we model cases where the spot significantly 
out or underperforms the forward by more than 5%. Therefore the two models 
describe opposing but not complementary events given that we have the 
range between 5% appreciation and 5% depreciation that is not covered by 
either model.  
Having selected our two model specifications we need to decide on a 
probability level above which we will classify the model result as a 
recommendation for buying or selling the local currency against the US dollar 
on a one month forward basis. We classify as a model generated 
recommendation to “sell” the local currency on a one-month forward rate 
basis the cases when the PROBDEP model generates a probability equal to 
or higher than k%. We classify as a model generated recommendation to 
“buy” an emerging market currency on a one-month forward exchange rate 
basis, the occasions when the PROBAPP model generates a probability equal 
to or higher than g%. We first apply these two rules separately as we assess 
the ability of each model in turn to fit in-sample what it was supposed to 
model. Later, when we move to the application of the models and build a 
trading rule to evaluate the model as a trading tool we consider the option of 
applying each model separately or combining the signals from both 
specifications in suggesting a trade for either direction. In the sections that 
follow we shall present results from both alternatives. We finally proceed to 
combine both models and translate their trade recommendations into 
actionable portfolios whose monthly performance we scrutinize.      
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4.2 Assessing Model Predictive Performance In and Out of 
Sample  
In this section we provide an overview of the models’ performance in 
successfully signalling significant currency moves at different probability cut-
off points. The rationale is the following: In any given calendar month we will 
either have more than 5% local currency “Depreciation” on a 1month forward 
basis or not. And in the same calendar month the PROBDEP model would 
have generated a probability that such “Depreciation” will occur. We select a 
certain level of k% for these probabilities and consider the instances when the 
model generates a probability higher than “k” as a “sell” trade 
recommendation. We test a number of different levels for “k”, assess in each 
case the success of the model in correctly classifying that month’s currency 
moves and decide which probability cut-off point works best for our purposes. 
We carry out the same exercise for the PROBAPP model. In any given 
calendar month we will either have more that 5% local currency “Appreciation” 
on a 1month forward basis or not. And in the same calendar month if the 
PROBAPP model generates more than g% probability we consider this a 
“buy” recommendation from the model. Again we test a number of different 
levels of “g” and select which probability cut-off point works best in capturing 
the significant real life appreciations as defined in our analysis.  
By definition, the lower the probability level we select as our event cut-off 
point the more successful our model will be in capturing incidents of actual 
currency moves by more than 5%. In fact the models would effectively be 
over-predicting significant moves in either direction in that they will typically 
generate erroneous signals for forthcoming sizeable currency moves when in 
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reality such moves do not materialize. We need to find a level of probability 
that balances the performance of the models in these two aspects. The trade-
off we are describing here is captured by the Type I and Type II statistical 
errors described in summary in Table 19 and Table 20 below. Type I error 
quantifies how many times the models gave a signal for an event that did not 
materialize. Type I error thus, penalizes the model for over-predicting 
significant currency moves in any given month. Type II error penalizes the 
model for missing real events. It quantifies the number of times when the 
model did not predict an event that actually occurred. Obviously we are 
interested in minimizing the two errors in order to maximize the times when 
the model provides a signal for an event that really occurs and the times when 
the model correctly predicts that we will not have an event in any given month. 
The trade-off between these two error types and the respective success ratios 
is a direct function of the probability selected for classifying signals. The lower 
the k% and g% probabilities we select the more cases we will have where the 
models will be giving event signals which will not happen in reality and 
therefore decreasing Type I error in the expense of Type II error. Vice versa 
the higher the probability levels the more likely that the model will be missing 
actual events and thus missing out on actionable and profitable trade 
recommendations but it will also be more successful in avoiding the false 
event signals thus reducing the risk of over-investing for the wrong reasons.   
Type I and II errors are traditional metrics adopted to quantify and 
assess a model’s goodness of fit. That is the ability of the estimated 
specification to really capture the reality it is supposed to describe in the first 
place. In our analysis we also introduce the notion of what we call Type III 
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error, which again is described in Table 19 and Table 20. Type III error is 
driven by the fact that our two models describe events that are opposing but 
not complementary. Between the incidents where we have more than 5% 
appreciation or more than 5% depreciation in any given month, we have the 
significant gap of currency moves of 10% in magnitude. We have explained 
that the choice of modelling returns of more than 5% in any given month was 
an arguably arbitrary decision which we felt provides a safety net for capturing 
events that are common enough to provide a sufficiently large sample and 
significant enough to cover transaction costs and accommodate the risk 
appetite of the majority of investors. However we look to apply our model in 
producing actionable trade signals and thereafter gauge the success of our 
trading rule in generating profits. Therefore we cannot ignore the reality that 
for any given month when the models produce a trade signal even if the 
returns are not more than 5% in reality, the investor still stands to profit as 
long as the actual currency move that month was in the direction suggested 
by the models. What really constitutes a failure for our exercise are the cases 
when the models produced a trade signal for currencies moving in one 
direction and in reality the currency in question moved in the opposite 
direction. This is the statistic we wish to capture with the Type III error. 
Effectively Type III error is what remains from Type I error when we extract 
the cases where the model got the direction correct even if the size of the 
profits was not more than 5%. From our point of interest the cases where the 
models predict the correct direction even though they miss the size of the 
move, can be considered an enhancement to the overall success ratio of the 
models in correctly predicting currency moves.  
 174 
Table 19 Type I, II and III errors in the case of the PROBDEP model 
Prob cut off =k% DEPR > 5%                              DEPR< 5%                              0%<DEPR < 5%                      DEPR<0% (APPR)                            
DEPR > 5%                              Getting Events Right = 1-b
Missing Non- Events 
= a = Type I error 
Getting At Least 
Direction Right = a-c
Missing Direction 
Altogether = c=   Type 
III error 
DEPR< 5%                              Missing Events = b = Type II error 
Getting Non-Events 
Right = 1-a
ACTUAL ACTUAL
PR
O
BD
EP
 
SI
G
NA
L
 
 
 
Table 20 Type I, II and III errors in the case of the PROBAPP model 
Prob cut off =g% APPR > 5%                              APPR< 5%                              0%<APPR < 5%                      APPR<0% (DEPR)                            
APPR > 5%                              Getting Events Right = 1-b
Missing Non- Events 
= a = Type I error 
Getting At Least 
Direction Right = a-c
Missing Direction 
Altogether = c=   Type 
III error 
APPR< 5%                              Missing Events = b = Type II error 
Getting Non-Events 
Right = 1-a
PR
O
BA
PP
 
SI
G
N
A
L 
ACTUAL ACTUAL
 
In what follows we present the results from testing our models goodness 
of fit both in and out of sample. In-sample testing constitutes of us fitting the 
model that was estimated in the sample that starts as early as January 1994 
and ends in March 2003, on the same period. Out-of-sample testing involves 
the re-estimation of the model in the sample that starts again from as early as 
January 1994 but ends in December 2001 and subsequently fitting the model 
on fourteen months of out-of-sample data from January 2002 to March 2003.  
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Table 21 PROBAPP model:  Type I, II and III errors: in-sample Jan 1994 – 
Mar 2003 
g% Probability cut-off level for 
classifying treding signals 2% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 15%
MODEL SUCCESS IN SIGNALING 
APPRECIATON >5% 78% 72% 65% 59% 55% 51% 45% 40% 37% 29%
TYPE II ERROR 22% 28% 35% 41% 45% 49% 55% 60% 63% 71%
MODEL SUCCESS IN SIGNALING      
LACK OF APPRECIATION >5% 8% 39% 56% 68% 75% 79% 83% 85% 87% 90%
TYPE I ERROR 92% 61% 44% 32% 25% 21% 17% 15% 13% 10%
MODEL SUCCESS IN SIGNALING  
APPRECIATION ALBEIT <5% 47% 32% 23% 15% 11% 8% 6% 5% 4% 2%
TYPE III ERROR 45% 29% 22% 17% 14% 13% 11% 10% 10% 8%
PROBAPP MODEL SUCCESS RATIOS                                                                                                                                                                                 
IN SAMPLE                                                                                                          
Jan 1994- Mar 2003
 
 
 
Table 22 PROBDEP model:  Type I, II and III errors: in-sample Jan 1994 – 
Mar 2003 
k% Probability cut-off level for 
classifying treding signals 2% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 15%
MODEL SUCCESS IN SIGNALING 
DEPRECIATON >5% 84% 64% 55% 53% 47% 41% 39% 33% 32% 25%
TYPE II ERROR 16% 36% 45% 47% 53% 59% 61% 67% 68% 75%
MODEL SUCCESS IN SIGNALING      
LACK OF DEPRECIATION >5% 15% 53% 67% 76% 81% 84% 86% 87% 88% 90%
TYPE I ERROR 85% 47% 33% 24% 19% 16% 14% 13% 12% 10%
MODEL SUCCESS IN SIGNALING  
DEPRECIATION ALBEIT <5% 31% 18% 12% 7% 5% 3% 2% 2% 1% 1%
TYPE III ERROR 53% 28% 21% 17% 15% 13% 12% 11% 11% 10%
PROBDEP MODEL SUCCESS RATIOS                                                                                                                                                                                 
IN SAMPLE                                                                                                          
Jan 1994- Mar 2003
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Table 23 PROBAPP model: Type I,II and III errors: out-of-sample Feb2002–
Mar2003 
g% Probability cut-off level for 
classifying treding signals 2% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 15%
MODEL SUCCESS IN SIGNALING 
APPRECIATON >5% 86% 67% 53% 50% 47% 47% 44% 42% 42% 39%
TYPE II ERROR 14% 33% 47% 50% 53% 53% 56% 58% 58% 61%
MODEL SUCCESS IN SIGNALING     
LACK OF APPRECIATION >5% 11% 44% 57% 71% 78% 82% 87% 88% 90% 95%
TYPE I ERROR 89% 56% 43% 29% 22% 18% 13% 12% 10% 5%
MODEL SUCCESS IN SIGNALING  
APPRECIATION ALBEIT <5% 57% 36% 29% 19% 14% 11% 8% 7% 6% 3%
TYPE III ERROR 32% 19% 14% 10% 9% 7% 5% 5% 4% 3%
PROBAPP MODEL SUCCESS RATIOS                                                                                                                                                                              
OUT OF SAMPLE                                                                                                    
Feb 2002- Mar 2003
 
 
 
 
 
Table 24 PROBDEP model: Type I,II and III errors:out-of-sample Feb2002–
Mar 2003 
k% Probability cut-off level for 
classifying treding signals 2% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 15%
MODEL SUCCESS IN SIGNALING 
DEPRECIATON >5% 69% 46% 38% 38% 31% 23% 23% 8% 8% 0%
TYPE II ERROR 31% 54% 62% 62% 69% 77% 77% 92% 92% 100%
MODEL SUCCESS IN SIGNALING      
LACK OF DEPRECIATION >5% 29% 80% 89% 93% 96% 97% 98% 99% 99% 100%
TYPE I ERROR 71% 20% 11% 7% 4% 3% 2% 1% 1% 0%
MODEL SUCCESS IN SIGNALING  
DEPRECIATION ALBEIT <5% 22% 6% 3% 2% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
TYPE III ERROR 49% 14% 9% 5% 3% 2% 2% 1% 1% 0%
PROBDEP MODEL SUCCESS RATIOS                                                                                                                                                                              
OUT OF SAMPLE                                                                                                    
Feb 2002- Mar 2003
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The results in Table 21 to Table 24 above suggest that selecting a 
probability level above 10% for either model would have resulted in a 
significant loss of power in predicting significant currency moves in favour of 
an almost perfect ability of the models to avoid giving a trade signal in cases 
where we did not have a substantial currency move. Such a trade-off is not 
consistent with our mandate as we will end up with only a handful of trade 
recommendations to follow. These findings are consistent both for the 
PROBAPP and the PROBDEP models, and in both the in and out of sample 
tests. We therefore conclude that we need to select a probability lower than 
10% for both models. On the other end of the spectrum as expected when 
selecting very low probabilities like 2% we get a very high success ratio in 
capturing significant currency moves above 5% but we end up with two trigger 
happy models that consistently over-predict big moves and will probably not 
benefit a real investor who needs to know both when to invest and when to 
stay in the sidelines. Again these results are consistent in and out of sample 
for both models. We therefore decide to select a probability level that will be 
higher than 2% for both models.  
Looking at the probability levels between 2% and 10% one could easily 
select a number of different levels as the trade-off between the success ratios 
and types of errors are both acceptable and consistent across different 
specifications. Our aim is to select a probability cut-off point that will generate 
fairly balanced error types and will only sacrifice the ratio of capturing 
significant moves to the extent that is necessary to avoid pointless over-
prediction of events that do not occur. Probability levels above 6% 
demonstrate a success ratio in avoiding over-prediction that starts from 
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around 70% and in most cases lays in the mid80% to mid90%. We are 
uninterested in such high success ratios if the ability of the model to predict 
actual big moves falls well below the 50% threshold.  
Taking all this into consideration and accepting that given how many 
parameters are relevant, the selection of the probability cut-off point to use is 
not an exact science, we selected a 5% probability as the cut-off point above 
which each model will be considered as generating a trade recommendation 
for us to follow in any given month. Arguably the choice between 4% and 5% 
was not a clear cut selection. If anything the PROPDEP model seems to 
perform better with the 4% probability level. Still we felt that we gave up little 
success, that could also be sample specific, to gain in terms of consistency of 
having the same cut-off level in both models. In sample results suggest that 
5% probability is a reliable cut-off point that captures 55% or 65% of 
depreciations or appreciations of more than 5% respectively. At the same time 
the models have 67% and 57% success ratio in not providing a sell or buy 
trade signal respectively when there is no need for one. These statistics are 
further enhanced by the third metric we follow according to which in about 
12% and 23% of the times that the models gave a trade signal to respectively 
sell or buy a currency, the latter indeed depreciated or appreciated 
respectively, be it by less than 5%.  
Arguably the in-sample results are important for the assessment of the 
goodness of fit of the model. However the toughest test for any model and the 
real criterion by which we need to decide on the models’ ability to generate 
reliable trade recommendations are the out-of sample results. As long as the 
latter do not contradict or cancel the in-sample findings we believe we have a 
 179 
solid foundation for trusting the model’s performance in real life. Our results in 
Table 23 and Table 24 support this notion. Although the out of sample period 
is fairly short consisting of only fourteen monthly observations, the results are 
by and large consistent with the in-sample findings. The two models have 
roughly a 40% to 50% success ratio in predicting actual moves of over 5%, 
and this with what seems to be a very cautious prediction pattern as they also 
manage to avoid generating a trade signal in around 60% to 90% of the 
cases. The results from the PROBAPP model are more consistent with our 
previously outlined selection criteria as success in both metrics is above 50%. 
In the PROBDEP model we find that the out-of-sample performance is a bit 
biased to the cautious side but at the same time we see that the trade-off 
could only be improved significantly if we opt for a probability level of 2%. A 
level of 4% seems like a good compromise in the case of the PROBDEP 
model but again we prefer to keep this characteristic in mind when we 
proceed to apply the models in real life monthly samples but stick to a single 
common probability cut-off point of 5% probability for both models. 
4.3 Assessing Model Trading Performance In and Out of 
Sample: Individual Trade Review    
We proceed with the current section where we set out to quantify the 
profit making ability of the model. Describing how many times a model gets 
the currency moves right tells only half the story from an investor’s point of 
view. The key consideration is how much profit would the model 
recommended trades generate. This is where we turn our focus to here. Again 
we look at the results in-sample and out of sample as defined in the previous 
section. We relate actual currency moves to the model signals that were 
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generated in any given month. We do so in two different ways. We first 
consider the two models separately and quantify the gain and loss generated 
if an investor were to go short or long a currency every time the PROBDEP or 
PROBAPP models respectively generated more than 5% probability of a 
significant depreciation or appreciation. The investor would have remained 
sidelined and un-invested at all times during which each model generated 
probabilities lower than 5% for either side.  
Having assessed the ability of each model on its own to generate 
profitable recommendations we then proceed to combine the results from the 
two models together in the following manner. In order for an investor to go 
long a specific currency we need the PROBAPP model to give a probability of 
significant appreciation equal to or more than 5% and at the same time we 
need the PROBDEP model to generate a probability of significant deprecation 
lower than 5%. In this way we cancel out conflicting signals that could at times 
be generated if one was to look at the two models separately as we apply one 
additional layer in our investment selection approach. All the results we 
present in this section are based on the assumption that investors blindly 
follow the model generated trade recommendations and implemented trades 
are not in any way biased or filtered by views or other subjective factors. Note 
also that in our analysis of the models’ profit generating ability we consider 
gains and losses higher than zero, and not necessarily higher than 5% in any 
given month. In Table 25 and Table 26 below we review the in-sample results 
from investing on the model trade recommendations when these are 
generated based on one of the two models or, in turn, when we have a signal 
that is based on the combined results from both models.  
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Table 25 P&L of short recommendations as generated from PROBDEP model 
alone and from the combination of both models. In sample Jan ’94 – Mar ‘03:    
PROBABILITY CUT-OFF LE VEL K% 2% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 15%
N UMBER OF SHOR T                                   
TRAD E RECOMMENDATIONS 1279 677 450 313 227 174 134 106 92 59
NUMBER  OF PROFITABLE SHORT       
TRAD E RECOMMENDATIONS 557 338 228 155 110 85 66 51 43 31
NUMBER  OF PROFITABLE SHORT     
TRAD E RECOMMENDATIONS                                         
(%  OF TOT AL  SH ORT  T RADE  
RECO MM EN DATION S) 
44% 50% 51% 50% 48% 49% 49% 48% 47% 53%
AVER AGE NET P&L PER SH OR T                     
TRADE RECOMMENDATION 0.27% 0.91% 1.24% 1.67% 2.32% 2.84% 3.13% 2.79% 3.19% 4.73%
PROBABILITY CUT-OFF LEVE LS 
K%=G% 2% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 15%
N UMBER OF SHOR T                                   
TRAD E RECOMMENDATIONS 143 601 422 290 213 162 129 103 92 59
NUMBER  OF PROFITABLE SHORT       
TRAD E RECOMMENDATIONS 73 309 219 149 105 80 64 49 43 31
NUMBER  OF PROFITABLE SHORT     
TRAD E RECOMMENDATIONS                                         
(%  OF TOT AL  SH ORT  T RADE  
RECO MM EN DATION S) 
51% 51% 52% 51% 49% 49% 50% 48% 47% 53%
AVER AGE NET P&L PER SH OR T                     
TRADE RECOMMENDATION 3.28% 0.97% 1.44% 2.02% 2.59% 3.16% 3.35% 2.93% 3.19% 4.73%
P&L PERFO RMANCE  OF SHORT  RECOMME NDATIONS BASED ON P ROBDEP  M ODEL SIGNALS                                                                                     
IN  SAMP LE:  JAN '94 TO MAR '03                                                                      
P &L PE RFORMANCE OF SHORT  RECOMMENDATIONS BAS ED ON COMBINE D MODELS' SIGNALS                                                                                   
IN  SAMP LE:  JAN '94 TO MAR '03                                                                      
 
 
Table 26 P&L of long recommendations as generated from PROBAPP model 
alone and from the combination of both models. In sample Jan ’94 – Mar ‘03    
PROBABILITY CUT-OFF LEVEL G% 2% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 15%
NUMBER OF LONG                                   
TRADE RECOMMENDATIONS 1381 897 634 442 335 263 204 168 135 79
NUMBER OF PROFITABLE LONG       
TRADE RECOMMENDATIONS 812 574 417 292 226 181 140 120 99 57
NUMBER OF PROFITABLE LONG     
TRADE RECOMMENDATIONS                                         
(% OF TOTAL LONG TRADE 
RECOMMENDATIONS) 
59% 64% 66% 66% 67% 69% 69% 71% 73% 75%
AVERAGE P&L PER LONG                     
TRADE RECOMMENDATION 0.35% 0.66% 0.99% 1.31% 1.51% 1.78% 2.01% 2.31% 2.62% 4.05%
PROBABILITY CUT-OFF LEVELS 
K%=G% 2% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 15%
NUMBER OF LONG                                   
TRADE RECOMMENDATIONS 145 821 606 419 321 251 199 165 135 76
NUMBER OF PROFITABLE LONG       
TRADE RECOMMENDATIONS 160 527 398 275 217 174 137 119 99 57
NUMBER OF PROFITABLE LONG     
TRADE RECOMMENDATIONS                                         
(% OF TOTAL LONG TRADE 
RECOMMENDATIONS) 
65% 64% 66% 66% 68% 69% 69% 72% 73% 75%
AVERAGE P&L PER LONG                     
TRADE RECOMMENDATION 1.46% 0.76% 0.96% 1.23% 1.50% 1.79% 2.00% 2.31% 2.62% 4.05%
P&L PERFORMANCE OF LONG RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON COMBINED MODELS' SIGNALS                                                                                   
IN SAMPLE:  JAN '94 TO MAR '03                                                                      
P&L PERFORMANCE OF LONG RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON PROBAPP MODEL SIGNALS                                                                                     
IN SAMPLE:  JAN '94 TO MAR '03                                                                      
 
 182 
In Table 25 we look at the times when either the PROBDEP model alone 
or both models combined generated signals for an investor to sell a local 
currency versus the USD on a one month forward basis. In Table 26 we 
summarize the results from all the times when either the PROBAPP model on 
its own or in combination with the PROBDEP model, generated signals for 
investors to buy an emerging market currency versus the USD in any given 
month, again on a one month forward basis. A number of conclusions can be 
driven from these two tables. First it is important that the models’ buy and sell 
recommendations, whether these are the result of each model separately or 
from their combination, are largely symmetrical. This supports the notion that 
both models perform in a consistent manner. Secondly the profit making 
recommendations are in almost all cases above 50% of total recommendation 
with many cases well above 70% of the total generated signals. Arguably the 
profit making percentages are higher in almost all probability cut-off points for 
the long recommendations. This could be well explained from the stylized fact 
that when one goes long emerging market currencies they stand to also 
benefit from what we described as the “carry” which results from high interest 
rate differentials in favour of the local currencies in most emerging markets. 
However it is worth remembering that besides higher returns on average, 
emerging currencies also display significant volatility and even though one is 
on average likely to benefit more times than not when buying the local 
currencies, it is also the case that once-off significant corrections can easily 
wipe out the gradual gains from these long positions. This reality is captured 
by the model results in Table 25 and Table 26 when we look at the average 
net gain and loss per long or short trade recommendation. It is worth 
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mentioning that in line with the argument presented above, short 
recommendations, although profit making less often than long 
recommendations, actually generate a higher profit per trade when one takes 
into account the size of all profits and losses generated. In any case, the 
models’ recommendations consistently generate profits for both long and 
short trades. This is a significant evidence of their goodness of fit, practical 
applicability and usability. 
Results remain largely unchanged when we move from using each 
model separately to using both models combined in the manner defined 
earlier in this section. Long recommendations are again more than short ones, 
have higher percentage success ratios, but generate lower net profit on 
average per trade when losses are also considered for the total of trade 
recommendations. One may also note that when combining the two models 
we get in most cases fewer trade signals than when taking our cue from each 
model separately. This though is not always the case. For example when we 
take the 2% as a probability cut-off point we basically consider as trade 
recommendations all the cases when one model generates a probability 
higher than 2% which can easily happen, but at the same we need the 
opposite model to have generated a probability lower than 2%, which is a 
fairly difficult condition to meet. Thus we see that in this case the long or short 
recommendations that result from the combination of the models are far fewer 
that when one looks at each model separately for trade signals. Similarly 
when we go to the other end of the spectrum combining the model or taking 
them separately makes little difference. Because in practice conditioning one 
model to generate more than 10% or 15% probability and the opposing model 
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to generate a probability of less than 10% or 15% is fairly easy to achieve as 
a combination. The rare event here would be for the first model to generate 
such high probabilities. Once this is achieved it is fairly unlikely that the 
opposite model would have also generated equally large probabilities. The 
fact that our results in Table 25 and Table 26 confirm this argument again 
supports the reliability of the two models.  
We now turn to Table 27 and Table 28 below and review the same 
results as above but for our out-of-sample period. The out-of-sample period 
covers 14months of data which is fairly long to allow us to confirm or cancel 
the in-sample findings. However any period of around one year can 
reasonably be expected to generate results which will capture very specific 
characteristics of that period, and our models are no exception. At this point 
what we were primarily testing is whether the out-of-sample results would 
contradict our in-sample findings in any significant way. It is fair to say that the 
results in Table 27 and Table 28 confirm our findings above. 
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Table 27 P&L of short recommendations as generated from PROBDEP model 
alone and from the combination of both models. Out of sample Feb ’02 – Mar 
‘03:       
PROBABILITY CUT-OFF LEVEL K% 2% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 15%
NUMBER OF SHORT                                   
TRADE RECOMMENDATIONS 208 62 37 25 16 11 10 5 5 1
NUMBER OF PROFITABLE SHORT       
TRADE RECOMMENDATIONS 71 23 13 11 7 4 4 2 2 0
NUMBER OF PROFITABLE SHORT     
TRADE RECOMMENDATIONS                                         
(% OF TOTAL SHORT T RADE 
RECOMMENDATIONS) 
34% 37% 35% 44% 44% 36% 40% 40% 40% 0%
AVERAGE P&L PER SHORT                     
TRADE RECOMMENDATION -0.73% -0.29% -0.27% 0.42% 0.14% 1.01% 1.52% 3.99% 3.99% -0.97%
PROBABILITY CUT-OFF LEVELS 
K%=G% 2% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 15%
NUMBER OF SHORT                                   
TRADE RECOMMENDATIONS 34 55 30 19 11 8 8 5 5 1
NUMBER OF PROFITABLE SHORT       
TRADE RECOMMENDATIONS 14 21 11 9 5 3 4 2 2 0
NUMBER OF PROFITABLE SHORT     
TRADE RECOMMENDATIONS                                         
(% OF TOTAL SHORT T RADE 
RECOMMENDATIONS) 
41% 38% 37% 47% 45% 38% 50% 40% 40% 0%
AVERAGE P&L PER SHORT                     
TRADE RECOMMENDATION -0.14% -0.15% -0.02% 0.99% 0.27% -0.05% 4.15% 3.99% 3.99% -0.97%
P&L PERFORMANCE OF SHORT RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON COMBINED MODELS' SIGNALS                                                                                    
OUT OF SAMPLE:  FEB '02 TO MAR '03                                                                      
P&L PERFORMANCE OF SHORT RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON PROBDEP MODEL SIGNALS                                                                                   
OUT OF SAMPLE:  FEB '02 TO MAR '03                                                                      
 
Table 28 P&L of long recommendations as generated from PROBAPP model 
alone and from the combination of both models. Out of sample Feb ’02 – Mar 
‘03    
PROBABILITY CUT-OFF LEVEL G% 2% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 15%
NUMBER OF LONG                                   
TRADE RECOMMENDATIONS 260 168 129 92 75 63 50 45 41 28
NUMBER OF PROFITABLE LONG       
TRADE RECOMMENDATIONS 177 118 93 66 52 45 36 32 31 21
NUMBER OF PROFITABLE LONG     
TRADE RECOMMENDATIONS                                         
(% OF TOTAL LONG TRADE 
RECOMMENDATIONS) 
68% 70% 72% 72% 69% 71% 72% 71% 76% 75%
AVERAGE P&L  PER LONG                     
TRADE RECOMMENDATION 0.73% 0.78% 0.65% 0.73% 0.79% 1.05% 1.59% 1.40% 1.70% 2.81%
PR OBABILITY  CUT-OFF LEVELS 
K%=G% 2% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 15%
NUMBER OF LONG                                   
TRADE RECOMMENDATIONS 86 161 122 86 70 60 48 45 41 28
NUMBER OF PROFITABLE LONG       
TRADE RECOMMENDATIONS 60 113 88 62 49 43 34 32 31 21
NUMBER OF PROFITABLE LONG     
TRADE RECOMMENDATIONS                                         
(% OF TOTAL LONG TRADE 
RECOMMENDATIONS) 
70% 70% 72% 72% 70% 72% 71% 71% 76% 75%
AVERAGE P&L  PER LONG                     
TRADE RECOMMENDATION 0.51% 0.75% 0.60% 0.69% 0.84% 1.29% 1.28% 1.40% 1.70% 2.81%
P&L PERFORM ANCE O F LONG  RECOMM ENDATIONS BASED ON CO MBINED MODELS' SIGNALS                                                                                    
OUT OF SAMPLE:  FEB '02 TO  MAR '03                                                                      
P&L PERFORMANCE OF LONG RECOM MENDATIO NS BASED ON PROBAPP MODEL SIGNALS                                                                                   
OUT O F SAMPLE:  FEB '02 TO MAR '03                                                                      
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Consistent with our in-sample results when we look at each model on its 
own trade recommendations become, as expected, less frequent as we raise 
the bar of probabilities. Like in the case of our in-sample results, we get more 
buy than sell signals, and the success ratios for the buy signals are by and 
large very high and superior to the sell trade recommendations statistics. In 
general profitable sell recommendations are around 35% to 50% of total sell 
signals, which is somewhat lower than the relevant in-sample statistics. Our 
out-of-sample statistics support the profit making ability of the model but 
although this is true for all probability cut-off points for the buy 
recommendations it is not true in all cases for the short trade signals. In fact 
we notice that net gain is superior in almost all the cases for long trade signals 
compared to short ones. This is true irrespective of whether we look at signals 
generated by one of both models together. These last two results are the two 
cases where the out-of sample results differ from our in-sample findings. 
However at the same time these findings can easily be biased due to the 
specific sample we are applying our models on. Year 2003 was in general a 
period of increased risk appetite during which risky assets outperformed. In 
particular high carry emerging market currencies were a very strong candidate 
for profitable long investments. What we prefer to focus on from the results in 
Table 27 and Table 28 is the fact that our models maintained their profit 
making ability even when applied in a fairly short sample which need not be 
very representative of the average circumstances that applied in-sample. 
Importantly the models displayed a bias towards generating more long 
recommendations which in our out-of-sample period were indeed the trades 
that made more profits on average.  
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4.4 Assessing Model Trading Performance In and Out of 
Sample: Portfolio review    
Satisfied with the models’ performance and the consistency of this 
performance we proceed to look at the model recommendations on a monthly 
portfolio basis. Again we review results in and out of sample but now we do 
not separate between long and short recommendations. Having reviewed the 
results in Table 21 to Table 28 above we now opt to look at the trade signals 
which are the result of combining both models and both directions together.  
In almost all cases this combination improved the average profit and loss per 
trade. In Table 29 and Table 30 below we review signals generated from such 
a combination on a monthly basis. Each country we included in our analysis 
has data that span on average 75 months. This is the basis on which we 
standardize our in-sample findings in Table 29 below. Importantly in Table 29 
and Table 30 we look at both portfolio returns and volatility. We also calculate 
the annualized Sharpe Ratio which is the ratio of the returns over their 
volatility times the square root of 12. Sharpe ratios standardize returns for 
their volatility. The higher the Sharpe ratio the stronger the performance of a 
portfolio as investors endure less volatility for making a certain amount of 
profit. These statistics matter to a real life investors as they reflect in a 
nutshell the overall model performance. Sharpe ratios allow us to drive safer 
conclusions even for out-of-sample periods. We mainly focus on the results 
for the 5% probability cut-off point that we have selected, but in Table 29 and 
Table 30 we also present the relevant figures for a handful of other probability 
levels as well, as a reference. 
Results in Table 29 and Table 30 suggest that the models perform 
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consistently well in and out of sample on a monthly portfolio basis. The same 
results hold both when one looks at returns alone, which are invariably 
positive, and when one measures the Sharpe ratio of these results which 
again are consistent and satisfactory. Both in and out-of-sample the models 
on average generate portfolios that consist of around 60% to 70% profit 
making trade signals. 
Table 29 P&L of portfolios recommended by the combination of both 
models:In sample Jan ’04 – Mar ‘03    
P RO B ABILITY  C U T-O FF  L E VE L S* * K % =G % 5% 7 % 1 0% 15%
A VE R AG E NUMB E R O F TRA D E 
REC CO MEN DAT IO N S PE R  MON TH 14 7 4 2
PR OFIT MA KING  TRAD E R ECOMM END A TION S                                     
(%  OF TO TA L TRAD E R ECOMM END A TION S) 60% 60% 63 % 65%
AV E RA GE M ON THLY  R ETU RN S ON  
RE CO MM EN DED  PO RT FO LIO 1.20% 2.37% 2.58% 4.6 9%
S TANDAR D D EV IA TIO N                                                      
O F AV ERAGE  MO NT H LY R E TUR NS 2.25% 4.67% 5.94% 9.9 3%
SHAR PE R ATIO                                                                 
O F AV ERAGE  MO NT H LY R E TUR NS                         
(AN NU ALISED  BA S IS ) 
1 .850 1 .7 60 1.4 20 1 .64 0
P & L  P E RF OR M ANC E O F  C OM B INE D  M O DE LS '* R EC CO M E N DATIONS                                                                                     
IN  S AM P LE :  JAN  '94  TO  M AR '03                                                                       
*  th e  tra d in g  sign a ls  are  b a se d on  t he  co m b in a tion  o f a stro ng  s ig na l  fro m  b o th  P R OB AP P  a nd  PR O BD E P
* * This is  th e pro b ab ili ty  cut -of f f or cla s i fy ing  t rad ing  s ig na ls.   H ere  the  sa m e  p rob a bitli ty  le ve l  is  a p plied  t o bo th  t he  
P R OB DEP  (k% ) a n d P RO BAP P  (g% )   
Table 30 P&L of portfolios recommended by the combination of both models: 
Out of sample Feb ’02 – Mar ‘03:    
P ROB ABILITY  C UT -O FF L E VE L S* * K % =G% 5% 7% 1 0% 15%
A VE R AG E NUMB E R O F TRA D E 
REC CO ME N DATION S PER  MON TH 11 6 4 2
PR OFIT MA KING  TRA D E R ECOMME ND A TION S                                     
(%  OF TO TA L TRA D E R ECOMME ND A TION S) 65% 67% 68% 72%
A V E RA GE  MON THLY  R ETU RN S ON  
RE CO MMEN DE D  PO RTFO LIO 0.53 % 0.82% 1.69% 2 .19%
S TA NDA R D D EV IAT IO N                                                      
O F AV ERA GE  MO NTH LY R E TUR NS 2.30 % 3.84% 5.48% 5 .90%
S HA R PE  R ATIO                                                                 
O F AV ERA GE  MO NTH LY R E TUR NS                         
(AN NU A LISED  BAS IS ) 
0.79 3 0.7 38 1.06 8 1.342
P &L  P E RFOR MANC E OF  C OMB INE D  MO DE LS '* R EC CO ME NDAT IONS                                                                                     
OUT  OF S AMP LE :  F E B '02 T O  MAR  '0 3                                                                      
*  the  trad in g  s igna ls are  ba sed on  the  co mb ina tion  o f a strong  s igna l  fro m bo th  PR OB AP P  a nd  P R OB D E P
** This is  the probab i lity  cut -of f for cla si fy ing  t rad ing  s igna ls.   H ere  the  sam e p rob abitlity  level  is appl ied  to bo th  the  
P R O BDE P  (k% ) a nd PRO BA P P (g% )   
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The resulting portfolios are invariably profit making whether we look at 
the in or out of sample results for any of the probability cut-off levels that we 
consider. The in-sample results suggest that a 5% probability cut off point will 
not only generate by far more trades on average every month, but these will 
also come at the best trade off between profit and volatility, thus giving the 
highest Sharpe ratio of all probability cut-off levels. A probability level of 15% 
for example would improve the average in sample portfolio monthly profits to 
a high 4.69% but this will come at a cost of significantly higher volatility which 
deteriorates the overall Sharpe ratio to 1.64 compared to 1.85 for the 
portfolios generated when we select 5% probability as a cut-off point.   
Looking at the out-of sample results in Table 30 we again see higher 
probabilities generating portfolios with fewer trades per month. Profit making 
trades as a percentage of total signals are consistently high and roughly the 
same at all probability levels. Like our in-sample results, the higher the 
probability cut-off point we select the higher the average monthly return our 
portfolios will generate. Interestingly the out of sample results suggest that 
Sharpe ratios actually improve as we move to higher probabilities but this 
could easily be a sample specific characteristic. As long as the 5% probability 
cut-off point generates profits and at a fairly low volatility cost even in our out-
of-sample tests we are happy to stick with this choice of cut –off point.   
We proceed to also test the consistency of the models’ performance 
across the different countries we include in our sample.  As mentioned in 
Chapter 1 of the thesis our sample consists of and our estimations are run, 
fitted and tested on a total of 21 currencies. However when we continue to 
implement the models on real life date as presented in the following section 
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we only do so on 19 of these currencies. In particular we omit the Venezuelan 
Bolivar and the Malaysian Ringgit which were practically fixed during our real 
life testing period. We therefore decided that applying our models in these two 
countries would not be of any use and would unnecessarily bias our results. 
Consistent with this rationale starting from Figure 27 below we exclude these 
two currencies. Figure 27 shows the number of profit and loss making trades 
generated by the models for each of the 19 countries we focus on during the 
in-sample period, while Figure 28 shows the average net P&L per country in 
the same period. The numbers in Figure 27 and Figure 28 are based on the 
trading rule we selected above, that is the trade signals are based on 
portfolios generated when combining the results from both the PROBAPP and 
the PROBDEP models and selecting 5% probability as the cut-off level above 
which to classify trade signals. Both figures support the fact that the models 
are not biased towards a sub-sample of countries as most countries display 
similar mix of profit and loss making trades. As shown in Figure 27 the models 
generated more profit than loss making trades for fifteen out of the nineteen 
countries included in our analysis. On average the models generated anything 
between 20 and 30 profit making recommendations for the majority of 
countries. There are of course outliers like Indonesia, South Africa or Thailand 
for which the models seems to have generated more than 40 profitable trades 
in the 75 available monthly observations per country on average. It is also 
worth mentioning that as Figure 28 shows, with the exception of Mexico, the 
models’ trade signals have in total been profitable for all the countries in our 
sample. The results are consistent through all three geographic regions we 
include in our analysis.  
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Figure 27 Total number of profit and loss making trades per country: In 
sample Jan ’94 – Mar ‘03 
NUMBER OF PROFIT AND LOSS MAKING TRADES PER COUTNRY:                  
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Figure 28  Average country P&L per trade: In sample Jan ’94 – Mar ‘03 
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Combining the results from Figure 27 and Figure 28 it is difficult to find a 
pattern between quantity and quality of signals. The only example of 
consistency in this sense is the exception of IDR for which the model 
generates the highest number of trades, amongst the greatest number of 
profitable trades and also the second highest profit on an overall portfolio 
basis. Brazil is one interesting case where the models generate only 30 profit 
making trades but still merits the highest portfolio profit in our sample of 
countries.   What matters to us most is the fact that the model 
recommended portfolios are by and large profitable, generate a fairly large 
number of signals and are not biased towards a sub sample of countries in 
any significant manner.   
Moving on to the out-of sample period of observations we find that the 
results although not identical, remain largely in line with our in-sample 
findings. Figure 29  shows how the models again generated more profitable 
that loss making trade signals for 15 out of the 19 countries we monitor. Again 
some countries will have more trades in total apply to them than others, but 
interestingly these are not the same countries as in our in-sample results. 
Figure 30 demonstrates how the model signals generated a profit for the 
majority of countries while the results were pretty neutral for another 5 
countries leaving only four of the countries having generating a loss in the 
specific data period we consider for our out of sample analysis. Again these 
results can easily be biased and sample specific but the important aspect to 
consider is that they do not cancel the in-sample results and remain 
consistent with our overall findings. These support the notion that the models 
work well in generating trade recommendations that can be expected to 
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generate profits for emerging market investors.  
Figure 29 Total number of profit and loss making trades per country: Out 
of sample Feb ’02 – Mar ‘03 
NUMBER OF PROFIT AND LOSS MAKING TRADES PER COUTNRY:                  
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Figure 30 Average country P&L per trade: Out of sample Feb ’02 – Mar 
‘03 
AVERAGE COUNTRY P&L PER TRADE: OUT-OF-SAMPLE FEB 02 - MAR 03
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4.5 Assessing Model Trading Performance On Real Time 
Data 
In the fifth section of this Chapter we put our models to the toughest test 
with regards to their applicability and usability in investment decisions. What 
we refer to as “real life” exercise covers a whole calendar year from January 
2004 to December 2004. We select a whole calendar year to apply our 
models to eliminate any concern that an arbitrary choice of sample may raise. 
During this period we applied the two models as described in Table 17 and 
Table 18 and applied the combined rule that produces country specific 
portfolios as described and applied in Section 4.4 above. Every time the 
PROBAPP (PROBDEP) model generates a probability equal to or higher than 
5% and for the same month and the same currency the PROBDEP 
(PROBAPP) model generates a probability lower than 5% we buy (sell) one 
unit of local currency against the USD on a one month forward basis at the 
beginning of the month and close the position at the last calendar day of the 
month against the prevailing spot. As we were doing this exercise in real life 
we also had the opportunity to scrutinize the model results and have a view 
on whether we would actually follow the model recommendation or ignore it. 
This is an essential element to this part of our analysis. However we wish to 
first review this year of results to further support the legitimacy of our models 
as objective investment tools. We present how the results can be altered by 
intuition and investors’ subjective judgment through a number of selected 
examples in the following and last section of this Chapter. What we will focus 
on here is the presentation of the 2004 model performance if one was to 
blindly follow the model generated portfolios.   
 195 
As it follows by the data in Table 31 and Figure 31 and Figure 32 below, 
the model generated trade signals in 2004, remain largely in line with our in 
sample and out of sample findings as reviewed in the previous sections. The 
model generated trade signals in all calendar months and these signals were 
fairly evenly distributed across different months. In the large majority of cases 
the models generated signals for most of the underlying currencies. In 
particular as per Table 31, in seven months the models generated a trade 
recommendation for 16 to 19 currencies from a total of 19 currencies on which 
we apply the models. In other three months the models generated a high 
number of total trades, ranging from 11 to 13 and on the remaining 2 quieter 
months the models generated signals for 7 or 8 currencies.  
Continuing the 2003 theme, high risk appetite remained the main 
element theme in 2004 with assets such as emerging market currencies 
rallying. This was successfully captured by the models which displayed a 
clear bias towards generating significantly more buy than sell 
recommendations throughout the year.  As Figure 32 below shows, from a 
total of 174 trade signals generated by the models in 2004, 68% were 
recommendations for investors to go long the local currency versus the USD. 
Only 9% of the model signals were a suggestion for investors to sell the local 
currencies. In 23% of the cases the combined model findings resulted in a 
neutral signal. Importantly, the models were in general successful in both their 
long and short recommendations. As shown in Figure 31 the models’ long 
signals turned out to be profitable in 67% of cases. Although the success ratio 
for the short signals was lower, still 38% of the models’ short 
recommendations turned out to be profitable. In general 61% of the trade 
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signals generated in 2004 would have been profitable if one was to simply 
follow all recommendations. April 2004 was a particularly bad month for the 
model performance as out of 19 generated signals only 11% was profit 
making, a result that drugs down the average performance of the whole year. 
At the same time September 2004 was a month with a portfolio of 18 trades, 
94% of which were profit making, an astonishing result for a quantitative 
model.   
Table 31 Overview of trade recommendations in 2004:  
 
TOTAL SHORT 
TRADE SIGNALS
PROFIT MAKING SHORT 
TRADE SIGNALS             
(% OF TOTAL SHORT 
TRADE SIGNALS)
TOTAL LONG 
TRADE SIGNALS
PROFIT MAKING LONG 
TRADE SIGNALS                 
(% OF TOTAL LONG 
TRADE SIGNALS)
TOTAL TRADE 
SIGNALS
PROFIT MAKING           
TRADE SIGNALS             
(% OF TOTAL TRADE 
SIGNALS)
 JANUARY 2004 2 50% 14 71% 16 69%
 FEBRUARY 2004 4 25% 12 67% 16 56%
 MARCH 2004 2 50% 14 71% 16 69%
 APRIL 2004 1 0% 18 11% 19 11%
 MAY 2004 1 100% 12 67% 13 69%
 JUNE 2004 1 0% 10 40% 11 36%
 JULY 2004 1 100% 18 61% 19 63%
 AUGUST 2004 1 100% 12 67% 13 69%
 SEPTEMBER 2004 0 0% 18 94% 18 94%
 OCTOBER 2004 0 0% 18 89% 18 89%
 NOVEMBER 2004 3 0% 5 100% 8 63%
 DECEMBER 2004 4 25% 3 67% 7 43%
SIGNALS TO SELL LOCAL CURRENCY 
vs USD
SIGNALS TO BUY LOCAL CURRENCY vs 
USD TOTAL SIGNALS 
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Figure 31 Profitable trade signals as % of total model recommendations 
in 2004 
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Figure 32 Breakdown of total 2004 model signals. 
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From the 12 monthly portfolios that the model generated in 2004, seven 
were profitable, three were loss making and two were neutral. Both the 
profitable and the loss-making months yielded roughly 1% profit or loss 
respectively on average. On a cumulative annual basis the model monthly 
portfolios generated a total profit of 4.06% per trade for the whole of 2004. 
Interestingly the cumulative P&L only turned negative in one month of the 
whole year but subsequently recovered to profit making mode. The reliability 
of the models’ consistent profit making ability is further supported by the 
return to volatility ratio of the 2004 portfolio results. As Table 32 below shows 
the model annualized return of 4.06% profit came with an annualized volatility 
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of 3.5%. Together these two give an annualized Sharpe ratio of return to 
volatility of 1.16. This level comes as a clear improvement of the out-of-
sample Sharpe ratio for 5% probability cut off, which stood at 0.79% and 
outperforms all but one of the other out-of-sample Sharpe ratios.  
Figure 33 Monthly & cumulative P&L of model recommended portfolios 
in 2004 
P&L OF MODEL GENERATED PORTFOLIOS: 2004
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Table 32 Statistical performance of model portfolios in 2004:  
R E TU R N  O F  A V E R A G E  
M O N T H L Y  R E TU R N S  P E R  
T R A D E  (A N N U A L IS E D )
4 .06%
V O L A T IL IT Y  O F  A V E R A G E  
M O N T H L Y  R E TU R N S  P E R  
T R A D E  (A N N U A L IS E D )
3 .50%
S H A R P E  R A T IO  O F  
A V E R A G E M O N TH L Y  
R E TU R N S P E R  T R A D E  
(A N N U A L IS E D  B A S IS )
1 .1 6
2 0 0 4  M O D E L  R E C O M M E N D E D  
P O R TF O L IO S
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To summarize we find that one whole calendar year of results from 
applying our models and blindly following the resulting trade 
recommendations support our belief that the PROBAPP and PROBDEP 
models provide a set of quantitative tools that tick the boxes that are important 
to real life investors. They are parsimonious and straightforward, intuitive in 
their structure, robust in their statistical performance both in and out of sample 
and most importantly consistent in their ability to generate profitable trade 
recommendations one can trust to blindly follow. At times the models are 
likely to display a bias in the recommendations they generate like in the case 
of our out-of-sample and 2004 exercises where most of the trade signals were 
for investors to buy the local currencies against the USD. However, this bias 
was well justified by market conditions of improved risk appetite during these 
periods, thus proving the models ability to capture the underlying market 
dynamics. Equally important is the fact that even when the type of trade 
signals was biased towards buy recommendations the resulting portfolios still 
turned out to be profitable. All in all one can safely conclude that the models 
developed herein meet the criteria of quantitative tools that investors can trust 
to include in their box of reliable tools. As investors go about making their final 
investment decisions by combining a number of different factors and 
considerations they stand to benefit from an intuitive and objective tool like the 
PROBAPP and PROBDEP models. These can assist in removing any degree 
of subjectivity which is often difficult to achieve in the absence of quantitative 
models. Of course the manner in which these tools will be ultimately used 
relies completely on an investor’s mandate and approach. It is this aspect that 
we discuss in greater detail in the following last section of this Chapter. 
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4.6 Bridging Quantitative Tools with Investors’ Realities 
Different types of investors adopt fundamentally different investment 
styles.  Specialization has evolved so much that investment firms raise capital 
with the mandate to invest it based on only one of many approaches, on one 
of many asset classes and target to satisfy one of many investor profiles. 
There is enough diversity to accommodate different risk appetites, different 
geographic regions, implement different risk management systems, introduce 
different degrees of technical expertise, apply different investment criteria 
altogether. The only common denominator in every fund raising exercise is 
the ability to convince about the profit generating ability of the chosen agenda. 
Products like the models developed and presented here fit well with a number 
of different investment profiles and mandates albeit with varying degrees of 
compatibility. On the one end of the spectrum a quantitative fund that invests 
in emerging markets or EM currencies in particular, would be a natural target 
for such products. Quantitative Funds opt to follow trade recommendations 
generated by models without any implementation of subjective judgment. 
Tools that are robust technically and have been proved to generate profits are 
exactly what such funds would typically look for.  
Investors with different risk appetites can adapt the model results by 
applying a higher or lower probability cut-off point when classifying the model 
probabilities as trade signals. Global emerging market investors would benefit 
from the fact that our models cover all three major emerging market 
geographic regions. However, even local investors can utilize the trade 
signals that apply to their mandate and simply use the rest of the model 
results as a barometer for global emerging markets. The same can apply to 
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investors who do not typically or at all invest in emerging markets but still 
need to keep them in their radar given the degree of linkages between 
emerging and non emerging markets and the constant possibility of contagion 
between the two. Equally, investors that do not directly invest in currencies 
but have a prime or sole focus on other asset classes from equities to credit to 
real estate stand to benefit from monitoring the results of the models 
developed here as these can serve as one additional indicator of general EM 
or country specific trends. Academics or policy centres such as the OECD, 
the ECB, the FED or the IMF would also merit from reviewing and monitoring 
tools adopted by investors especially if these incorporate elements of 
macroeconomic theory and generate signals that consistently lead currency 
moves in emerging markets.  
We will now look at what we consider as a representative investor who 
could use the trade signals generated by the PROBAPP and PROBDEP 
models. An investor that would review and possibly filter the model results 
based on his own personal views but more importantly on a number of 
stylized facts and market considerations which are well known at the time of 
publication of the model results. Such information would have possibly served 
to ignore some of the generated recommendations. In our analysis we will 
attempt to be as specific as possible and present a number of clear rules that 
would apply rather than base our views on instinctive and subjective 
judgment.  In doing so we will scrutinize the model recommended portfolio for 
March 2004 which we feel offers a representative example of results. 
As shown in Figure 34 and Figure 35 below the probabilities generated 
by the  PROBAPP and PROBDEP models in March 2004 were quite 
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representative of the models’ results as presented so far in this Chapter. The 
models generated trade signals for sixteen out of the nineteen countries 
included in the analysis. None of the “buy” recommendations generated by 
the PROBAPP model were cancelled by the PROBDEP results and vice versa 
none of the “short” trade signals that the PROBDEP model generated were 
cancelled based on the PROBAPP probabilities. We end up with a typical mix 
of more long than short recommendations. In particular the combined models’ 
results suggest that an investor should buy one unit of each of the COP, ZAR, 
THB, RUB, TWD, SGD, INR, MXN, HUF, PHP, CZK, KRW, PLN, IDR all 
against the USD on a one month forward basis at the beginning of March and 
close the positions at the prevailing spot at the end of March. From these 
fourteen buy signals about half are substantially stronger in terms of 
probabilities but at this point we do not filter model recommendations on the 
back of the signal strength. The combined model results also suggest that 
investors should in March sell two emerging market currencies, the ARS and 
CLP versus the USD.  
Figure 34 Monthly Probabilities of local currencies appreciating in March 
2004  
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 Figure 35 Monthly Probabilities of local currencies depreciating in March 
2004 
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Blindly following the model portfolio as presented above would have 
generated a net profit of 1.11%. One of the two short recommendations and 
ten out of the fourteen long recommendations were profitable.  
Table 33 Performance of model portfolio in March 2004:  
S H O R T                        
T R A D E  S IG N A L S
L O N G                            
T R A D E  S I G N A L S
T O T A L                              
T R A D E  S I G N A L S
N U M B E R  O F  T R A D E S 2 1 4 1 6
P R O F I T  M A K I N G  
T R A D E S 1 1 0 1 1
P R O F I T  M A K I N G  
T R A D E S                                 
( %  O F  T O T A L  
T R A D E S )
5 0 % 7 1 % 6 9 %
N E T  M A R C H  
P O R T F O L IO  P & L 1 .1 1
M A R C H  2 0 0 4  P O R T F O L IO                                                                                                                                
B A S E D  O N  B L IN D L Y  F O L L O W IN G  T H E  M O D E L  T R A D E  S IG N A L S
 
Figure 36 below shows the following information:  On the left hand axis 
one can see the PROBAPP and PROBDEP probabilities for March 2004. On 
the right hand axis on an inverted scale we show the actual realized 
performance of each currency on a forward basis in March 2004. The “long” 
model recommendations that coincide with positive monthly returns and the 
“short” model recommendations that coincide with currency depreciations are 
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the trades that generated a profit in March. The “buy” model signals that 
coincide with weakening currencies and the “sell” model recommendations 
that coincide with currencies appreciating are the loss making trades from the 
March portfolio. 
Figure 36 Monthly probabilities of local currencies appreciating or 
depreciating and actual realized returns in March 2004 
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To make these results more clear we show, in Figure 37 below, the 
currency specific gain and loss for March 2004. The grey bars refer to 
currencies for which the models did not generate a signal and in which we did 
not invest. The green bars are the buy or sell signals that were profitable and 
the red bars are the model buy or sell signals that made a loss.  Interestingly 
some of the weaker signals were the ones that made the least or no profit at 
all. Such examples include the signals to buy COP, THB or RUB. Some of the 
stronger signals indeed made significant gains like the PLN and the KRW on 
the buy side or the CLP on the sell side. However one can see that we also 
have strong signals that generated losses like the two extremes of sell ARS or 
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buy IDR and we actually have the higher profit coming from one of the weaker 
signals, that for buying ZAR. These results alone suggest there is no safe rule 
in ignoring or accepting the model results simply on the back of their strength 
and one would do well to stick to the objective probability cut-off points 
adopted in our analysis so far.  
Figure 37 March 2004 signals generated by the models and relevant 
performance 
MARCH 2004 SIGNALS AND PERFORMANCE
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Below we present a number of suggestions that we personally found to 
work as safe guide-sticks that one could adopt when filtering the model 
results. In the absence of a country specific negative rating action, the driving 
force behind the model results are the deviations of each country’s real 
effective exchange rate (REER) from its Hodrick Prescott medium term trend 
(HP). The deviations are based on REERs that are calculated using the 
average realized spot exchange rates between each currency and its major 
trading partners two months prior to the month we are forecasting. 
Accordingly the HP trends cover the period from January 1994 to and 
including the relevant REER month. As we are forecasting March 2004 here 
 206 
both the REERs and the HPs used span the period up to and including 
January 2004. In reality we will only be producing the model March forecasts 
when we are at the end of February and there is a good chance that 
currencies will have moved significantly in the time from the end of January till 
our update. This is a type of information we would have incorporated in our 
investment decision and we would like to somewhat quantify in the way we 
review the model results. Thus we decided to also monitor the deviations of 
each currency’s REER from its HP trend based on the daily spot of the day 
when we run the model to forecast March, which was the 26th of February. 
Besides spot exchange rates, REERs also incorporate inflation and trade 
weight data which would still be largely, if not solely, reflecting the January 
releases. However the factor that affects REERs intra-monthly is indeed by far 
the spot exchange rate. The latest spot rates are likely to incorporate the 
latest market information available, be it positioning, fundamentals or 
investors’ appetite. And we could stand to benefit from such information.  
The way one uses this information is not an exact science. We find it is 
worth ignoring signals that are reversed in the time that passed from the end 
of January till the time we update the model near the end of February. For 
example if a currency comes up as undervalued in REER terms at the end of 
January but the spot has moved so significantly that by the 26th of February 
the currency seems overvalued, then we could consider ignoring the buy 
recommendation. In our example below only TWD fits this profile but only 
marginally so as it went from being mildly undervalued by 0.7% based on the 
deviation of the January REER and HP trend to being around 2% overvalued 
when comparing the February 26th REERs to the respective trend. This is 
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arguably not a very strong signal though.  The light blue dot in Figure 38 
below shows how in March 2004 the TWD REER was crossing the long term 
HP trend moving from slightly undervalued levels to slightly overvalued ones. 
Still these are all relevant to a trend that is overall downwards sloping and a 
REER which is not terribly volatile in the post 2001 years. This is compatible 
with the significant degree of market intervention that Asian central banks 
have displayed in recent years in an attempt to slow down significant currency 
appreciation and also manage exchange rates with the aim of avoiding the 
repetition of the crises they experienced in the 1990s. One could chose to 
ignore the buy TWD signal on the back of our rule suggested above. However 
we would in general suggest one looks for stronger signs of valuation 
reversals before ignoring trade signals purely on that basis.  
Figure 38 TWD REER and relevant HP trend 
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We would also gauge the strength of the signals that did not reverse in 
the period from the end of January to the 26th of February. Most signals are 
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still supportive of REER valuations as of the end of January and many of them 
now seem even stronger than before. Such examples include the ARS which 
came with a sell recommendation and some of the strongest buy signals like 
the ones for IDR and PLN. We would not ignore any of the model March 
signals on the basis of the REER dynamics as per February 26th. This rule 
served well in successfully filtering out a number of signals in other months 
and we think it can serve as a valid safety net for those wishing to evaluate 
the model results in any given month.  
Figure 39 REER %deviations from HP trends (+ve denotes REER overvaluation)  
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There are limitations in using any long term trend as a fair value against 
which we measure currency over and under valuations. Still we have 
discussed in detail the benefits of using the HP trend and our findings strongly 
support the use of the HP trend and the deviations of REERs from this trend. 
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However the educated investor will look for exceptions to the general rule of 
trend dynamics working efficiently. The Argentine Peso offers such an 
example. In March 2004 like in many months before that, the models 
generated a sell recommendation for the ARS which is often, like in the case 
of our March portfolio, the strongest sell trade signal. This signal come in the 
absence of a negative rating action for Argentina and despite the overall 
bullish environment which, as discussed, tended to bias the model results 
towards generating significantly larger number of buy than sell 
recommendations. The sell ARS signal comes on the back of the estimated 
overvaluation of the currency when compared to its HP trend. The ARS REER 
is around 20% stronger than the HP trend would have suggested at the end of 
January, the month we use as input for our March signals. This however is the 
result of a technical limitation of backwards and forwards looking trends like 
the HP. As shown in Figure 40 below the ARS HP trend is strongly 
downwards sloping in an attempt to adjust for the structural break that 
occurred with the January 2002 devaluation. Two sided trends that include 
structural breaks as abrupt as in the case of the ARS will typically depict the 
following characteristic. The retrospective trend will typically suggest the 
underlying series is overvalued before the event and undervalued for a 
number of months following the big event. However this type of information 
would have not been evident at the time if one looked at the trend ending 
before January 2002.  
This trend would have only gradually adjusted to the devaluation in the 
months that followed. One would typically expect structural breaks to 
gradually return to some notion of pre-break balance and the trend to 
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accordingly smoothen as it adjusts to more regular REER valuations. 
However in the case of Argentina the devaluation was followed by constant 
policy intervention to avoid currency strength. This successful intervention 
was seen as the only solution to the country’s macro imbalances by protecting 
the competitive advantage of the country’s external sector and supporting its 
exporters. Most economists were openly against this type of policies, 
especially as they came hand in hand with manipulation of economic 
statistics. The country’s inflation data in particular were regularly fudged, with 
official figures only a fraction of real numbers. In the case of Argentina the 
weak currency coincided with a period of extremely beneficial terms of trade 
effects from international commodities tripling in the decade following the 
Argentine default and devaluation. This effect allowed the country to generate 
greater fiscal revenues and balance its fiscal dynamics faster and grow even  
without tapping international capital markets or restructuring the defaulted 
debt for a considerable amount of time. The highly interventionist policies kept 
the ARS and the REER artificially weak and the HP trend reflected this reality. 
Therefore what we have in our March model results is a fundamentally weak 
currency showing as overvalued only because it is compared to a technically 
biased trend. This is a good example of the type of model signals we would 
ignore as misleading due to the way the models are set up.  
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Figure 40 Argentine Peso REER vs HP trend   
Argentine Peso REER and HP trend
50
70
90
110
130
150
170
190
210
230
Ja
n-9
4
Ju
l-9
4
Ja
n-9
5
Ju
l-9
5
Ja
n-9
6
Ju
l-9
6
Ja
n-9
7
Ju
l-9
7
Ja
n-9
8
Ju
l-9
8
Ja
n-9
9
Ju
l-9
9
Ja
n-0
0
Ju
l-0
0
Ja
n-0
1
Ju
l-0
1
Ja
n-0
2
Ju
l-0
2
Ja
n-0
3
Ju
l-0
3
Ja
n-0
4
Le
ve
l o
f R
EE
R
 a
nd
 H
P 
tr
en
d
ARS REER INDEX LEVEL
ARS REER HP TREND 
 
Another element important for emerging market investors that again 
aims to capture the most up to date market information is the carry that is 
priced in already by forward exchange rates at the time of updating the model 
results. Figure 41 below shows how much carry was priced in the one month 
forward exchange rate as of February 25th 2004. Negative carry works as a 
supportive factor for all the buy recommendations and would only really deter 
an investor from buying an emerging market currency if it was significantly 
positive. Most emerging market forward exchange rates will benefit from the 
higher local interest rates compared to the USD and price in a local currency 
depreciation for the coming month, which is how we define the negative carry. 
At times of high risk appetite this is like a free lunch for investors who buy the 
local currencies and benefit from the overall market interest that effectively 
supports these currencies. At the end of the month, investors that went long 
these currencies stand to benefit at a minimum from the depreciation that was 
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priced in, in the form of carry. Any actual appreciation will provide additional 
gains. At the same time the negative carry offers a buffer, should the 
currencies indeed weaken in spot terms and provides some comfort until the 
positions start making losses. This is exactly the argument that deters 
investors from shorting high yielding currencies at times of rising risk appetite 
and lack of significant country specific negative views. For example if the 
models generated a sell signal for the TRL one would have to have a very 
strong conviction that the currency will indeed weaken in March and 
significantly more than the almost 2% move priced in already, before actually 
selling the TRL on a one month forward basis against the USD. However this 
is not a relevant dilemma here as the models generated a neutral signal for 
TRL in March.  
Figure 41 Spot moves priced in by 1month Forward exchange rates on 
February 25th 2005 
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For the rest of the portfolio recommended for March 2004 we have no 
hard rules to suggest. We can however give examples of the thinking process 
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we underwent when assessing each of the model signals. Starting from the 
fewer sell recommendations we first turn to the Chilean Peso. The CLP 
appreciated versus the USD by as much as 26% in 2003 largely on the back 
of generalized US dollar weakness, global positive growth momentum and 
thriving commodities prices and in particular copper. A USD rebound which 
led to a CLP downwards correction by almost 6% from January 9th to 
February 27th 2004 brought the CLP at levels almost flat to the beginning of 
the year. If the dollar was expected to continue on its strengthening trend it 
would mean the CLP could be expected to weaken further. However, the 
CLP’s recent move described above meant valuations were less supportive of 
significant further CLP weakening in the immediate future. Taking into account 
that there is no carry cost in shorting the CLP we decide to abide by the sell 
CLP model signal but also decide to apply a 1% stop loss trigger in case our 
fears for dollar re-pricing turn out to be correct. The other trade signal that 
referred to a Latin American currency was the buy MXN recommendation. 
This signal came at a time when investor appetite had lost its momentum for 
MXN as a number of good news failed to provide the expected peso support. 
Although this could be seen as a technical feature that was bound to correct, 
by mid February 2004 rising uncertainty on Mexican inflation was adding to 
the currency downside risks. In light of these factors we decided to ignore the 
model buy MXN signals. We also had no strong reasons to object the weak 
COP buy signal.  
Continuing on to the buy side of the model portfolio we see a theme that 
is consistent in many previous months, that of a general bullish trend for Asian 
currencies. The models generate a buy recommendation for the Indonesian 
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rupiah (IDR), the Korean won (KRW), the Philippines peso (PHP), the Indian 
rupee (INR), the Singapore dollar (SGD) the Taiwan dollar (TWD) and the 
Thai baht (THB). Overall Asian currencies were allowed to strengthen more 
than usual in 2003 but this change of policy was largely enabled by the 
weakening US dollar. Most Asian authorities remained very wary of allowing 
their currencies to appreciate versus their major trading partners. This was 
justified by the reality that growth in Asia was largely driven by trade dynamics 
and external demand. However as a large portion of the Asian trade was 
intra-regional and often between each country and Japan the Asian 
governments could afford to allow the USD crosses to somehow appreciate. 
This also relieved an amount of pressure they were incurring from 
international organizations asking for free floating currencies and less policy 
intervention. The overall Asian bullish trend was indeed uninterrupted in 2004 
but as mentioned above by mid February the understanding was that the USD 
had recovered a lot of its lost ground and could well continue to do so.   
On a more country specific mode we would have traded on the IDR buy 
signal as the positive carry was still a significant driver of positioning for the 
IDR. The PHP was the Asian currency offering the highest carry at the time. 
However in the case of Philippines, political concerns relating to the run-up to 
the highly emotional elections of May 10th 2004, were keeping many 
investors side-lined. On these grounds we too would have decided not to 
follow the model buy PHP signal in March 2004. We decided to trade the buy 
SGD signal but with a stop loss of 1% because the authorities of Singapore 
followed at the time an undisclosed REER and NEER target for the SGD and 
in REER terms we see that the SGD had been very stable and does not seem 
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undervalued. At the time we also decided to ignore the buy TWD signal as the 
REER signal had reversed by the end of February as discussed earlier, but 
also because of ongoing political tensions on the run up to the December 
2004 election in Taiwan. In the months that preceded the elections conflict 
between major parties with regards to how the Taiwan-China interstate 
relations should be handled were creating a lot of heat which, like in the case 
of the Philippines, was enough to de-motivate international investors. We had 
no reason to dispute the models’ buy INR recommendation.  We also followed 
the models’ buy recommendation for the Korean won (KRW) which we felt 
had room to further appreciate. A possible USD rebound was a concern and 
we felt that if this materialized it would be worth switching our long KRW 
position against the JPY instead of the USD.  Last on the Asian model signals 
we decided to follow the buy THB recommendation on the back of strong 
fundamentals that supported further currency appreciation. We remained wary 
though that the Bank of Thailand was likely to intervene to cap substantial 
currency strength.     
Turning to the EMEA trade signals we have a buy recommendation for 
three out of the four central European currencies, The Polish zloty (PLN), the 
Czech koruna (CZK) and the Hungarian forint (HUF).  The model signals 
came at a time or interest rate decisions in all three countries. Interestingly, 
although all three decided to leave their interest rates unchanged their 
decisions triggered different market reactions for each one of them. In Poland 
the Monetary Policy Committee left interest rates unchanged and signalled a 
possible move to a tightening bias in coming months. Together with 
expectations for progress in structural reforms and in particular fiscal reform 
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based on a vote expected in March, we felt markets would support the zloty in 
the near future. We therefore traded on the models’ buy PLN recommendation 
but with a stop loss of 1% to avoid sudden market reactions to nasty political 
surprises.  Following the decision not to change interest rates the Hungarian 
forint became the highest carry currency in the EMEA region leading us to 
endorse the models’ buy signal on expectations for further HUF strength.  We 
also followed the buy CZK recommendation as we had no strong reasons to 
oppose the signal. We also abided by the models’ long recommendation for 
the Russian rubble which had been pretty resilient to event risk from a recent 
cabinet reshuffle. We felt the RUB was running little downside risk from the 
upcoming presidential elections in mid March and had fundamentals and high 
oil prices supporting it. One buy signal we ignore in the EMEA region is that 
for the South African rand. The models were correctly capturing the significant 
ZAR weakness in January 2004 which saw the ZAR drop by as much as 17% 
vs the USD in a matter of ten days. However the rand had recovered most of 
its losses and rose by about 10% by the end of February. This volatility 
together with unsupportive country fundamentals and the fears of possible US 
dollar continuing rebound led us to ignore the buy ZAR signal.  
From applying our subjective approach to the model generated trade 
signals we ended up trading fewer currencies and marginally improving our 
overall portfolio performance. However the results were mixed in that our 
filtering meant that at times we avoided losses but at times we also missed 
out on profits. In general as shown in Table 34 below we ignored a total of five 
signals, of which one was a sell and four were buy recommendations. We 
also implemented a stop loss when trading three of the model generated trade 
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signals. None of the stop losses were actually triggered as all three positions 
on short CLP, long SGD and long PLN were profitable. From the signals we 
ignored we avoided a loss of -2.3% in the case of the ARS and a loss of -
0.43% in the case of the MXN. The two Asian currency buy recommendations 
we ignored meant we actually missed out on profits. Both the PHP and the 
TWD appreciated in March on one month forward rate terms but we feel our 
judgment to not invest on the back of political concerns was well funded. Of 
course other investors with higher appetite of risk would have probably not 
ignored these signals. The other signal we ignored was the long ZAR trade 
which cost us the highest profit as the rand appreciated by 5.07% in March. 
Still the arguments we presented against this position would have been 
enough to deter most investors who trade on the back of macro and other 
fundamentals and not purely on a speculative basis.  
Table 34 Recommendations of model portfolio in March 2004 
LOCAL CURRENCY
MO DEL 
RECO MMENDED 
PORTFO LIO               
MAR 2004
MODEL 
RECOMM ENDED 
PO RTFOLIO                
MAR 2004 ADJUSTED 
FOR SUBJECTIVE 
VIEWS
ARS SHORT NEUTRAL
CLP SHORT SHO RT*
SKK NEUTRAL NEUTRAL
TRL NEUTRAL NEUTRAL
BRL NEUTRAL NEUTRAL
COP LONG LONG
ZAR LONG NEUTRAL
THB LONG LONG
RUB LONG LONG
TWD LONG NEUTRAL
SGD LONG LO NG *
INR LONG LONG
MXN LONG NEUTRAL
HUF LONG LONG
PHP LONG NEUTRAL
CZK LONG LONG
KRW LONG LONG
PLN LONG LO NG *
IDR LONG LONG
* IND ICATES W E IMPLEME NTD ED A STO P LO SS OF 1%  
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Figure 42 Performance of model recommended portfolio in March 2004  
MARCH 2004 PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE                                                                         BASED 
ON OUR FILTERING OF THE MODEL SIGNALS
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As per Table 35 below overlaying our subjective judgment on the model 
results meant that overall we scored a slightly higher portfolio P&L of 1.22% 
compared to the 1.11% if we were to simply follow all the models’ 
recommendations for March. We improved the success ratios for our short 
trades as we only sold one currency and this trade was profitable. Our long 
success ratios were slightly worse as we bought ten instead of fourteen 
currencies and 70% of these trades were profitable compared to 71% success 
ratio if we had not implemented any judgment. Overall our hit ratio improved 
to 73% of all trades we implemented compared to 69% before.  
Table 35 Performance of model portfolio in March 2004:  
SHORT                       
TRADE SIGN ALS
LO NG                            
TRADE SIGNALS
TO TAL                             
TRADE SIGNALS
NUMBER OF TRADES 1 10 11
PRO FIT MAKING  
TRADES 1 7 8
PRO FIT MAKING  
TRADES                                
(% OF TOTAL 
TRADES)
100% 70% 73%
NET M ARCH 
PORTFOLIO P&L 1.22
MARCH 2004 POR TFO LIO                                                                                                                                        
BASED O N OUR FILTERIN G OF THE  M ODEL TRADE SIGNALS
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Arguably March is only one month of observations and it is hard to drive 
solid conclusions based only on this exercise of how subjective views alter the 
P&L of a portfolio. However March was a very representative month in terms 
of the model results and more importantly the criteria we opted to apply when 
filtering the model recommendations. It was also very balanced in terms of 
how subjective views even the ones that are funded on very sound arguments 
are not necessarily going to improve overall performance. This is why it is of 
extreme importance from an investors’ point of view to know that his starting 
point is a robust tool like the PROBAPP and PROBDEP models which when 
left to perform their objective mandate can be trusted to consistently generate 
signals that are intuitive and also generate profits. 
4.7 Conclusion 
Chapter 4 concludes the detailed presentation of our work on building an 
emerging markets currency model that can be an addition to the toolbox of a 
wide spectrum of users from academics and members of policy setting 
centres to and foremost real life investors. In the previous chapters we 
presented the literature that relates most to our line of work, the ways in which 
we extended previous research and the steps we followed in selecting the 
specifications that met the intuitive and statistical criteria we set. In Chapter 4 
we proceeded to scrutinise the applicability of our model in a number of ways. 
We estimate two separate models applying a Logit type of regression analysis 
on each one in order to model and forecast two different binary outcomes. We 
transform the model results into probabilities of having or not more than 5% 
returns from investing in the one month forward exchange rate of 19 emerging 
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market currencies. What we call the PROBAPP model captures and forecasts 
the probability of having more than 5% appreciation in any given calendar 
month, while the model we call PROBDEP estimates the probabilities of local 
currency depreciating in one month forward rate terms by more than 5%.   
The primary task was to decide on the level of model generated 
probability that we would consider as the cut-off level above which we would 
categorise model results as trade signals. In doing so we reviewed the model 
performance when implementing a range of probabilities from as low as 2% to 
as high as 15%. We applied three different approaches. First we considered 
each model separately and reviewed the signals each one would have 
generated at any given probability level. Every time the PROBAPP or the 
PROBADEP model produced a probability higher than g% or k% respectively, 
we would classify that point as a buy or sell signal accordingly.  The second 
step was to combine the two models when generating and reviewing 
individual buy or sell trades. For us to classify a point as a buy 
recommendation two conditions had to be satisfied. The PROBAPP model 
should have generated a probability higher than g% and, at the same time, 
the PROBDEP model should have generated a probability lower than k%. All 
other signals would have been ignored. The third step was to assess the 
model results on a portfolio basis whereby we considered the overall group of 
trades recommended in any given month, both buy and sell 
recommendations, and quantify the performance of those model generated 
portfolios.  
We first reviewed the Type I, II and III errors to test our models’ ability to 
successfully generate trading signals when fitted to our long in-sample data 
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series or forecast the shorter out of sample data. Type I error penalises the 
models for “over-predicting” and generating too many signals for returns 
higher than 5% while  realised returns do not meet this threshold. Type II error 
penalises the models for “under-predicting” and missing points when realised 
returns where indeed above 5% in either direction. We also introduced what 
we called Type III error which filters the Type I errors and captures the cases 
when the models predicted excessive returns in a certain direction but not 
only did returns not reach such levels but actual direction was opposite to 
what the models forecasted. We proceeded to review in a number of formats 
the profit generating ability of the model. This was applied to the individual 
and combined results but also, and in greater detail, to the model results that 
were reviewed on a portfolio basis.   
From a sample point of view our tests were performed on three different 
levels. The first involves what we call the in sample analysis where we 
estimate and fit the models on a large sample from as early as January 1994 
to March 2003. The second involves what we call the out-of-sample analysis, 
where we first estimate the model on a sample that ends in January 2002 and 
we then test the model performance on a period of fourteen months from 
February 2002 to March 2003. The third involves our real time analysis where 
we apply the models that were estimated on the long in sample period on 
monthly data that span a whole calendar year, from January to December 
2004. The real time data are first reviewed solely on the basis of the objective 
tests and criteria we set out. We then apply our market awareness and 
subjective judgement and assess how such elements that are inherent in a 
typical investor’s decision process would alter the model performance.  
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Turning first to the selection of the cut-off probability level we applied we 
found, unsurprisingly, that applying higher probability cut-off points meant the 
models avoided false trade calls but also missed actual trades. The lower 
probabilities produced a model that over-predicted moves and ended up with 
lower success ratios. After considering all the results, we selected the 5% 
probability for both models as the threshold that provided trust-worthy, 
actionable trade recommendations while balancing in a satisfactory manner 
several performance trade-offs such as the three types of errors we 
mentioned above. The PROBDEP model would have benefited from a slightly 
lower probability cut-off level but for the sake of consistency we opted for a 
common threshold of 5%. In-sample and at the 5% probability threshold, the 
PROBAPP and PROBDEP models were successful in fitting 65% and 55% of 
actual cases of more than 5% appreciation and deprecation respectively thus 
missing about 35% and 45% of events. These PROBAPP and PROBDEP 
success ratios in capturing the currency moves they aim to model, were 
further enhanced by about 23% and 12% respectively due to the residual from 
the Type I and Type III errors. These residuals cover the cases where the 
models predicted the correct direction but not the correct size of returns. In-
sample the models were also successful in not signalling non-trades. The 
PROBAPP and PRBDEP models correctly did not signal a trade in 56% and 
67%, respectively, of the times when indeed we did not see returns in the 
desired direction and of more than 5%. Out-of- sample the PROBAPP model 
had a small deterioration in its performance capturing a total of 82% of cases 
of appreciation while the PROBDEP model had a poorer performance with a 
success ratio of capturing a total of 41% of depreciations.  
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We proceeded to apply the 5% probability threshold at the individual or 
combined buy and sell signals and also when looking at the model generated 
portfolios and assessed the success of the models in generating profitable 
trades.  The PROBAPP signals were profitable in 66% of the cases in-sample 
and 72% of the cases out-of-sample. The PROBDEP model had a success 
ratio of profitable trades of around 52% in-sample, which dropped to about 
37% out-of-sample. The results were consistent irrespective of whether we 
looked at single model signals or combined both models. With the exception 
of the out-of-sample PROBDEP signals we had consistently profit making 
trades with very high success ratios. The PROBDEP performance could be 
justified by the higher than optimal probability level we applied to it. Our out-
of-sample period covered a risk loving era which meant the models were 
rightly biased in generating significantly more buy than sell recommendations. 
Importantly the bulk of the buy signals were profit-making.  
Analysing the models on a monthly portfolio basis helps smooth away 
any minor biases we have mentioned so far and also provides a more 
rounded overview of the model performance. The 5% probability threshold 
generated portfolios that involve a significant number of trades each month of 
which about 60% and 65% were profit making, when looking at the in and out-
of-sample periods respectively.  Importantly, the portfolios generated an 
average monthly return of about 1.2% and 0.53% in and out-of-sample and at 
a Sharpe ratio of 1.85 and 0.8 respectively. With an acceptable degree of 
variation and only a few exceptions, these results were not biased towards a 
sub-sample of countries or any specific period that we analysed. The above 
mentioned results amply confirm our view that the models developed are 
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indeed reliable quantitative tools that one can trust to consistently generate 
profit making trade recommendations. Importantly these trade 
recommendations can be followed blindly without overlaying any type of 
subjective judgment or even stylized facts evident to investors which may 
invariably be expected to improve the overall investment performance.  
We finally carried out our exercise in real time throughout 2004 and 
proceeded to overlay our sense of market stylized facts prevailing at the time 
and our understanding of the technical limitations of our quantitative model. 
The 2004 model generated portfolios are very much in line with our previous 
results and, if anything, improve our out of sample statistics. We still have a 
bias towards more buy than sell recommendations due to the continuation of 
high risk appetite globally in 2004. Throughout the year we only had one 
month of loss making model signals. On average per month we had the same 
number of trades and the same high percentages of profit making signals as 
in our previous analysis. The annual returns per trade stood at a 4.06% with a 
Sharpe ratio of 1.16. We concluded our analysis by focusing on the March 
2004 results and applying our knowledge of market realities and model 
limitations. We introduced a number of criteria that suggested we ignore 
certain model generated signals. For example, we ignored signals that had 
been reversed by more recent market price actions or signals that went 
against the intervention policies adopted by country authorities. We also 
ignored signals that were the result of the model bias to structural breaks. 
Finally we ignored signals that we felt were too sensitive to follow due to 
political and other qualitative risks that applied to certain countries at the time. 
Following the implementation of these guidelines we saw a small 
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improvement in the March 2004 model results.  
Our analysis and findings confirm that our Emerging Markets Currency 
Models are the sort of quantitative products that can be applied in real life and 
produce reliable recommendations. Blindly following the model signals results 
in profitable trade portfolios, while intuition and market awareness assist the 
deeper understanding and often the better implementation of such signals. In 
the following final chapter of the thesis we present our work on another 
quantitative product, the Emerging Markets Ratings Model. The latter is yet 
one more attempt to quantify one aspect of emerging market dynamics, albeit 
at a lower frequency and with a more macroeconomic orientation than our 
currency model. The two products combined help support or cancel signals 
that can be translated into investment decisions on a number of asset classes 
in the unquantifiable emerging markets universe. 
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5 CHAPTER FIVE: Modelling and Forecasting Emerging 
Market Sovereign Rating Dynamics 
5.1 Introduction 
The current Chapter describes our work on developing an Emerging 
Markets Ratings Model. The model forecasts ratings assigned by S&P and 
Moody’s to long-term, hard currency denominated sovereign debt. It provides 
information about both the ratings and the rating outlooks of 30 emerging 
markets sovereigns. Tests on historical data indicate that the model performs 
consistently well in capturing the dynamics of sovereign credit ratings. Our 
selected specification is a linear description of the linkage between the values 
of a few key macroeconomic variables and the assigned sovereign ratings. 
We have not attempted to capture the impact of non-quantifiable variables 
such as political stability, on sovereign credit ratings. This arguably 
constraints the forecasting accuracy of the model but it also helps keep the 
interpretation of its results “clean” of subjective judgments. The model 
presented here introduces a number of innovative improvements, over what 
has been attempted and presented in relevant literature in terms of focus, 
estimation methodology and applicability of results. 
In the first four chapters of the thesis we presented in detail the rationale, 
structure and application of a quantitative model used to model and forecast 
currency dynamics in emerging markets. The aim of the specifications we 
called PROBAPP and PROBDEP models was to generate actionable trading 
signals with regards to near term direction of an emerging country’s forward 
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exchange rate versus the US dollar. The time horizon involved was one 
calendar month and the key input of the models was the deviation of a 
country’s Real Effective Exchange Rate from a medium term trend which we 
calculated with the use of Hodrick Prescott filters.  The other two variables we 
included in our currency models were both related to rating agencies. In 
particular we used the 12 month trailing moving average of the global 
speculative grade corporate default rate as calculated by Moody’s and the 
downgrades of long term hard currency sovereign ratings by S&P. The former 
was the only “Global” variable we incorporated in the models and a variable 
we felt provided a measure of global risk appetite as perceived by markets. 
The latter was only included in the model of currency depreciations and was 
seen as a barometer that would weigh on investors’ balance of risks as an 
early warning signal for forthcoming country malaise.  
Our findings of strong links between currency risks and rating agencies’ 
data, support the notion that financial market actions and sovereign ratings 
are often the two sides of the same coin. Rating actions were described in 
Chapter 2 as a data series that provides packaged information on a country’s 
fundamentals and captures both, quantifiable macro data and qualitative 
elements of sovereign risk. In this last chapter of the thesis we present our 
attempts to explicitly model and forecast this variable and prove in greater 
detail that ratings and rating actions can indeed be explained largely by hard 
economic data and provide the assumed and desired proxy for a country’s 
macroeconomic outlook.  
In Section 5.2 below we present an overview of the mandate and 
evolution of major rating agencies. Section 5.3 reviews a selection of the most 
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prominent and relevant academic papers that attempted to model sovereign 
rating dynamics before us and provide an update of the topics relevant to our 
findings with regards to more recent research. We proceed to outline how our 
work compares to previous work and what are the new elements that we 
introduce in the modelling of ratings and rating actions. Section 5.4 presents 
in more detail the considerations we underwent when building the model 
specification we eventually adopted. Section 5.5 presents our findings from 
applying the selected specification on real time data in 2003 and 2004 and 
provides a number of examples of how the results of such a model could be 
incorporated in the agenda of an emerging markets investor. Finally Section 
5.6 Concludes.  
5.2 Rating Agencies and the Evolution of their Mandate  
Rating Agencies are private corporations that assign credit rating scores 
to a number of entities, corporate or sovereign. The two major rating agencies 
that we also focus our analysis on are Moody’s and Standard and Poor 
(hereafter referred to as S&P). Both these agencies were set up in the 20th 
century and were primarily involved in rating corporates. Agencies started 
assigning developed markets sovereign ratings in recent decades and only 
expanded to the emerging markets universe in the 1980’s. The details of how 
rating agencies were first set up and how they go about deciding which 
entities to rate is of little relevance to this thesis. We do however wish to 
outline a number of characteristics that describe their increasing role in capital 
markets and highlight the effect of their decision. This in turn helps explain 
why we think it is worth modelling ratings and rating actions and why we 
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considered them valid candidates for inclusion in our currency risk models.  
As mentioned above in our analysis we focus on the two major rating 
agencies namely Moody’s and Standard and Poor. Both are well established 
agencies whose ratings are essential elements of market practices. Rating 
agencies act as independent agents that assess all information publicly or 
privately available to them with regards to the credit quality of an entity they 
rate. After combining a number of quantitative analytics and qualitative 
assessments they conclude with a credit rating relevant to that entity. The 
fact, however, that agencies are hired by the rated entities themselves has 
attracted a lot of criticism in terms of their ability to remain objective and 
independent. We will review the criticism and defence of rating agencies in 
the next section of this chapter. Once a rating has been decided by the 
agencies, they promptly inform both the rated entity and the market 
participants of their decision and thinking process. Ratings are supposed to 
reflect medium term credit dynamics and capture the overall ability of an entity 
to repay its current and future credit obligations in full and on a timely manner. 
The universe of ratings covers a spectrum of scores that is crudely divided 
into two sub groups. The higher quality ratings form the sub-group that is 
called Investment Grade (hereafter referred to as IG) and the lower quality 
ratings form the group that is called Speculative Grade (hereafter referred to 
as SG). Within each one of these subgroups credit quality will obviously vary. 
In the IG group the highest rating one can assign is the so called triple A 
(hereafter referred to as AAA) which describes the best possible credit quality 
with the minimum, if any, associated risks of default.  The SG sub group 
includes ratings that can range from poor credit quality to what is described as 
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default or selective default and describes a credit event that has already taken 
place according to the agencies. 
Rating agencies provide scores for a vast number of entities that can be 
generally grouped to two categories: Sovereigns and Corporates. In our thesis 
here we are focusing on the sovereign credit ratings that agencies assign to a 
number of emerging countries. The definition of “sovereignty” incorporates the 
ability of the entity to act independently of external control and merit political 
autonomy. Country or central government ratings which are the type we 
analyse in this thesis, will typically assign a very significant weight on that 
country’s macro fundamentals and will also attempt to capture elements of 
political and social pressure that are implicit in all governments’ political 
framework. When rating Sovereigns, agencies have an even greater incentive 
to look beyond short term factors and incorporate all possible elements that 
matter to a nation’s debt repayment plans. Most importantly in the case of a 
sovereign, agencies attribute a very significant weight not only to the nation’s 
ability but also to its willingness to service its debt obligations fully and on 
time.  Every nation’s central government is assumed to be able to mobilize 
enough resources to meet its obligations. However the social and political 
implications of what are often very tough decisions could affect a 
government’s willingness to implement all necessary measures. The lack of 
willingness becomes more relevant for lower rated entities, where the 
possibility of a credit event and the loss in case of default increase.  
A sovereign will not face the same sanctions that a corporate would in 
case of default. This could at a first reading reduce the willingness of a 
sovereign to meet its debt obligations. In practice though there are many key 
 231 
considerations that motivate central governments to service their debt 
properly and fully. First and foremost history has shown that counties that do 
select to restructure or default on all or part of their debt face significant 
difficulties in returning to capital markets. Hence their ability to raise further 
debt and finance their operations is heavily hindered. This together with the 
fact that sovereign defaults are almost invariably linked with banking and 
currency crises results in a significant hit to a country’s growth prospects for 
the near and medium run. Sovereigns are seen as most likely to default on 
their foreign currency obligations as, in theory at least, they have unlimited 
ability to print the local currency amounts they need to service local currency 
obligations. Even before or without actually defaulting, sovereigns may find a 
number of ways to alleviate their debt burden, like causing an inflation spiral 
domestically that effectively “eats in” their debt obligations. Sovereign ratings 
are central to the considerations of all investors considering the specific 
country. This is also because rating agencies consider the sovereign’s foreign 
currency rating as a ceiling for all other ratings assigned to any entity 
corporate or other within that country.  
The ratings spectrum we described earlier in this section carries a 
somewhat more specific interpretation in the case of sovereigns. For example 
S&P describes the “AAA” universe of sovereigns as those that amongst other 
characteristics “typically have strong political institutions and adaptable 
political systems, are open to trade and finance and their macroeconomic 
stability precludes the development of destabilising imbalances and provides 
an environment conducive to investment.” The middle of the spectrum “BBB” 
sovereigns are described as those for which “the cushion supporting timely 
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debt service is not as large as at higher rating levels. Political factors play a 
larger role than at higher levels but orthodox market –oriented economic 
programs are generally well established.” According to S&P median per capita 
GDP is far below for these countries compared the median A rating category 
and “there is likely to be greater reliance upon short term debt and debt 
denominated in a foreign currency”. At the low end of credit quality below the 
single B rating S&P finds that “there is a clear and present danger of default. 
There is considerable economic and perhaps political turmoil. The currency is 
weakening, inflation is rising and the short term debt service burden is a huge 
challenge.”  
Default is obviously the most important incident in any entity’s history of 
credit servicing. Agencies define default in a very narrow and rigid fashion as 
missing or delaying even a single interest payment in part. Sovereign defaults 
are the most serious of all in terms of their serious and lasting implications. 
Often people feel that these are only rare occurrences but reality is very 
different. For example according to rating agencies in the twenty two years 
from 1960 to 1982, at least 22 countries had defaulted in some shape, form 
and size towards their creditors. All of these countries were part of the 
emerging markets universe. In our analysis here we do not care solely about 
actual default events because with the evolution of markets and the improving 
growth prospects of most major emerging markets this risk has been 
diminishing substantially. Even if actual defaults are still a possibility, they are 
rare and not what we solely aim to model. An entity may exhibit financial 
stress long before or even without defaulting. Equally an entity may avoid 
default and recover solidly. Our focus lies on the more high frequency 
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dynamics captured by all rating actions and their possible implications for 
markets. The majority of what is described as Emerging Market sovereigns 
have typically been rated lower than developed market nations.  The very 
nature of emerging markets and their evolving character explains why rating 
actions are far more common in the case of emerging sovereigns. For our 
purposes these characteristics mean that we have a far greater number of 
data points to model, making our exercise more promising.   
The assigned ratings also differ with regards to a number of other 
factors. For example agencies distinguish between ratings with different time 
horizon, namely short term and long term. They also assign different ratings 
for different currency risks, namely local or foreign currency.  Different rating 
categories will typically reflect different credit considerations. Nevertheless 
rating agencies have always been conscious of the market need to use 
ratings in a way that is as uniform as possible. Therefore the attempt has 
been to increase the common denominator behind the different rating 
categories and assign a lesser weight in the idiosyncratic factors. Ratings are 
in general expected to reflect a view on a number of elements: namely 
financial stability of the rated entity, probability of default and expected loss in 
the case of credit event. All these factors are interlinked and also affected by 
external elements like third party support or the point in the business cycle. 
Agencies make a point of smoothing through the business cycle and 
expressing a view that looks beyond the current snapshot of the credit 
fundamentals of an entity.  
In an attempt to create a finer way to convey their views to investors , 
which would allow them to reflect and adjust their short term views while 
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standing to their long term convictions, agencies have introduced a number of 
elements like reviews and outlooks. To be exact S&P refers to the medium 
run signals as Outlooks and Moody’s as Credit-watches. Notwithstanding the 
possible fine differences in definition or practice we shall consider the two as 
equivalent and refer to both as “outlooks” in the remaining part of the chapter. 
Both, reviews and outlooks have a shorter time frame than official ratings and 
serve to signal the most up to date direction of the agency’s assessment. 
Reviews are more official processes that have a defined timeframe of about 
three months and indicate the direction towards which an agency is thinking of 
proceeding. An entity can be placed on review for possible upgrade or 
downgrade and can subsequently be upgraded, downgraded or confirmed at 
its current rating. Outlooks were introduced in the 1980’s and reflect a   less 
rigid part of the rating process than reviews. Outlooks are not expected to 
result in a specific decision within a specific timeframe and are supposed to 
reflect a prospect that could trigger a rating action within the following six to 
eighteen months. As agencies assigned outlooks for a growing number of 
years and cases, they improved the way that these instruments are used by 
them to convey the necessary information to markets, and the way market 
participants feel comfortable to use such indicators as signals of forthcoming 
actions.  
Rating agencies aim to provide market participants with independent, in 
depth analysis of the credit dynamics that apply to the rated entities. Market 
participants tend to use the resulting credit scores as a comparable score they 
can trust to incorporate in their investment process. The investment mandate 
of most investors, especially those that solely invest in bond markets, dictates 
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that they can only invest in securities that have obtained a minimum rating 
from major rating agencies. Most investable bond indices are designed to 
incorporate entities of specific rating categories. These indices are often the 
benchmark against which many investors link their performance. Rating 
agencies are in practice seen by many official institutions and market 
participants as quasi-regulators of bond markets but ironically lack any 
regulation themselves. Agencies have often been accused of a number of 
limitations that do not serve the interests of investors. The agencies’ slow 
reaction to change of fundamentals, the need to decrease subjective 
judgement, increase the uniform interpretation of ratings or improve the clarity 
with which agencies disclose the information available to them are but a few 
of the issues that are part of an almost constant open dialogue between 
agencies and investors.  
The crisis of late 2010 brought many of these issues again in the 
limelight. Debates, credit considerations and rating action processes that till 
then only applied to the riskier emerging markets, became relevant for 
developed markets. In the aftermath of the great recession that hit markets 
globally in the middle of 2007, the focus turned to the structural vulnerabilities 
of a number of countries. In recovering from the 2008 recession, the trend 
was for governments to step in and take over the debt burden of the private 
sector and at the same time try to support growth with spending that was 
largely financed by low cost financing. In Europe sovereign debt accumulation 
and fiscal loosening led to a number of EU countries breaching the 
fundamental criteria outlined in the Maastricht Treaty. The implicit or explicit 
support by the EU became a matter of debate and the ability and willingness 
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of these governments to service their debt came under market scrutiny. With 
first the case of Greece that was downgraded a number of times in the space 
of two years and a number of other EU countries following suit as possible 
candidates for debt restructuring, the unthinkable had become very likely or, 
according to many market participants, unavoidable. As we type, these events 
are still unfolding but they have at a very minimum brought renewed interest 
on the role of agencies in global markets.  
Rating agencies have been trying to normalise their decision making 
procedures and have been trying to stay as objective as possible. Introducing 
quantitative processes and tools in the process is one way of proving their 
commitment to objectivity. It also serves well to assess the historic 
performance and consistency of these agencies. Historic evidence of their 
ability to assign proper ratings, inherent default probabilities and resulting loss 
and recovery values are a very clear cut way to quantify their success ratio. 
Ratings unavoidably incorporate the element of subjective judgement as 
agencies avoid using solely quantitative tools in their decision process. In that 
sense it is futile to attempt to create a quantitative tool to replicate their 
decisions. It is however very useful to try and model that part of their rating 
process which is attributable to measurable factors. This is indeed the scope 
of our modelling exercise here. 
 
 
 
 237 
5.3 Academic Literature and our Contribution to Sovereign 
Rating Models Research 
Most analysts that have addressed the topic of sovereign debt dynamics 
have by and far focused on debt crises. The latter typically describes the 
cases of a sovereign that has defaulted in some shape, form and size on their 
debt obligations. Similarly, as discussed in the first Chapter of the thesis, most 
analysts focused on currency crises when researching currency dynamics. 
Currency and debt crises are events that have been linked in theory or in 
practice and are often analyzed together. The definition of a debt crisis 
unavoidably brings the rating agencies in the picture as most consider a 
sovereign being in default once it has been assigned the Selective Default 
(hereafter referred to as SD) rating by a leading agency. Unsurprisingly, a 
significant amount of research has focused on explaining the decision process 
and actions of these agencies. The motivation is usually the wish to defend or 
criticise the agencies’ responses. Some have found that rating agencies 
indeed provide early signals ahead of debt crises but others have claimed that 
agencies react too slowly and too inconsistently to events and more often 
than not aggravate existing situations instead of helping guide markets and 
rated entities. 
A number of papers have flagged the need for practically usable results 
and have attempted to link rating actions to market moves. The most obvious 
and common link attempted is that between rating changes and some 
measure of spreads of investable securities like bonds, issued by the rated 
entity. Our take on the analysis of ratings dynamics shares a number of 
concerns of these papers but extends on previous work in a number of 
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methodological, conceptual and practical manners which we shall outline 
throughout this section. This section does not by any means aim to provide an 
exhaustive overview of research on rating dynamics. We will merely attempt a 
brief summary of trends in the relevant research and findings in the years that 
preceded our own exercise which was carried out in 2002 and mention a 
number of key papers that were published in recent years and relate to our 
line of work.   
The authors that set the base for the analysis of Rating Agencies and 
their work are R. Cantor and F. Packer who produced two seminal papers in 
mid 1990’s. In 1994 they set out the basics in a paper titled: “The Credit 
Rating Industry”(20)  and in 1996 they published the most closely followed 
piece on the field with the title “Determinants and Impact of Sovereign Credit 
Ratings”(21) (hereafter we shall refer to the latter piece as “CP’). In this paper 
Cantor and Packer use data from 49 rated countries which include both 
emerging markets (hereafter referred to as EM) and developed markets 
(hereafter referred to as DM). CP estimate a cross section model where the 
dependent variable is an average of the ratings assigned by Moody’s and 
S&P and subsequently they run the same regressions for each one of the two 
agencies separately. Interestingly they find that their results hold in a very 
similar manner for both agencies individually as well as for the resulting 
average rating. These ratings are transformed into an index ranging from 1, 
for the weakest rating they consider which is the lowest in the single B 
universe, to 16 for the highest AAA rating. The model is estimated with the 
use of the Ordinary Least Squares method (hereafter referred to as OLS). 
They use a small group of quantitative variables some of which describe 
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macroeconomic variables, dummy variables that distinguish between EM and 
DM and one dummy variable to indicate if a country had a default history or 
not. The macro variables they test are: the GNP per capita, the real GDP 
growth, some measure of fiscal and external balance both as ratios to GDP, 
some measure of external debt again as a ratio to GDP and inflation. CP find 
that macro data indeed explain ratings by a significant amount and that 
surprisingly measures of fiscal and external balance do not seem to work as 
expected. CP also proceed to test the link between ratings and bond yields 
and find that there is indeed a relationship between the two and that, 
especially for lower rated entities, rating announcements do seem to have an 
effect on bond yields and markets.  
Again in 1996, N.U.Haque, M.S.Kumar, N. Mark and D.J.Mathieson 
(hereby referred to as “Haque et al ‘96”) published an equally prominent paper 
titled: “The Economic Content of Indicators of Developing Country Credit-
worthiness”(52). In their work they focused on panel data for over 60 emerging 
markets and review their creditworthiness by analyzing the ratings assigned to 
them by Institutional Investor, Euromoney and The Economist Intelligence 
Unit. They too find that economic data explain 80 to 97% of the variation of 
ratings. The variables they find of greater importance are non-gold FX 
reserves as a ratio to imports, like CP, GDP growth and inflation, and unlike 
CP current account balance to GDP. “Haque et al ‘96” also find that events in 
global financial markets affect EM ratings in a uniform manner, similarly to 
how we described global risk appetite affects EM currencies in the earlier 
chapters of the thesis. “Haque et al ‘96” were also interested in suggesting 
ways that could, in theory, speed up the process of a country being rated 
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again or being upgraded following an economic stabilization program. In 1998 
N.U.Haque, N. Mark and D.J.Mathieson (hereby referred to as “Haque et al 
‘98”) published a paper on “The relative importance of political and economic 
variables in creditworthiness ratings”(53) complementing their 1996 findings by 
attempting to also capture and incorporate the political variables that 
determine a country’s rating. They tried to incorporate amongst other 
incidents events such as coups, assassinations, strikes or major government 
crises and concluded that although the inclusion of such factors may improve 
the results, the exclusion does not bias their estimates for economic variables. 
They conclude that indeed ratings of EM sovereigns’ creditworthiness are by 
and large determined by economic factors.  
G.Larrain, H.Reisen and J.von Maltzan published in 1997 a paper 
(hereafter referred to as LRM) on “Emerging Market Risk and Sovereign 
Credit Ratings”(78) where again they look at a mix of 26 OECD and non-OECD 
countries throughout a number of years and also incorporate the change in 
rating outlooks when accounting for rating actions. They run Granger 
Causality tests between ratings and bond spreads and find that indeed rating 
actions affect financial markets. LRM also stress that interestingly negative 
rating actions have a significantly greater impact compared to positive ratings 
actions. In their paper LRM acknowledge that Rating Agencies were amongst 
the many that failed to predict the Mexican crisis of 1994-1995 but conclude 
that rating agencies could play a significant role in the future.  
The advent of the Asian, Russian and Brazilian Crises in late 1990’s 
brought renewed criticism on the workings of Ratings Agencies and the 
possible bias they may have when rating sovereigns as these provide the bulk 
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of the rating agencies’ fees income. Analysts re-estimated the CP models and 
found that the relationships failed to reflect what was considered a structural 
break in 1998. Others focused on re-calibrating the default and transition 
probability models, in an attempt to re-define the core of the Ratings Agencies 
mandate. In 1999 G.Ferri, L.-G. Liu and J.E.Stiglitz (hereafter referred as 
FLR) published a paper on “The pro-cyclical role of Rating Agencies: 
Evidence from the East Asian Crisis”(45) where they directly blamed the major 
rating agencies of multiple failure. They basically accused the rating agencies 
of both failing to predict but also exacerbating the Asian crisis. In 2001 C.M 
Reinhart (hereafter referred to as Reinhart) published her work on “Sovereign 
Credit Ratings Before and After Financial Crises”(111) and took the criticism 
one step further linking the debt crises to currency and banking crises as 
these all share very strong links in the EM universe. Reinhart made the point 
that ratings should be forward looking and downgrades should precede EM 
financial crises of the sort we described in more detail in the first chapter of 
the thesis. Reinhart concluded that practical evidence does not support the 
leading role of ratings and wondered whether one should question rating 
agencies for their overall ability to meet their mandate of assessing a 
sovereign’s ability to service its debt.  Reinhart makes the point that Rating 
Agencies’ failure to capture forthcoming crises is largely due to the fact that 
they focus on the wrong set of fundamentals. The criticism in particular is that 
Agencies focus too much on debt to export ratios and play little notice on 
important factors such as liquidity, currency mis-valuations and asset prices. 
H. Reisen (hereafter referred as Reisen) raised similar concerns in the 2001 
paper titled “Ratings Since the Asian Crisis”(112) where the point is made that 
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Rating Agencies failed to learn from their mistakes both in the Mexican and 
Asian crises and remained lagging rather than leading indicators for the 
markets. Reisen went as far as predicting that the role of Rating Agencies 
would and should diminish as a result of their inability to adjust and improve.  
In 2001 N.Mora ((hereafter referred as Mora) published a paper that 
seemed to come to the defence of Rating Agencies. In the paper titled: 
“Sovereign Credit Ratings: Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt?”(91), Mora 
clarifies the definition of the Rating Agencies Mandate and what one can 
expect of ratings and ratings actions as leading variables of crises. Mora 
outlines a number of objections to the FLR paper against Rating Agencies 
and suggests that once a number of corrections are made to their 
specification, their results fail to condemn the Agencies. Mora makes the point 
that the relationship between ratings and spreads becomes more clear when 
one introduces lagged spreads as dependent variables, but this also reflects 
the reality that spread markets and ratings are inter-linked and capture similar 
dynamics. Mora argues that Ratings can indeed be forward looking and good 
predictors of forward crashes and in particular currency crashes. The Logit 
panel analysis Mora introduces includes both rating levels and actions or 
change in outlooks as explanatory variables of future currency crashes. Mora 
finds that different specifications yield different results but in general rating 
actions are an important factor in explaining currency crashes. Surprisingly 
Mora finds that rating levels per se come up with the wrong sign in most 
specifications. All in all Mora concludes that despite the failures of Rating 
Agencies, markets still use them as second best but necessary resource and 
they cannot be proven to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt.  
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In the relevant research in the years post 2001 the link between rating 
actions and markets, whether that is reflected in stock prices or bond spreads, 
was the focus of a number of studies many of which yielded contradicting 
results. Others continued trying to address the more general issue of debt 
crises, their causes and the ability of ratings to forecast such crises. Our 
analysis here does not exactly fall in any of the lines of thinking outlined 
above though there are more similarities with some and differences with 
others. We proceed to outline the main points where we have common and 
different approaches with previous work. Like in the case of our Emerging 
Markets Currency Model, we carried out our work on developing our 
Emerging Markets Ratings Model while working in the strategy departments of 
Credit Suisse. We thus leveraged from the wealth of market expertise and 
data available within a major financial institution and also worked to improve 
an existing version of a ratings model. Amlan Roy had re-estimated in 
September 2000 the previous version of CS’s EM Ratings Model (hereafter 
referred to as Roy 2000) (114). Roy closely followed the work of CP in that he 
transformed the ratings in index form but chose to extend the index beyond 
the 16 ranks used by CP and assign the index rank of 20 to the four rating 
categories below the single B level. Roy focused only on emerging markets 
hard currency sovereign debt ratings and used only a handful of macro 
variables against which he regressed the rating levels. Roy performed annual 
cross-section regressions and found the ability of the macro data to explain 
ratings to be significant but varying throughout the years. The four variables 
Roy used were: the GNP per capita at PPP, Import cover defined as the ratio 
of FX Reserves to Imports, Total external Debt to Exports and Average 
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Inflation of 3 to 5 years.  
In our attempt to model Sovereign Ratings we too focus on Emerging 
Markets and the ratings of their long term hard currency sovereign debt. We 
have already found that downgrades are a powerful variable in explaining 
forthcoming currency risks and we also have seen that default statistics are 
an important market consideration when assessing near term currency 
dynamics. In this part of the thesis we outline our work in building a model that 
uses a small selection of highly significant macro variables that would 
substantially and consistently explain the ratings and rating actions of the two 
major rating agencies Moody’s and S&P. We cover a universe of 30 countries 
globally and run both single and multi year regressions of ratings on a number 
of macroeconomic variables. Our work differs from what has been carried out 
before in a number of ways which we outline hereafter.  
Firstly we want to develop a medium frequency tool that we trust to 
update regularly and produce reliable indicators of forthcoming ratings and 
rating actions. Though the very definition and likelihood of default is of central 
consideration in credit markets we do not focus our analysis only on such 
incidents but rather aim to capture the whole palette of rating dynamics. Even 
though the dependent variables of the specifications we create are the rating 
levels per se, we test our models’ performance not only in terms of fitting and 
describing such ratings but also in terms of their ability to forecast both ratings 
and rating actions. This element of forecasting success alone distinguishes 
our work from what was done previously. In our work we acknowledge that 
post 1998 Rating Agencies themselves have adapted to the request of 
markets for faster and better reaction by the agencies and the need for them 
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to be more leading rather than lagging indicators of credit dynamics. Thus we 
use data starting from 1998 onwards. We run both single year cross-section 
and multi-year panel models to test the stability of our findings and conclude 
that we can safely use single–year analysis.  
A key consideration in our analysis is that we apply a very significant 
weight on rating outlooks and consider them as equivalent to ratings. This is a 
main point that differentiates us from the work done by analysts before us. 
Our empirical results provide strong support for the inclusion of “rating 
outlooks” in the model. S&P and Moody’s use changes in the “rating outlook” 
as the initial signal of a change of their credit-assessment in response to new 
macroeconomic or political developments. Changes in actual ratings happen 
less frequently and sometimes with a substantial time-lag from the time at 
which a change in the macro-environment occurs. It is therefore unsurprising 
that the explanatory power of our ratings model rises substantially when we 
use it for forecasting a combination of “ratings and outlooks” rather than when 
we use it for forecasting  “ratings” on their own.  
A number of more recent papers by the Agencies themselves but also 
from independent analysts support our findings with regards to the information 
content of rating outlooks. In a working paper by the IMF in late 2010 the role 
of Ratings Agencies is re-assessed in light of the great recession that started 
with the US crisis, had a domino effect throughout the world and also 
triggered the sovereign debt crisis of the EU in late 2010’s. In this  paper 
titled: “The uses and abuses of Sovereign Credit Ratings”(59) the IMF 
(hereafter referred to as “IMF”) reaffirms that Rating Agencies indeed affect 
markets through their actions, that downgrades especially through the 
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Investment Grade threshold cause market reactions and that Agencies indeed 
convey new information in particular via their use of outlooks, reviews and 
watches. 
A factor in which we differ from all other papers before or after our 
modelling exercise is that in modelling ratings and rating outlooks we use the 
rating agencies’ own forecasts of macro-data both when building and when 
applying the models. For example, for the purpose of estimating the model 
parameters for 2001 we used Moody’s own estimates for the 2001 macro 
variables. We aimed to maximize the likelihood that the data used in our 
estimations were the data used by the agencies when making their ratings 
decisions. The admittedly arbitrary choice of data provided by Moody’s rather 
than S&P purely reflects the fact that Moody’s data were readily available. 
Another parameter that distinguishes our work from that of the academic 
research on debt crises and default dynamics is that we wish to produce a 
product that will be usable and practical. The Ratings Model we select is the 
one that performs best when tested for its forecasting power. When 
forecasting the 2002 ratings for example, we applied forecasts for the 2002 
macro-data to the estimated parameters from the 2002 model. These 
forecasts were produced by highly market sensitive economists of a major 
investment bank, CS. We present the model selection process in more detail 
in the following section. We then proceed by applying the selected 
specification to real time data for a number of years and suggest ways in 
which an investor could incorporate this type of quantitative product to their 
universe of decision making tools.  
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5.4 Model Selection Process 
5.4.1 Selection and Transformation of Dependent Variable 
Since the seminal paper of Cantor and Packer published in 1996, it has 
become commonplace to model sovereign ratings by transforming them into 
an index. Moody’s and S&P’s ratings range from triple-A (the rating that 
signals the lowest default risk) to “default” or in the case of many sovereigns 
“selective default” (the rating that describes that a credit event has taken 
place). In this thesis we use the terms default and selective default as 
equivalent and refer to both with the term SD. The method suggested by 
Cantor and Packer if applied to replicate the whole range of possible ratings 
assigned, involves transforming ratings into numerical scores ranging from 1 
to 20 with higher index scores corresponding to higher default risk and 
therefore lower ratings. For the purpose of the estimation of the model 
described here, we chose to use a finer scale that takes into account both the 
ratings and the rating outlooks and treats the difference between any two 
points in the index as equivalent. We thus end up with an index that ranges 
from 1 to 58. For each of the 20 possible ratings-levels, except “SD”, there are 
three possible outlook-levels, “positive”, “stable”, and “negative”. Table 31 
below shows the full spectrum of possible ratings, their respective outlooks 
and their mapping to index format. In our specification selection process 
outlined below in section 5.4.4 we explain how we tested both the models of 
ratings alone and those that explained ratings and rating outlooks. Our results 
strongly supported the inclusion of rating outlooks in the analysis.  
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Table 36 Ratings and Rating outlooks transformed into Index form 
Moody's Rating 
& Outllok
Index 
Score 
Assigned
S&P Rating & 
Outllok
Moody's Rating 
& Outllok
Index 
Score 
Assigned
S&P Rating & 
Outllok
Aaa positive 1 AAA positive Ba1 positive 31 BB+ positive
Aaa stable 2 AAA stable Ba1 stable 32 BB+ stable
Aaa negative 3 AAA negative Ba1 negative 33 BB+ negative
Aa1 positive 4 AA+ positive Ba2 positive 34 BB positive
Aa1 stable 5 AA+ stable Ba2 stable 35 BB stable
Aa1 negative 6 AA+ negative Ba2 negative 36 BB negative
Aa2 positive 7 AA positive Ba3 positive 37 BB- positive
Aa2 stable 8 AA stable Ba3 stable 38 BB- stable
Aa2 negative 9 AA negative Ba3 negative 39 BB- negative
Aa3 positive 10 AA- positive B1 positive 40 B+ positive
Aa3 stable 11 AA- stable B1 stable 41 B+ stable
Aa3 negative 12 AA- negative B1 negative 42 B+ negative
A1 positive 13 A+ positive B2 positive 43 B positive
A1 stable 14 A+ stable B2 stable 44 B stable
A1 negative 15 A+ negative B2 negative 45 B negative
A2 positive 16 A positive B3 positive 46 B- positive
A2 stable 17 A stable B3 stable 47 B- stable
A2 negative 18 A negative B3 negative 48 B- negative
A3 positive 19 A- positive Caa1 positive 49 CCC+ positive
A3 stable 20 A- stable Caa1 stable 50 CCC+ stable
A3 negative 21 A- negative Caa1 negative 51 CCC+ negative
Baa1 positive 22 BBB+ positive Caa2 positive 52 CCC positive
Baa1 stable 23 BBB+ stable Caa2 stable 53 CCC stable
Baa1 negative 24 BBB+ negative Caa2 negative 54 CCC negative
Baa2 positive 25 BBB positive Caa3 positive 55 CCC- positive
Baa2 stable 26 BBB stable Caa3 stable 56 CCC- stable
Baa2 negative 27 BBB negative Caa3 negative 57 CCC- negative
Baa3 positive 28 BBB- positive SD 58 SD
Baa3 stable 29 BBB- stable
Baa3 negative 30 BBB- negative
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The second important point with regards to our dependent variable is 
that despite the higher number of values with the inclusion of outlooks, we still 
model a bounded variable. Assigned ratings can only take any one from a 
total of 58 values from AAA with a positive outlook to SD.  The explanatory 
variables we consider however are macro fundamentals like GDP per capita 
or inflation that are not bounded. This creates the inconsistency of mapping 
unbounded data series that can in theory at least, take any value, onto a 
limited range with only integral values.  In an attempt to address this concern 
we effect a Logarithmic transformation to the ratings Index we have 
constructed as described in Equation 13 below, where: 
tI  = the value of the Index of ratings and rating outlooks we described 
in Table 31 above at time t  
tL  = the logarithmic version of the Index of ratings and rating outlooks 
at time t  
Equation 13  Logarithmic transformation of Ratings and Outlooks Index 
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Once we regress this logarithmic transformation of the index on the 
selected macro variables we produce fitted and forecasted values. These we 
transform back in the more usable and intuitive measure of Index format as 
described in Equation 14 below. 
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Equation 14  Transformation of regression results to Index format 
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Again in our specification filtering process we tested both, regressions 
where the index was used in its original format, which is also the way many 
others before us have used it, and regressions of the logarithmic version of 
the index. Our results strongly supported the use of the latter.  
5.4.2 Explanatory Variables: Selection process and sources 
After testing the explanatory power of a large number of variables, we 
selected the four that consistently provided for the best model performance. 
The selected variables are: real GDP per capita expressed in US dollars at a 
purchasing power parity exchange rate; year-end CPI inflation and two 
measures of the country’s net indebtedness. The two debt-measures are both 
expressed as ratios of the level of indebtedness to a scale variable. The 
absolute level of indebtedness is computed as the difference between the 
whole country’s foreign currency debt and the central bank’s foreign exchange 
reserves. The two debt ratios differ only with respect to the scale variables. 
The first is the ratio of indebtedness to GDP, and the other is the ratio of 
indebtedness to exports of goods and services. Given the empirical results 
that other analysts have published, it is not surprising that these four variables 
(GDP per capita, inflation, and the two debt measures) performed best in our 
empirical tests, in terms of their ability to describe the rating-actions of S&P 
and Moody’s. Our selection of variables is largely consistent with the findings 
in relevant academic literature. Let us review each of these variables 
separately and in more detail.  
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GDP per capita and inflation appear in our regression-analysis as 
important explanatory variables of rating actions. Arguably a country with high 
GDP can repay a given nominal amount of debt more easily than a country 
with low GDP. This argument fully justifies scaling the measure of a country’s 
indebtedness by GDP. Such scaled debt measure is already included as a 
separate explanatory variable in our model. It is not necessarily clear why this 
argument also justifies the separate inclusion of GDP per capita as an 
explanatory variable in the model. According to our empirical results though, 
ratings agencies do assign a significant weight on GDP per capita especially 
when this is measured on a Purchasing Power Parity basis. One possible 
argument to the defence of this finding is that a particular country’s GDP per 
capita, especially when it is measured at a purchasing power exchange rate, 
can be seen as a very broad measure of the cumulative success of the 
country’s policies and systemic characteristics over many years. Another 
more practical reason why GDP per capita matters in the eyes of rating 
agencies is very simply because it quantifies the extent to which a 
government can tap into wealth resources and raise the funds necessary to 
service its debt. This can be done via additional taxation or other 
administrative or macro prudential measures. The effectiveness of such 
measures arguably has to be tested on a case by case basis as additional 
taxation does not always translate into higher fiscal revenues. Here like in the 
case of the sovereign default risk parameters the willingness of the individuals 
is of prime consideration, whilst the GDP per capita merely captures their 
ability to pay more.  
Inflation also shows up in our empirical testing as a significant influence 
 252 
on the sovereign ratings. Again this finding is consistent with the findings of 
many others before us. There is no direct theoretical link between the level of 
inflation in a country and the country’s debt repayment capacity, except in 
cases where inflation becomes sufficiently high to be synonymous with chaos. 
Arguably though, many governments have tried to inflate their way out of their 
debt burden. Our empirical results indeed point to an inverse relationship 
between inflation and the ratings-agencies’ perception of creditworthiness 
which we find intuitive. A country using higher inflation to evaporate the value 
of its foreign exchange debt cannot be praised by the agencies. Therefore it is 
understandable that agencies will react or will be expected to react with lower 
ratings in cases of higher inflation. Inflation also tends to be correlated with 
other variables that are important for a country’s sovereign default risk. Thus, 
the level of inflation may in many cases be seen by the ratings agencies as an 
indicator that is inversely related to fiscal responsibility displayed over the 
years.  
What we found interesting is that measures of the whole country’s 
indebtedness perform better statistically, as drivers of the agencies 
assessment of sovereign credit risk than do measures of sovereign 
indebtedness alone. Our estimation results indicate that both measures have 
significant explanatory power but that the models work best if only the whole 
country’s indebtedness is taken into account. A possible reason for this is that 
the ratings agencies may see a high risk that non-sovereign debt within a 
particular country ends up creating a serious problem for the sovereign in 
times of crisis. Government may easily face calls for government-sponsored 
bailouts of banks or systemically important corporates. This is particularly 
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relevant in Emerging Markets where state support is explicit or implicit in 
many cases. But as the global recession of the end of 2010s showed, 
government of developed markets are just as likely and might be even more 
direct in transferring risk from strained private agents to the government 
balance sheet, which in turn translates into higher sovereign credit risks.                                      
5.4.3 Model Assessment Considerations  
One important element when discussing the explanatory variables 
considered and selected, is our choice to use the Rating Agencies themselves 
as data sources. When running a regression on any period we used as model 
input the estimations that Moody’s produced for that period. When we initially 
selected our specification we used data from 1998 to 2001. The older the data 
the more the Moody’s estimation would have adapted to actual official data. 
But the more recent data for 2001 for example were indeed estimates. We 
also tried out both single year and panel estimations in an attempt to test the 
robustness of our model. In the case of panel data we started with a single 
year model for 1998 and expanded the time horizon by adding one more year 
of data each time and tested the consistency of our model. Our findings were 
largely unaffected by the choice of year or method.  We thus concluded that 
we prefer to use single year specifications which will allow us to best capture 
the information content from the agencies’ macro estimates for any given 
year. Even if these forecasts were not the best forecasts of released data, it 
would not matter as our aim is to model ratings in the first place. If these 
ratings are based on data that will be heavily revised, the ratings will also be 
revised.  
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We used annual data published by Moody’s in their “Statistical 
Handbook for Country Credit”. This is published quarterly by Moody’s directly 
and includes data on a number of years for a long list of macro variables that 
Moody’s claims to pay attention to in the rating process. The choice of 
Moody’s over S&P reflects simply the availability of such comprehensive data 
from Moody’s at the time of our work. Interestingly our findings suggest that 
these data work equally well in explaining both the decisions of Moody’s and 
S&P, thus introducing no bias in the analysis. By selecting to use single year 
specifications, we effectively commit to re-estimate the models on an annual 
basis. This we feel adds to the ability of the specifications to capture any 
possible change in the agencies methodology. 
When selecting our preferred specifications we fitted each estimated 
model on the data of the period it was estimated on and on the data of the 
next calendar year. In the first case we compared the model suggested 
results with actual results and quantified the models’ success ratio. In the 
latter case we assessed the models’ forecasting ability. In this last exercise 
we used forecasts produced by the emerging market economists of Credit 
Suisse. At the beginning of a calendar year, say 2003, we would model the 
previous year, in this example 2002, with Moody’s 2002 macro estimates. We 
would then fit the 2002 Moody’s data in the resulting estimation and calculate 
the 2002 theoretical ratings and outlooks. We would then apply the 2003 CS 
macro forecasts on the 2002 estimated values to estimate where we think 
ratings could be at the end of the year. We finally compare the 2003 
forecasted values to the actual ratings and outlooks applying at the time of the 
update. This comparison allowed us to see how much room for upgrades or 
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downgrades was suggested by the models for every sovereign. 
Our models capture levels of ratings and outlooks. However one is also 
interested in the dynamic aspect of rating agency decisions as depicted by 
rating actions. Due to the nature of the model workings the most appropriate 
way of quantifying its success in capturing rating actions is the following: In 
our example above we compare model generated rating forecasts for 2003 to 
the 2002 values that resulted from again fitting the models with CS estimates 
for 2002. This allows us to remain consistent in terms of macro data we 
compare from the one year to the next. The difference of the CS 2002 fitted 
model estimates and the 2003 CS forecasted values suggested a direction 
and size of the rating actions expected to apply to the underlying sovereign. 
We would then compare these to the actual direction and size of actions 
taking place in a calendar year.  Throughout the real-life application of the 
models we re-estimated them annually at the beginning of the year and 
updated them with revised macro forecasts and realized actions quarterly. We 
review the success of our selected models in the sections that follow.  
5.4.4 Specification Selection process 
In this section we outline our criteria in selecting a model specification 
and the explanatory macro variables used as a basis for our ratings forecasts. 
A large number of different specifications were estimated and tested in terms 
of forecasting ability and statistical robustness. In particular we run 
regressions on single year cross-section data from 1998 to 2001 and 
subsequently we run panel regressions on data starting from 1998 and adding 
one extra year each time till we included 2001. We finally run a panel 
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regression that started from 1999, the year past what we described as 
structural break for the rating agencies methodology, and again included one 
additional year every time till we reached 2001. We run all these 
specifications on Moody’s data alone, on S&P data alone and on the average 
rating between the two agencies. We defined the dependent variable as 
ratings alone and then as the combination of ratings and rating outlooks. We 
also tested both the regressions where the dependent variable was in index 
form and in logarithmic transformation. As dependent variables we considered 
in all the above model versions some measure of the following: Real GDP per 
capita, CPI inflation, External Debt, Government Debt, FX reserves as a ratio 
to money supply and an indicator of a government’s overall financing 
requirements calculated as the current account deficit plus debt amortizations 
adjusted for Foreign Direct Investments and all this as a ratio to GDP.    
We opted to select the specification that displayed the highest 
forecasting power. To choose between different model specifications we 
applied statistical criteria for the model’s goodness of fit such as the R-square, 
the standard error, F-statistics and information criteria. We selected only 
variables for which the estimated coefficients displayed the signs (positive or 
negative) that would be expected on the basis of economic theory and 
intuition. We made the choice between different variables satisfying this 
criterion by comparing the statistical significance of their estimated 
coefficients. We expected our results to be consistent across time.  
We chose the model specification that best complied with these 
selection criteria. This was the single year specification that included both 
ratings and rating outlooks and in which the dependent variable was included 
 257 
in logarithmic format.  The explanatory variables we included in our selected 
model were: the log of real GDP per capita on a PPP basis, the end-of- year 
annual percentage rate of consumer price inflation, foreign currency debt 
minus non-gold foreign currency reserves expressed as a percentage ratio to 
GDP and separately as a ratio to exports. The selected model displays a high 
R-square indicating a good explanatory power. This is true whether the model 
is used to forecast ratings from Moody’s, ratings from S&P or the average 
rating between the two agencies. The high R-square is consistent across all 
years, signalling that the structure of the model is relatively stable and thus 
could be trusted for forecasting purposes. All four explanatory variables 
display the expected sign in all specifications. As we finally opted for the 
single year specification we find it of little use to show the actual estimated 
models because we would have to show the results for every year and each 
agency as the estimated coefficients change every year. Instead we prefer to 
tabulate below in a more concise manner the results from the resulting 
specifications for the four years from 1998 to 2001 which we used to forecast 
the years from 1999 to 2002 and on the basis of which we selected the single 
year version. We then proceed to show the results of the model estimated in 
real time that cover 2002 and 2003 and are used to forecast 2003 and 2004 
respectively.  
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Table 37 Selected specification statistical performance  
1998 model     
(Used to           
forecast 1999)
1999 model      
(Used to 
forecast 2000)
2000 model      
(Used to 
forecast 2001)
2001 model      
(Used to 
forecast 2002)
R-squared
Moody’s 70.8 85.2 79.6 73.9
S&P 72.6 78.1 72.7 77.9
Average 73.2 85.6 76.3 76.9
Correct signs*
Moody’s 4 (3,0) 4 (4,0) 4 (4,0) 4 (2,1)
S&P 4 (3,1) 4 (3,1) 4 (3,0) 4 (3,0)
Average 4 (3,1) 4 (4,0) 4 (3,0) 4 (3,0)
Source: Credit Suis se Firs t Boston
*The num bers  in parentheses  s how how m any of the correctly s igned coefficients  were 
s ignificant at up to 10% level and between 10% and 20% levels
 
For the purpose of assessing the model’s forecasting ability we focused 
on both levels and direction of ratings and rating outlooks. Let us first review 
the model performance in forecasting what it sets out to model in the first 
place, rating and rating outlook levels. As explained in more detail in the 
previous section when estimating the model for a certain year, say 2000, we 
used Moody’s forecasts as input for that year’s (2000) macro-data. We 
estimated the values of the model-coefficients on an annual basis – i.e. we 
estimated a separate set of coefficients for each year, based on cross-country 
data for only that year. We then fitted CS forecasts for the following year’s 
macro data, say 2001, to the 2000 model-coefficients. This produced the 
model “forecasts” for ratings and rating outlooks for the year 2001. For the 
purpose of testing the forecasting ability of the model, we compare our 2001 
model-generated forecasts with the actual ratings at the end of the same year 
(2001). As Table 38 below suggests, on average, 60% of the model’s 
forecasts for the period 1999-2001 were within one notch of the actual rating, 
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whereas, on average, 18% of the model-forecasts were exactly right. The 
“forecast-errors” regarding the level of the ratings might in some cases reflect 
sluggishness on the part of the ratings agencies, or the inadequacies and 
simplicity of the model, such as the fact that that model fails to capture 
political developments. 
Table 38 Selected specifications’ power to forecast ratings and outlook 
levels 
Forecasted 
rating was:
Moody’s S&P Average 
Rating
Moody’s S&P Average 
Rating
Moody’s S&P Average 
Rating
Moody’s S&P Average 
Rating
Same                    
as actual 
rating
17% 17% 13% 13% 17% 33% 10% 20% 20% 23% 10% 10%
Higher                 
by one rating
20% 20% 23% 17% 17% 17% 20% 17% 20% 20% 37% 27%
Higher                     
by more                                                      
than one 
rating
13% 23% 30% 20% 23% 30% 23% 23% 33% 17% 17% 37%
Higher                   
by more                
than two 
ratings
10% 13% 23% 10% 13% 17% 10% 17% 20% 13% 10% 13%
Lower                          
by one rating
33% 23% 30% 37% 17% 7% 20% 20% 20% 13% 13% 13%
Lower                    
by more                      
than one 
rating
17% 17% 3% 13% 27% 13% 27% 20% 7% 27% 23% 13%
Lower                       
by more                    
than two 
ratings
0% 0% 0% 7% 10% 0% 7% 7% 0% 17% 10% 7%
1999 2000 2001 2002
Source: Credit Suisse First 
Boston  
When testing the directional forecasting ability of the model we 
compared, for each country, “actual ratings changes” to “changes that the 
model would suggest”. For example, the model-based forecasts for the 
direction of change for year 2000 was computed by comparing the model-
generated rating-scores when fitting macro-data for 1999 and 2000 in the 
model that was estimated on 1999 data. The difference between these scores 
could be directly compared to the actual ratings changes occurring between 
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the end of 1999 and the end of 2000. The tables below suggest that our 
model does well in forecasting the direction of change of the ratings. The 
errors that the model generates are in many cases explained by easily 
identifiable factors that fit into the universe of non-quantifiable variables that 
we have deliberately kept out of our modelling exercise. We provide examples 
of this type of the model limitation later in this section. In other cases, our 
model produces erroneous model-forecasts because the model responds “too 
fast” to macro-changes compared to the relatively sluggish responses of the 
ratings agencies.  For the historical period covered by our tests, there are 
many cases in which the model suggests a directional move in a particular 
year, but the move only occurs in the following year. 
The model’s ability to forecast rating changes is measured below by the 
share of actual rating actions (changes in either the ratings-level or the ratings 
outlook) that moved in the direction that was suggested by the model. The 
model has impressive performance in capturing the dynamics of sovereign 
ratings. Arguably the model consistently performs best in forecasting Moody’s 
actions compared to the S&P. This bias however diminished in certain years. 
Importantly the success ratio in forecasting the S&P actions remains 
significantly high and above 60% in all cases. In the case of forecasting 
Moody’s actions the model successfully predicts, direction wise, on average 
85% of actions. These success ratios become even more relevant in light of 
the fact that both rating agencies have been very active in the years of our 
analysis acting anything from 12 to 26 times in any single year.  
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Table 39 Selected specification’s power to forecast ratings actions:                 
Share of actual rating actions moving in the direction suggested by the model 
number % number % number % number %
Moodys 13 out of 15 87% 12 out of 14 86% 10 out of 12 83% 18 out of 21 86%
S&P 9out of 15 60% 15 out of 19 79% 11 out of 16 69% 15 out of 17 88%
Average 
Rating 14 out of 20 70% 16 out of 21 76% 14 out of 18 78% 19 out of 26 78%
Source: Credit Suisse First Boston
The “forecasted direction of change for a particular year” was calculated as the difference between the model-estimate for the “ratings and rating 
outlooks” for the end of that year and the equivalent model-estimate for the end of the previous year.
2002200120001999
 
5.5 Model real time application: 2003-2004 
Having concluded our theoretical and analytical work, we carefully tested 
and selected the model specification that we felt best captured the dynamics 
involved in the decision process of two major ratings agencies when it came 
to scoring emerging market sovereigns. We tested the model on four 
consecutive calendar years of input data from 1998 to 2001 and accordingly 
four consecutive years of forecasts from 1999 to 2002. Like in the case of our 
currency model we then proceeded to put our ratings model to the hardest 
test by applying it on real time data to fit and forecast two calendar years 2003 
and 2004. At the beginning of each year we re-estimated the model based on 
the Moody’s data for the previous year. This meant that we really did use 
agency’s estimates and not their replication of officially announced data. This 
is because most macro variables are only available with a significant lag and 
even then continue to be revised for some time after. Therefore using year-
end Moody’s data for any given year, does really suggest we are using 
Moody’s forecasts. Over the 2years during which we run our Ratings Model in 
this manner, the performance remained very impressive. The results repeat 
the success ratios of the previous testing period and if anything the bias in 
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favour of Moody’s seems to almost disappear.  
Table 40 Selected specification statistical performance in 2003-2004  
 
2 00 3  m o d e l                     
(U s ed  to  fo rec as t 20 04 )
20 04  m o d e l              
(U s ed  to  fo rec as t 2 005 )
M o o d y 's 81 .7 8 3 .3%
S & P 81 .0 7 4 .2%
Av erag e  82 .2 8 2 .8%
M o o d y 's 4  (4 ,0 ) 4  (3 ,1 )
S & P 4  (3 ,1 ) 4  (2 ,1 )
Av erag e 4  (4 ,0 ) 4  (4 ,0 )
C o rrec t s ig n s  an d  s ig n ific an c e  lev e ls *
S ourc e:  Credit  S uis s e  F irs t  B os ton
*  Th e  n u m b e rs  in  p a re n th e s e s  s h o w  h o w  m a n y o f th e  co rre ctly s ig n e d  co e ffic ie n ts  w e re  
s ig n i fica n t  a t u p  to  1 0 %  le ve l ( fi rs t n u m b e r), a n d  b /w  1 0 %  a n d  2 0 %  (s e co n d  n u m b e r)
R -s q u a red
 
Table 41 Selected specification performance in forecasting 2003-2004 
ratings levels 
 
Forecast Rating was: Moody's S&P Average  Rating Moody's S&P
Average  
Rating
 Same as actual rating 33% 47% 43% 21% 32% 29%
 Higher by one rating  10% 7% 7% 7% 0% 7%
 Higher by more than one rating  13% 10% 13% 14% 25% 18%
 Higher by more than two ratings  10% 7% 7% 11% 14% 14%
 Lower by one rating  7% 10% 13% 21% 7% 11%
 Lower by more than one rating  37% 27% 23% 36% 36% 36%
 Lower by more than two ratings  13% 10% 10% 18% 18% 18%
Source: Credit Suisse First Boston                                                                                                                                     
20042003
 
 
Table 42 Selected specification performance in forecasting 2003-2004 
rating actions 
 
2003 2004
Moody's 11/14     (79%) 11/13     (85%)
S&P 15/16     (94%) 13/14     (93%)
Share of actual rating actions moving in the direction suggested 
by the model
Source: Credit Suisse First Boston                                                                                                                                     
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At the beginning of each calendar year we would produce two different 
tabulations of the model forecasts for that coming year. Let’s take 2003 for 
example. In January we would put together the data depicted Figure 43 and 
Table 43 below. Figure 43 below shows for each country whether our model 
suggests that the sovereign is “overrated” or “underrated”. “Underrating” of a 
particular sovereign implies scope for upgrades. The sovereigns that appear 
on the left in the table are, according to the model, “underrated”. This implies 
that there is a positive gap between (1) the model’s forecasts for Moody’s and 
S&P’s end 2003 sovereign ratings and (2) the actual ratings assigned by 
these agencies as of January 7th 2003.  As a reminder the model  forecasts 
are the result from plugging the CSFB economists’ 2003 macro forecasts as 
of January 2003 in the specification estimated with 2002  Moody’s macro 
estimates. 
Figure 43 Differences between Model-forecast for the appropriate level of 
ratings and/or rating outlooks in 2003 versus actual ratings and outlooks as of 
January 2003 
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Even in cases where the model may misjudge the appropriateness of a 
particular “ratings level” (because it is missing political and other non-
quantifiable variables) it can be a useful tool for gauging the extent to which 
changes in the macro-fundamentals speak in favour of upgrades or 
downgrades.  In Table 43, we show what the model tells us about this. This 
chart shows the direction of change (over time) in the model-estimate for each 
country’s sovereign rating and rating outlook.  
Table 43 Model-forecast for the direction of change in ratings and/or rating 
outlooks during 2003: Update as of January 2003  
 
 COUNTRY Argentina Brazil Bulgaria Chile China
Moody's
S&P
COUNTRY Colombia Croatia Czech Ecuador Egypt
Moody's
S&P
COUNTRY Hungary India Indonesia Israel Malaysia
Moody's
S&P
COUNTRY Mexico Peru Philippines Poland Romania
Moody's
S&P
COUNTRY Russia Singapore Slovakia South Africa South Korea
Moody's
S&P
COUNTRY Taiwan Thailand Turkey Ukraine Venezuela
Moody's
S&P
Sideways = Model results suggest a macro-change within 2003 that is small enough to be considered  
insignificant (representing less than a change in rating- outlook)
Source: Credit Suisse First Boston
Interpretation of the individual arrow’s orientation and color:
UP (DOWN) = Model results suggest a favorable (unfavorable) macro-change within 2003
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The chart’s measure of the “direction of change” is defined as the 
difference between (1) the models forecast for what the rating will be as of 
end-2003 (this forecast is based on CSFB’s latest forecasts for the macro-
data for 2003) and (2) the model estimates of what the ratings “should have 
been” at the end of 2002. The latter is the result of fitting the end of 2002 
estimates by CSFB economist for the 2002 values of the macro-variables in 
the estimated 2002 model specification. At the end of a calendar year we 
would review the performance of our recommendations in Table 43. We show 
the results for 2003 in Table 44  below.  
 Table 44 Model-performance in forecasting for the direction of change in 
ratings and/or rating outlooks during 2003  
COUNTRY Argentina Brazil Bulgaria Chile China*
Moody's
S&P
COUNTRY Colombia Croatia Czech Ecuador Egypt
Moody's
S&P
COUNTRY Hungary India Indonesia Israel Malaysia
Moody's
S&P
COUNTRY Mexico Peru Philippines* Poland* Romania
Moody's
S&P
COUNTRY Russia Singapore Slovakia South Africa South Korea
Moody's
S&P
COUNTRY Taiwan Thailand Turkey Ukraine Venezuela
Moody's
S&P  
Sideways = Model results suggest a macro-change within 2003 that is small enough to be considered  
insignificant (representing less than a change in rating- outlook)
Source: Credit Suisse First Boston
Interpretation of the individual arrow’s orientation and color:
UP (DOWN) = Model results suggest a favorable (unfavorable) macro-change within 2003
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The way to read the results that are presented in Table 44 is the 
following: the direction of the arrows reflects the direction of a country’s 
fundamentals when comparing the CS estimates for the previous (2002) and 
forecast (2003) year. The color of the arrow demonstrates whether there was 
a rating action in 2003 (grey arrows signal no action, white and black arrows 
signal a rating action) and whether the realized direction was consistent (white 
arrows) or opposite (black arrows) to what the evolution of macro 
fundamentals would suggest. The important point to make is that the rating 
actions that took place in 2003 and 2004 were widely spread to many of our 
sample countries and this applies to both rating agencies. In particular around 
20 countries had their rating changed by at least a rating outlook in 2003 and 
2004. This represents two thirds of our sample of countries. The vast majority 
of these ratings were upgrades with only three downgrades in each year.  
In the remaining of this section we discuss in more detail the way in 
which we typically presented the results of our model. At the beginning of the 
year we would review the success of the model throughout the previous 
calendar year, re-estimate it and present the model signals for the coming 
calendar year. We would also interpret the results as a combination of the 
signals in the two formats we discussed above and perform some sort of 
reality check overlaying market awareness on the model results. Through the 
remaining of the year we would update the results on a quarterly basis based 
on revised CSFB forecasts for the current year and the actual rating actions 
that had taken place till that point. Let us use the results we presented in 
Figure 43 and Table 43 above as examples of this process presenting the 
arguments that we made at the time of publication and avoiding the benefit of 
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hindsight that one would have if looking at the results at a later time.  Figure 
43 above indicated that at the beginning of 2003 Ukraine, Bulgaria and 
Ecuador were particularly underrated and that Hungary, Turkey and Poland 
were particularly overrated. However, it is important to treat the model results 
with care as the model forms a judgment purely on the basis of a small 
sample of macro-variables. For Poland and Hungary, the model pointed to 
“overrating”, because it failed to capture the fact that these two countries had 
been offered membership of the EU with effect in 2004. However, this does 
not mean that the model result for these countries should simply be 
discarded. The model result does show that if Poland and Hungary had not 
been shielded by this “EU safeguard”, they would, in the absence of a change 
in their macro-performance, be treated substantially less generously by the 
ratings agencies than they currently are. For example if Hungary were located 
in Latin America, its rating would be much lower than it was at the time.  
Figure 43  also suggests that Turkey was substantially “overrated” in 
January 2003. This reflected to some extent the role that the rate of inflation 
plays in the model. Our estimations suggest that inflation has tended 
historically to significantly influence the rating action of the agencies, although 
some economists would question whether this is rational. At the time of 
publication of the January 2003 results, Turkey’s inflation was low by Turkish 
historical standards (and still falling), but it remained high in comparison to the 
inflation-rates that were recorded in other countries. Another important 
consideration is the fact that the model failed to capture Turkey’s strategic 
importance to the US, which created financial benefits for the country (such as 
large-scale IMF support) that helped boost the country’s ratings. Taking these 
 268 
factors into consideration, we were more optimistic than the model regarding 
Turkey’s rating level. Again according to the results in Figure 43 above 
Ukraine and Bulgaria were the most underrated countries. Ukraine’s political 
uncertainty (which our model failed to capture) was expected to block the way 
for further upgrades in the near future although the country macro-data 
suggested that upgrades would be warranted. Bulgaria was, however, a 
strong candidate for upgrades, not just because of the macro-performance 
that was captured by our model, but also, and arguably more importantly, 
because of the recent at the time decision by the EU to target Bulgarian 
membership of the union in 2007. In result we expected that Moody’s would 
proceed with upgrades that would align its rating for Bulgaria with that of S&P 
and Fitch.  
If our macro-forecasts for 2003 turned out to be correct, the strongest 
candidates for ratings upgrades would have been Ecuador and Romania, both 
of which were in January 2003 “under-rated”, according to Figure 43 and both 
of which were forecast to see a substantial macro-improvement in 2003 
according to Table 43. Amongst the list of countries that appear in Figure 43 
as being overrated, Turkey, Hungary, Israel and Colombia were, according to 
Table 43, the only ones whose macro-fundamentals (as measured by the 
macro-variables that feed into the model) were expected to improve in 2003. 
The high rating already assigned by the agencies to these sovereigns seemed 
to have more than fully discounted such improvement. Therefore should our 
positive expectations for these counties were to materialize, they would allow 
for a “catching-up” with the already high ratings rather than justify further 
upgrades. 
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Besides the obvious merits of having a model that consistently and 
successfully captures sovereign credit dynamics on the basis of sound macro-
considerations there are also other ways that our model could be utilized. One 
is to apply the estimated specification on unrated sovereigns and gain a 
sense of how that sovereign should be rated. This is something we actually 
explored with very interesting findings but given the sensitivities involved in 
such results especially without the overlay of the effects from factors not 
captured by the model we feel that there is little point in presenting these 
findings here . The reason why such analysis may be useful is that, albeit 
theoretical, it provides a basis on which one can compare this sovereign to 
others in a more systematic manner. It also provides a metric that can be 
applied to the corporate universe of that country given that the sovereign hard 
currency rating reflects a ceiling applicable to all entities rated in that country. 
Another way one could utilize the model we constructed would be to attempt 
to link it to some version of actionable trade recommendations like we did in 
the case of our currency model. This is however less obvious in the case of 
the ratings model.  The first reason is that in this case we would be indirectly 
modelling a marketable security and the second is the time frame which does 
not lend itself for such an exercise. For example the first step would be to link 
ratings or rating actions to some market price. Candidates could be the price, 
yield or spread of debt securities issued by the rated entity. Each entity issues 
a number of debt instruments with different characteristics in terms of 
maturity, liquidity, coupon, currency, even applicable law. It is far from clear 
which one would be the most relevant instrument to model and it would be 
even less clear how exactly one should apply the results to other related 
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instruments. The second limitation is the fact that we modelled ratings using 
low frequency annual macro data. In any case all these ideas lend themselves 
as interesting topics for further research.  
5.6 Conclusion 
The fifth and final Chapter of the thesis describes our work in building an 
Emerging Markets Ratings Model. We used rating agency data as input in our 
Emerging Markets Currency Model, presented in great detail in the first four 
Chapters of the thesis, and we felt that these input variables are both relevant 
to markets but also connected to fundamentals. In this chapter we thoroughly 
investigate these assumptions. Our work on building an Emerging Markets 
Ratings Model was also guided, much like in the case of our Currency Model, 
by the mandate to create a tool that would generate results that are 
theoretically sound but also practically applicable. We aim to model and 
forecast ratings and rating actions by the two leading ratings agencies, 
Moody’s and S&P, that apply to the long term hard currency debt of 30 
emerging market sovereigns globally. We tapped on the relevant literature 
and explore different alternatives for our dependent and explanatory 
variables. We test out models and base our selection on annual data from 
1998 to 2001 as we share the view that post 1998 rating agencies significantly 
changed the way they operate. This was done on the back of criticism that 
followed the delayed agencies’ reaction to the major financial crises that hit 
the emerging markets world in the mid 1990’s.   
We opt to select specifications that are estimated and applied on a 
single year basis. The dependent variable we model involves an index that 
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captures the spectrum of ratings and rating outlooks assigned by the 
agencies. This index if further transformed in a logarithmic fashion in order to 
be included in the model in a manner that renders it unbounded and allows a 
better link to macro fundamentals. The results are again transformed to index 
format and mapped to actual rating and outlook levels. We tap on the relevant 
literature and the analysis of the agencies themselves to decide on a group of 
relevant explanatory variables to consider. The variables we finally select are 
the real GDP per capita on a PPP basis, the CPI inflation rate and the 
country’s foreign currency debt adjusted for FX reserves and expressed as a 
ratio to GDP and exports. The importance of these variables is consistent with 
intuition and economic theory but we remain aware of the limitation of our 
model that only captures a small selection of hard macroeconomic data and 
omits the very important element of qualitative factors that clearly matter to 
rating agencies.  
Our models introduce a number of new elements that we feel boost their 
explanatory power despite the limitations we just mentioned. We make a point 
of including rating outlooks as well. Outlooks are tools that agencies have 
opted to use in recent years and have increasingly gained attention in terms 
of their information content. Our findings support the notion that outlooks help 
convey information that is very relevant to markets and at a higher frequency 
that ratings alone. We also opted to use macro data as estimated by Moody’s 
themselves. This allows us to model the way agencies link macroeconomic 
data to their decisions more directly. We also availed ourselves of estimates 
from market economists to gauge the forecasting ability of the models and its 
relevance to market expectations. We use annual data in our estimations and 
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forecasts, though the latter are updated and reviewed on a quarterly basis.  
Our models demonstrate consistently high fitting power, and R-squared 
measures that range from 70% to 85% in the four years of testing from 1998 
to 2001. Again in this period all selected variables carry the signs expected by 
intuition and economic theory. The higher the GDP per capita, the lower the 
inflation and the lower the debt ratios, the higher the sovereign ratings 
assigned. Almost all estimated coefficients are found to be statistically 
significant in the testing period. Our models forecast around 60% of actual 
ratings assigned within one rating notch. The results are not biased towards a 
single year or one of the two agencies. The models demonstrate significant 
power in predicting rating actions. In the four years of our testing period the 
models correctly forecast about 60% of the S&P actions and about 85% of the 
Moody’s action in terms of direction. We proceed to apply the models in 
forecasting 2003 and 2004. This is a real life exercise similar to the one we 
carried out for our EM Currency Model. Again we find that the model results 
are equivalent to the ones from our testing period and even improve the 
forecasting ability of both specifications. In summary we find that the 
parsimonious, quantitative tool we created bodes well in capturing the 
dynamics of emerging market sovereign ratings which we have found to be of 
great importance to market participants.  
We acknowledge the limitations of a model that purely reflects 
quantifiable data and proceed to explore the ways in which this would be 
understood and managed by real life investors. We present a host of 
examples that overlay reality checks on the model results and suggest ways 
in which one would best use such a product. The Ratings Model we produce 
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stops short of producing actionable trade recommendations. We find that this 
tool is best used as a lower frequency, theoretically sound product that allows 
for comparison amongst a large sample of emerging markets globally and 
directly quantifies their macro-economic fundamentals and prospects.  
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CONCLUSION 
With the research presented in this thesis, we opted to produce two 
theoretically sound, statistically robust quantitative products that aim to model 
and forecast emerging market currency and sovereign rating dynamics and 
provide important additions to the toolbox of a wide spectrum of end users. 
Critically we find that our models can add value to emerging market investors 
and their market assessment process. Both models are parsimonious 
specifications that apply to global emerging markets, rely solely on 
quantifiable explanatory variables, build on the long literature of currency and 
debt crises and expand previous work in a number of important ways. They 
differ with each other in terms of time frame and applicability. We are aware of 
the limitations that any quantitative tool faces. Limitations that are further 
magnified when the aim is to create a one-size-fits-all model to describe a part 
of the unquantifiable Emerging Markets Universe. We succeed however in 
producing two models that objectively capture two very important aspects of 
Emerging Markets in a way that can be defended by both economic theory 
and market awareness.  
Our Emerging Markets Currency Models comprise of two separate 
specifications, called PROBAPP and PROBDEP, which model and forecast 
the probability of each one of 20 different emerging currencies out or under-
performing the USD on a one month forward exchange rate basis. With the 
use of clearly defined trading rules, the model results are transformed into 
recommendations to buy or sell the corresponding forward exchange rate on 
a one month horizon. The dependent variables are dummy variables that 
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capture the binary event of having or not more than 5% returns on either 
direction in any given calendar month. The explanatory variables are high 
frequency, leading indicators that are available on a timely fashion, are not 
revised following initial release and do not require any significant modification. 
Their effect is not biased towards a country or time sub sample and this 
allows us to apply a panel specification and estimate common coefficients for 
all countries. This in turn ensures that results are comparable across 
countries and time. In effect we select a small set of common denominators 
that we include in our final specifications. The Real Effective Exchange Rates 
(REERs), expressed as deviations from a medium term HP trend are the one 
purely macroeconomic variable that drives the model results. This is also the 
one variable that merits near consensus approval from all previous research 
in areas similar to ours. REERs capture exchange rate valuations, trade links 
and inflation dynamics and provide some sort of fair value measure that one 
may reasonably expect currencies to revert to. All other macro economic data 
were excluded on the back of data availability, intuition or statistical findings 
which suggested they are more coincident rather than leading indicators. The 
one factor we included as a global risk appetite indicator is Moody’s 
speculative grade default rate. No other tested variable ticked the boxes of 
consistency and symmetric performance we would expect a global variable to 
tick.  The last variable we only included in our PROBDEP model and acted as 
an extra trigger for downside currency pressure. This was the S&P sovereign 
downgrades. Our findings supported the notion that our selected 
specifications were statistically solid and practically applicable. We tested the 
models fitting and forecasting ability on a large in-sample period, a shorter 
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out-of-sample period and in real life data that spanned one whole calendar 
year. We assessed the profit making performance of the model based on the 
trading signals that were generated when applying the models separately, 
when combining the two models in order to provide signals on each direction 
and on a portfolio basis where we merge both models and both directions to 
produce one final outcome. Results amply confirmed that the models could be 
blindly followed and trusted to produce profit making trade recommendations. 
The overlay of market awareness and intuition further enhanced the results 
but in no way cancelled the model power.  
The first four Chapters of the thesis outline in great detail the 
considerations behind building the EM Currency Model. The last Chapter 
presents our work in creating our EM Ratings Model. Both models are related 
as two out of the three variables that we include in the currency model are 
from the rating agencies universe. We model long term hard currency 
sovereign ratings and outlooks and we do so solely with the use of 
macroeconomic explanatory variables. In doing so we provide support for our 
notion that ratings act as a proxy for the macro balance prevailing in any given 
EM sovereign, which we believe explains why rating agency data performed 
well when included in the currency model. Indeed we found that a small 
selection of economic data explain the majority of rating actions. We selected 
a measure of GDP per capita in PPP terms, a measure of consumer inflation 
and two measures of a country’s FX debt burden adjusted for FX reserves 
and expressed as a ratio to exports or GDP. We applied both single and multi 
year analysis on data post 1998 which we find to be a turning point for the 
way agencies rated sovereigns. We made a strong case of including outlooks 
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as equivalent to actual ratings and found that this significantly improved our 
results. We also used input data from the agencies themselves and hence 
modeled their decisions based on their own assessments. The data used 
were annual and the results were reviewed quarterly. We finally opted to use 
a single year specification which performs very well in fitting and predicting 
both levels and direction of ratings for a universe of 30 emerging markets 
globally. 
It is important to stress that almost all the variables selected on the left 
and right hand side of our specifications, provide a wide spectrum of 
information in a compact manner. Some achieve this by expressing more than 
one series as a ratio of one to the other.  The ratios of Debt to GDP or Debt to 
FX Reserves are such examples. In other cases the macro variables we 
utilize, are calculated based on a number of other macroeconomic data. For 
example the REERs incorporate information on terms of trade, inflation 
differentials and nominal cross currency exchange rates between a country 
and its major trading partners. The GDP per Capita expressed on a PPP 
basis incorporates GDP, population dynamics and a measure of cross-country 
competitiveness. Other variables, like the sovereign ratings assigned by major 
rating agencies, are by construction intended to provide a proxy for a host of 
quantitative and qualitative factors. Derivatives of such proxies, like sovereign 
rating actions and evolution of corporate default rates convey equally 
diversified information. Finally, in our Currency Model we opt to explain 
market determined forward exchange rates, a variable that itself merges 
market intelligence and economic theory. The intention to create valid links 
between compact dependent and explanatory variables is one of the key 
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contributions of our work that differentiates ours from similar research.   
Emerging Markets as an asset class have been continuously evolving in 
recent decades. Countries have learned from past crises and have applied a 
host of reforms  on fronts like fiscal dynamics, credit and private sector debt 
controls, currency regime management, policy intervention, institutional 
structure, corruption and other social indices, reduction of poverty and 
illiteracy, entrepreneurship and business leadership, economic data 
consistency and  transparency, clarity of policy and market openness. These 
improvements have brought emerging economies in the forefront of investable 
markets and have attracted a rising stream of capital inflows. More importantly 
these inflows have been changing in nature reflecting more permanent and 
structural funds as opposed to the trigger happy hot flows witnessed in the 
past. The crisis of late 2000’s that started from the US subprime loans 
expanded with a lasting effect on all Developed Markets (DM). In late 2011 
DM were still trying to recover the lost ground and find ways to support the 
faltering growth that could trigger a double dip recession while addressing 
deep problematic fiscal imbalances which called for austerity measures. The 
inflation – growth debate is still ongoing though at the moment the focus has 
again clearly shifted towards growth, while inflation has most probably peaked 
in most ways that burden the consumers and producers of the world. Amidst 
these diverging and powerful effects Emerging Markets have shown 
tremendous resilience and have minimized the contagion effect from DM to 
EM. Policy has remained accommodative in EM for the longest of periods, 
without triggering destructive inflation spirals. The crisis has brought about a 
new trend in policy setting in both DM and EM. Faced with the limitations of 
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traditional monetary policy easing via lowering rates, major DMs have 
embarked in Quantitative Easing (QE) which involves amongst other 
measures the enlargement of the CBs balance sheet in order to provide 
further liquidity to the markets while keeping policy rates low for a long period 
of time. Emerging Markets, faced with the liquidity waves from the DM QE 
policies reacted with renewed intervention in FX markets and embarked 
themselves in Quantitative Tightening (QT). Amongst other measures, QT 
involves a number of macro-prudential policies that allow policy makers to 
target specific aspects of the economy and avoid traditional economy wide 
monetary tightening measures that would risk hurting economic growth. The 
jury is still out on the full assessment of the success of such policies. And we 
are in uncharted territory in terms of global dynamics.  
Times like this offer themselves for a host of research projects many of 
which could further expand our work here. We have found that all the 
explanatory variables included in both models remained very relevant 
throughout the crisis and this suggests that the models still apply in many 
ways that are useful. It would however be very interesting to apply both 
modeling exercises to more recent data and further test our understanding. A 
very interesting idea in light of recent developments would be to apply the 
models created and presented in this thesis to developed markets. We 
believe that the recent crisis has triggered a very interesting change of rules 
whereby DM face risks and adopt policies that have been traditionally linked 
to EM and EM have developed to act and be treated more like the DMs of the 
world.  And of course one can always try and expand the usability of the 
models we have created and attempt to link the results to new markets. In 
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summary we find that we have created two quantitative products that serve 
well their purpose of assisting the understanding of complicated financial 
markets, allow the overlay of objective statistical findings and subjective end 
users’ perceptions and in essence provide useful tools to investors, 
academics and policy makers alike. This was the purpose of our research to 
begin with. Future research will hopefully build on these findings and expand 
on our work in ways that will further assist the understanding of markets. n the 
words of George E.P.Box, whose name is associated with significant 
statistical breakthroughs like the Box-Jenkins model and the Box-Cox 
transformations: “Essentially, all models are wrong, but some are useful.” 
What we set out to do in the research presented in this thesis is to create 
models that are indeed useful and are also fund to be right in a number of 
important aspects.  
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